Employee Interaction with Infringing Content May Disqualify a Service Provider from DMCA Safe Harbor: SDNY | Practical Law

Employee Interaction with Infringing Content May Disqualify a Service Provider from DMCA Safe Harbor: SDNY | Practical Law

In Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC d/b/a Vimeo.com, the US District Court for the Southern District of New York held, among other things, that a trier of fact could find that the interaction of an online service provider's employees with infringing content gives the provider actual or red flag knowledge of the infringing content sufficient to disqualify the provider from protection under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) 512(c) safe harbor.

Employee Interaction with Infringing Content May Disqualify a Service Provider from DMCA Safe Harbor: SDNY

by Practical Law Intellectual Property & Technology
Published on 24 Sep 2013USA (National/Federal)
In Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC d/b/a Vimeo.com, the US District Court for the Southern District of New York held, among other things, that a trier of fact could find that the interaction of an online service provider's employees with infringing content gives the provider actual or red flag knowledge of the infringing content sufficient to disqualify the provider from protection under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) 512(c) safe harbor.
On September 18, 2013, the US District Court for the Southern District of New York issued an opinion in Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC d/b/a Vimeo.com, a copyright infringement action based on videos containing plaintiffs' copyrighted music that were uploaded to defendant Vimeo's website. The court granted in part Vimeo's motion for summary judgment, finding Vimeo was entitled to safe harbor protection under section 512(c) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) for 144 of the uploaded videos, except for any videos containing pre-1972 sound recordings. The court denied summary judgment for 55 uploaded videos, finding there were triable questions of fact on whether:
  • Vimeo acquired actual or red flag knowledge of the infringing content when its employees interacted with those videos.
  • Ten videos uploaded by Vimeo employees were "stored at the direction of a user" as required by the 512(c) safe harbor.
Finally, the court found that safe harbor protection did not extend to sound recordings recorded before 1972 and granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the videos containing pre-1972 sound recordings.

Background

Defendant Vimeo owns and operates a website where users can upload, share and view original videos. In December 2009, record and music publishing companies Capitol Records, LLC, EMI Blackwood Music, Inc. and a host of other record companies (collectively Capitol) filed complaints against Vimeo alleging direct, contributory and vicarious copyright infringement for 199 uploaded videos that contained the plaintiffs' copyrighted music. Vimeo moved for summary judgment, asserting it was entitled to safe harbor protection under section 512(c) of the DMCA. Capitol cross-moved for partial summary judgment claiming that Vimeo was ineligible for safe harbor protection for any videos that contained pre-1972 sound recordings.

Outcome

In a lengthy decision, the court determined that:
  • Vimeo was entitled to section 512(c) safe harbor protection, and summary judgment, on 144 of the videos at issue, except for videos containing pre-1972 sound recordings.
  • Vimeo was not entitled to summary judgment for 55 of the videos, find that triable issues existed on:
    • whether ten videos uploaded by Vimeo employees were "stored at the direction of a user" as required by the 512(c) safe harbor; and
    • whether Vimeo had actual or red flag knowledge of the infringing content of 55 videos with which Vimeo employees interacted, so as to disqualify Vimeo for safe harbor protection regarding those videos.
  • Capitol was entitled to summary judgment that videos containing pre-1972 sound recordings do not quality for safe harbor protection.

DMCA Threshold Issues

The court began by noting that the various DMCA safe harbors shield service providers from claims of copyright infringement. To qualify for protection under any DMCA safe harbor, including the section 512(c) safe harbor, a party must establish that it meets three threshold criteria:
  • It must be a service provider as defined by the statute.
  • It must have adopted a policy for the termination of repeat infringers, informed users of the policy and reasonably implemented the policy.
  • It must not interfere with standard technical measures used by copyright owners to identify or protect copyrighted works.
Here, the court determined that Vimeo met all three criteria because:
  • It was a service provider within the expansive definition of the statute because it was a provider of online services that hosts and distributes user material by permitting users to upload, share and view videos.
  • It adopted, informed users of and reasonably implemented a repeat infringer policy when it, among other things:
    • required users to agree to its Terms of Service including agreeing that they would not use the service to upload or otherwise make available any content that infringed any patent, trademark, trade secret or copyright right;
    • informed users in its Terms of Service that it reserved the right to remove videos and user accounts for violations of the Terms; and
    • terminated the accounts of infringing users.
  • Capitol's claim that Vimeo's privacy settings thwart copyright owners from collecting information needed to send a takedown notice was insufficient evidence to prove that Vimeo interferes with standard technical measures.

512(c) Safe Harbor Requirements

After determining that Vimeo met the threshold requirements for safe harbor protection, the court considered whether Vimeo met the specific requirements for section 512(c) safe harbor protection. Capitol argued that Vimeo did not meet the requirements because:
  • The infringing content in the videos was not "by reason of the storage at the direction of a user."
  • Vimeo had actual or red flag knowledge of infringement, or was willfully blind to it.
  • Vimeo had the right and ability to control the infringement and financially benefitted from it.
  • Vimeo did not expeditiously remove infringing material.

