Implied terms in contract: only one question to ask | Practical Law

Implied terms in contract: only one question to ask | Practical Law

The Privy Council has clarified the test that a court should use when it is asked to decide whether a term needs to be implied into a contract or other instrument to reflect the parties' intentions.

Implied terms in contract: only one question to ask

Practical Law UK Legal Update 4-385-9968 (Approx. 3 pages)

Implied terms in contract: only one question to ask

by Angeline Welsh and Alistair Robertson, Allen & Overy LLP
Published on 24 Apr 2009United Kingdom
The Privy Council has clarified the test that a court should use when it is asked to decide whether a term needs to be implied into a contract or other instrument to reflect the parties' intentions.
The Privy Council has clarified the test that a court should use when it is asked to decide whether a term needs to be implied into a contract or other instrument to reflect the parties' intentions (Attorney General & Ors v Belize Telecom Ltd & Anor [2009] UKPC 10) (see box "What is an implied term?"). Although the judgment is not binding on English courts, it was decided on the basis of English authority and is highly persuasive, so is likely to be followed.

The case

Ecom Limited, a Belizean company, appealed to the Privy Council about the construction of the articles of association of the former major telecommunications provider in Belize, Belize Telecommunications Limited (BTL).
The articles provided that, if a person held both a golden share plus a certain number of ordinary shares in BTL, then that person could appoint or remove two directors. The articles were silent as to what happened to the two directors if, as happened in this case, the golden shareholder ceased to hold the requisite ordinary shares.

The decision

The Privy Council agreed with Ecom Limited that a term needed to be implied to avoid defeating what appeared to have been the overriding purpose of the machinery of appointment and removal of directors in the articles. In addition, and obiter, the Privy Council:
  • Condensed the various formulations set out in earlier case law for implying a term into a contract into one objective question: is that what the instrument, read as a whole against the relevant background, would reasonably be understood to mean?
  • Provided important guidance on the extent to which background material could be relied on when construing articles of association.

Practical impact

The Privy Council was concerned that the previous formulations of the test for implying a term should not be allowed to take on an independent life of their own and lead the court away from an objective test. For example, the formulation that the term must "go without saying" might lead to subjective considerations wrongly creeping into the test: that is, how the actual parties would view the proposed implied term. Or the formulation "necessary to give business efficacy" might lead to the court looking at what works perfectly well for the parties rather than what the reasonable person would have understood the contract to mean.
The restatement of the test has reinforced the objective approach and means that parties need only consider one test, rather than attempt to tackle several at the same time, providing greater certainty.
Of course, litigation over the existence or otherwise of an implied term in a contract is never certain and is fact-specific. By far the best way to ensure contractual certainty is, when drafting the contract, to consider carefully as many potential events as possible and deal with them expressly in the contract.
However, if an unexpected situation arises and the parties to the contract disagree on what the consequences of that situation should be, then the answer lies in what the reasonable man would have understood the contract to say the consequences should be.
The judgment also has potentially important ramifications for the interpretation of articles of association. Articles have been interpreted differently from other contractual instruments because they represent a contract between shareholders who, unlike parties to other contracts, do not negotiate and agree terms before entering into a contract. Rather, they commit to the terms of the articles as they appear in the public registry. For that reason, there was previously some uncertainty as to the extent to which, if at all, the court could look outside the four corners of the articles to interpret them.
This judgment, however, says that one can use extrinsic facts to construe the articles, but that admissible background information must be limited to what any reader would reasonably be supposed to know. Previous case law suggesting that no reference could be made to the facts was distinguished on the basis that it related to facts known only to some of those involved in the formation of the company. Facts of that sort, the Privy Council reiterated, cannot be taken into account.
In practice, therefore, extrinsic facts that the court might take into account will be limited only to those obvious to everyone. For example, in this case, the extrinsic fact considered was one that would have been obvious to everyone in Belize, and in particular to every shareholder or potential shareholder in BTL: that telecoms in Belize had been a state monopoly and that BTL was part of a scheme of privatisation.
Angeline Welsh is a senior associate and Alistair Robertson is an associate in the litigation department of Allen & Overy LLP.
Allen & Overy LLP acted for Ecom Limited, the second appellant. The other appellants did not participate in the appeal.

What is an implied term?

Implied terms are terms that have not been expressly agreed by the parties but apply anyway. This may be because the parties have decided to record only the most important terms, leaving others to be understood, or because the parties have not considered that a particular situation would arise. The courts have traditionally implied a term into a contract by: usage and custom; previous course of dealings; intention of the parties; statute; and common law.