Once Categorically Supervisors, Tugboat Mates are Now Employees Covered by the NLRA: NLRB | Practical Law

Once Categorically Supervisors, Tugboat Mates are Now Employees Covered by the NLRA: NLRB | Practical Law

In Brusco Tug and Barge, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) held that tugboat mates were not supervisors within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) on the basis that they either assigned or responsibly directed other employees.

Once Categorically Supervisors, Tugboat Mates are Now Employees Covered by the NLRA: NLRB

by PLC Labor & Employment
Published on 05 Feb 2013USA (National/Federal)
In Brusco Tug and Barge, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) held that tugboat mates were not supervisors within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) on the basis that they either assigned or responsibly directed other employees.

Key Litigated Issues

In Brusco Tug and Barge, the key litigated issue that the NLRB considered was whether tugboat mates, whom the NLRB has traditionally considered supervisors excluded from the NLRA's coverage, were supervisors or employees under the NLRA.

Background

Brusco operates about 34 tugboats along the Pacific Coast and on the Columbia River out of a home port in Washington state. Ocean-bound tugboats are usually staffed by a crew of four consisting of:
  • A captain.
  • A mate.
  • An engineer.
  • A deckhand.
Crews work in rotations of about 30 days on and 30 days off. The mate is on watch from 12 to 6 a.m. and 12 to 6 p.m. The mate, who is also a Coast Guard licensed officer, steers the tugboat when the captain is off watch. On the mate’s watch, the mate is in charge. The mate's duties include:
  • In advance of the maneuvers of "making up a tow" or "docking a barge":
    • taking instruction from the captain as to how the captain wants the maneuvers done; and
    • passing that instruction on to the rest of the crew.
  • While "making up a tow" or "docking a barge," directing the deckhand:
    • where he should station himself;
    • where the tugboat lines will be placed, which lines to release and in what order;
    • which tools to take with him;
    • in "bringing the wire to the winch"; and
    • in which tow line to tie first when "hipping up" to the barge.
  • Deciding (during his watch) whether it is necessary to change the length of the towline.
  • Directing deckhands to run the winch.
  • Posting the deckhands to keep watch on the bow (in low-visibility situations).
  • Waking the captain if on his watch there is an:
    • emergency situation;
    • adverse weather; or
    • heavy traffic conditions.
  • Planning and conducting safety drills on board the tugboats.
  • Waking the engineer if he has any concern about the engine on his watch.
  • Adding tasks to the duty roster and determining staffing needs.
  • Acting as relief captain in the event the captain is off the vessel due to vacation or illness.
After a complicated procedural history, starting with a 1999 union petition for an election, in 2006 an NLRB regional director issued a decision holding that the mates were:
  • Not supervisors.
  • Properly included in a bargaining unit.
The employer petitioned the panel (Board) which heads the NLRB's judicial functions and which is primarily responsible for certifying election results to review the regional director's decision.

Outcome

In a 2-1 decision (Member Hayes dissented) in Brusco Tug and Barge dated December 14, 2012 but released January 24, 2013, a three-member panel of the Board affirmed the regional director’s finding that the tugboat mates are not supervisors within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the NLRA. Having conducted a "fact-intensive inquiry" the Board found that, based on the discrete facts of this case, the tugboat mates did not sufficiently assign or responsibly direct to be supervisors excluded from the NLRA's coverage.
In its analysis, the Board explained that, to establish that individuals are supervisors, an employer must show that the individuals:
  • Have authority to engage in any one of 12 enumerated supervisory functions.
  • Exercise their authority in one or more supervisory functions:
    • in more than a routine or clerical manner;
    • using independent judgment; and
    • "in the interest of the employer."
(Oakwood.)
The Board further explained that a party can prove the requisite supervisory authority either by demonstrating that the individuals:
  • Actually exercise a supervisory function.
  • Effectively recommend the exercise of a supervisory function.
(Oakwood.)
To exercise "independent judgment" an individual must at minimum act, or effectively recommend action, free of the control of others and form an opinion or evaluation by discerning and comparing data (Oakwood).
The Board disagreed with Brusco's assertion that the tugboat mates are supervisors based both on their:
  • Authority to assign other employees.
  • Responsibility to direct other employees.
The Board concluded that the mates did not have sufficient authority to assign other employees because the instructions that the mate gives to the deckhand:
  • Are "ad hoc" and do not involve:
    • designating an employee to a place or time; or
    • giving the employee significant overall duties.
  • Do not rise to the level of supervision.
The Board noted that under Oakwood, the Board found that responsible direction requires a finding that the person directing the performance of a task be held accountable for that task's performance. The Board majority dismissed Brusco's assertions that mates are accountable because, under Federal maritime law, they are responsible for their own actions and their crew's actions, whenever the captains are asleep or ill.
In his dissent, Member Hayes pointed out that under the majority's analysis, the tugboats have no supervision 12 out of every 24 hours and whenever a captain is on vacation or ill, even though federal maritime law requires tugboats to have accountable supervision at all times. Member Hayes believed that existing Board precedent holding that mates are supervisors should have controlled (see, e.g., Masters, Mates and Pilots Local 28.)

Practical Implications

The Board majority continues to maintain an expansive view of who is an employee (who can vote in a union election) and a reflexively narrow view of who is a supervisor. The majority effectively deemed all supervisory status determinations in pre-Oakwood cases unprecedential, even if the analysis in those cases is consistent with Oakwood and just written with different phrasing.
Employers should continue to support their arguments that certain persons are supervisors under NLRB precedent in which the Board found persons performing the same type of work, with the same job title and state or federal certification processes, to preserve those arguments for appellate review or review by Board that might take a different view in the future.
In light of this and other recent Board decisions about supervisory status, employers may have difficulties convincing the Board majority that categories of workers traditionally held by Board precedent to be supervisors are not employees covered by the NLRA and not eligible to vote for and join unions. However, if they are willing to consider obtaining appellate court review of the Board’s bargaining unit determinations by refusing to bargain, and then appealing the resulting adverse unfair labor practice (ULP) case decision, federal appellate courts have reversed the Board's recent views about supervisory status (see, for example, Legal Update, NLRB Disregarded Evidence in Finding Nurses Were Not Supervisors: Eleventh Circuit).
Employers may also consider taking advantage of the decisions finding persons traditionally held to be supervisors are employees, by:
  • Using the decisions to convince the NLRB that certain marginal supervisors (who align themselves with management) and are more likely to vote against union representation should be permitted to vote in union elections.
  • To the extent employers may be held accountable in ULP proceedings for the actions of their supervisors, use the decisions to defend against respondeat superior theories of ULP liability when a rogue marginal supervisor is alleged to have infringed on employees' Section 7 Rights to engage in union or other concerted protected activities.