Storage at the Direction of a User

Taking each allegation in turn, the court first addressed whether certain videos uploaded by Vimeo employees were "stored at the direction of a user." It was undisputed that ten of the 199 videos at issue in the suit were uploaded by individuals who were or became Vimeo employees. Capitol argued that Vimeo employees served as an editorial voice for the site and pointed out that the web pages displaying the videos indicated that the video was posted by a Vimeo employee. As a result, Capitol argued, the ten employee-uploaded videos could not be characterized as being "stored at the direction of a user" but instead were at the direction of Vimeo through common law agency principles. The court found that based on the existing evidence it was unclear whether the employees were storing the videos in their capacity as Vimeo employees or as "users" within the meaning of the statute and therefore a triable issue of fact had been raised precluding summary judgment for Vimeo on those videos.
Capitol also argued that because Vimeo permits users to download videos on the website, that it does not provide "storage" under § 512(c). The court rejected this argument because Capitol could not point to any case law that held or suggested that a service provider must be denied DMCA protection if it allowed users to download content.

Knowledge of Infringement

Capitol claimed that Vimeo had actual or red flag knowledge of infringement because Vimeo employees:
  • Entered comments on the designated web pages of some of the videos at issue.
  • "Liked" some of the videos by clicking a "like" button.
  • Placed some videos on channels.
  • Whitelisted some videos by disabling a function that allows users to flag a video the user believes to violate Vimeo's Terms of Service.
  • Buried some of the videos by preventing them from appearing on the website's Discovery page.
  • Reviewed some uploaded videos in user's paid accounts.
Specifically, employees interacted in the above ways with 55 of the videos at issue, which all featured plaintiffs' copyrighted music. Capitol argued that these interactions were evidence that Vimeo had actual or red flag knowledge of infringement. While the court declined to hold that these interactions automatically compelled the conclusion that Vimeo, through its employees, was aware of facts and circumstances that would make it objectively obvious to a reasonably person that the videos were infringing, the court also declined to accept Vimeo's argument that it met its burden of proving it did not have actual or red flag knowledge. The court found that there was a triable issue of fact on whether the employee interactions with the 55 videos constituted actual or red flag knowledge, and denied summary judgment as to those videos.
Capitol also argued that Vimeo should not be protected by the safe harbor because it engaged in willful blindness, and pointed to deposition testimony where Vimeo employees referenced ignoring videos containing copyrighted music. While the court acknowledged that the willful blindness doctrine may be applied in appropriate circumstances to demonstrate knowledge or awareness of specific instances of infringement under the DMCA, it rejected Capitol's arguments because the examples it cited to did not relate to the videos in suit.

Right and Ability to Control the Infringement

The court next noted that to obtain safe harbor protection a service provider must not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity.
Capitol argued that Vimeo had a monitoring program that it used to enforce the content restrictions and communicate with users regarding content and policy questions. Although there was evidence that Vimeo employees communicated with users and suggested at times that it would tolerate the uploading of copyrighted material, the court found that the monitoring program did not in practice exert substantial influence over the content of the uploaded material.
Capitol also argued that Vimeo had substantial influence over users' activities by its inducement of infringement, specifically that:
  • Vimeo induced infringement by example by making videos that incorporate infringing content and by supporting and participating in group projects involving infringement.
  • Vimeo employees' communication with, and provision of technical assistance to, Vimeo users constituted inducement of infringement.
  • Vimeo's privacy settings induced infringement.
The court rejected each of these arguments, finding that Capitol pointed to limited anecdotal evidence which did not show that Vimeo had a substantial influence over user activities that was widespread and comprehensive.

Expeditious Removal of Infringing Videos

Lastly, the court noted that the 512(c) safe harbor provision requires the service provider to expeditiously remove infringing material upon notification of claimed infringement. On three occasions Capitol sent Vimeo takedown notices, and Vimeo removed the videos within three and a half weeks for the first notice and on the same day for the remaining two notices. The court found that the takedowns that occurred on the same day as Vimeo received the notices constituted expeditious removal. Likewise, the court found that three and a half weeks to comply with the first DMCA notice was also expeditious given that the notice identified approximately 170 videos to be removed.

Pre-1972 Recordings

The court found that Vimeo was not entitled to safe harbor protection on videos that contained pre-1972 copyrighted works. The court pointed to a 2011 Copyright Office Report that concluded that DMCA safe harbor protection does not apply to pre-1972 recordings because Congress has not chosen to extend the Copyright Act to pre-1972 sound recordings. Accordingly, the court awarded summary judgment to Capitol for those applicable videos.

Practical Implications

Companies operating websites that enable user-generated content should take note of the court’s discussion of the types of employee conduct that the court found may disqualify a service provider from 512(c) safe harbor protection and, in particular, that safe harbor protection may be unavailable where employees either:
  • Upload infringing content in the scope of their employment.
  • Interact with infringing content in a manner that provides the service provider with actual or red flag knowledge of the infringement.
Service providers should consider implementing those policies and procedures for permitted employee interaction with use-generated content and steps employees should take if content they interact with appears to contain infringing material.