Freeman sued his employer, PPG Auto Glass, in the district court for discrimination after he was fired. After discovery, the parties entered a binding arbitration agreement and chose an arbitrator who appeared on both parties' list of three potential arbitrators. When the parties first spoke with the arbitrator, she disclosed that she knew people at PPG and had taught a seminar with PPG's senior employment attorney.

After Freeman lost the arbitration, he filed a motion in district court to vacate the arbitral award and alleged that the arbitrator failed to disclose campaign contributions of US$4,500 from PPG when the arbitrator ran for the state supreme court. Freeman argued that the arbitrator was "evidently partial in violation of 9 USC § 10(a)(2)", among other claims. Freeman did not mention in his motion that the law firm representing him throughout the dispute also donated US$26,000 to the arbitrator during the same campaign. The district court denied the motion, finding that the "nondisclosures were immaterial and insubstantial".

Freeman appealed.

The US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the district court's decision. After addressing arguments on its jurisdiction and waiver of the bias challenge, the Court of Appeals explained that the standard for evident partiality is not the standard for disqualification of federal judges. The standard for federal judges includes the appearance of bias, but an arbitrator is "evidently partial only if a reasonable person would have to conclude that she was partial to one side". This requires more than a vague appearance of bias.

The court further explained that, in arbitration, unlike in court, parties choose the arbitrator and often choose industry insiders. The court reasoned that a strict bias standard would result in disqualification of some of the most qualified arbitrators and could deprive the parties of their choice of arbitrator when there is apparent bias. The court did explain, however, that the Federal Arbitration Act does not allow actual bias, and parties cannot "proceed in the face of actual bias". The same evident partiality standard applies regardless of whether a party is alleging non-disclosure by an arbitrator or actual bias.

Applying the evident partiality standard to the facts of the case, the court concluded that no reasonable person would think the arbitrator was partial to PPG, for the following reasons:

Based on these contributions, it would not be clear to a reasonable person which side the arbitrator was biased towards. The court also found that the fact that the arbitrator had taught a seminar with a PPG employee was not enough to show bias, because a professional relationship alone is not indicative of bias. Based on these facts, the court saw no reason to vacate the arbitral award.

This case demonstrates the application of the evident partiality standard in the Federal Arbitration Act and illustrates how it differs from the disqualification standard applicable to federal judges. Parties claiming bias in arbitration have to make a "stronger showing" to succeed.