On February 16, 2016, in Bechuck v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to place a re-filing restriction on a voluntarily dismissed claim without past vexatious behavior by the re-filing party ( (5th Cir. Feb. 16, 2016)).

In July 2014, Stephan Bechuck was injured when he fell from an allegedly defective chair located in the common area of a Home Depot store. Bechuck sued Home Depot in Texas state court, and Home Depot removed to the US District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Bechuck amended his complaint to add Advantage Sales & Marketing (ASM) as a party after learning that ASM was the distributor of the chair.

After a pretrial conference, the district court dismissed Bechuck's claims against Home Depot, but did not specify which rule it relied on for the dismissal. On the same day, Bechuck voluntarily dismissed his claims against ASM without prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 41(a)(1)(A)(i). The District Court later issued an order that:

Bechuck appealed, contending, among other things, that the district court erred by imposing the re-filing restriction on future suits against ASM and Home Depot.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to place any restrictions on the FRCP 41(a)(1)(A)(i) dismissal of ASM because once Bechuck moved to dismiss under this rule, the case was effectively terminated and the court had no power to attach any conditions to the dismissal. The Fifth Circuit recognized that a district court may use its inherent supervisory authority to consider collateral issues after an action ends, but clarified that these collateral issues are limited to orders remedying a wrong already committed, such as a history of vexatious filing. Because Bechuck had not displayed any pattern of vexatious filing and had committed no past wrongs to remedy, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to attach the re-filing restriction against ASM.

The Fifth Circuit also considered whether the court's dismissal of Home Depot was appealable. Although the district court's order was unclear, the court surmised that the district court dismissed Home Depot under FRCP 41(a)(2), which allows the court to dismiss a party at the plaintiff's request on terms the court considers proper. An FRCP 41(a)(2) dismissal is not ordinarily appealable because it is not normally considered an adverse judgment. However, a Rule 41(a)(2) order may be appealed when the plaintiff:

In a question of first impression, the Fifth Circuit held that the re-filing restriction by itself was legally prejudicial to Bechuck because he effectively needed to convince the court of the worthiness of his claims before reopening his case against Home Depot. Further, Bechuck had objected to the re-filing restriction, making it clear he did not agree to it. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the voluntary dismissal in this case was appealable.