Iqbal’s Plausibility Requirement Applies to Title VII Complaints of Discrimination: Second Circuit | Practical Law

Iqbal’s Plausibility Requirement Applies to Title VII Complaints of Discrimination: Second Circuit | Practical Law

In Littlejohn v. City of New York, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that pleading requirements in the US Supreme Court's Ashcroft v. Iqbal decision, that a complaint contain facts stating a plausible claim, apply to Title VII employment discrimination complaints. The court also held that Iqbal's plausibility requirement does not affect the temporary presumption of discriminatory motivation that benefits plaintiffs during the prima facie phase in employment discrimination cases under the so-called "McDonnell Douglas quartet" of cases.

Iqbal’s Plausibility Requirement Applies to Title VII Complaints of Discrimination: Second Circuit

by Practical Law Labor & Employment
Published on 11 Aug 2015 • USA (National/Federal)
In Littlejohn v. City of New York, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that pleading requirements in the US Supreme Court's Ashcroft v. Iqbal decision, that a complaint contain facts stating a plausible claim, apply to Title VII employment discrimination complaints. The court also held that Iqbal's plausibility requirement does not affect the temporary presumption of discriminatory motivation that benefits plaintiffs during the prima facie phase in employment discrimination cases under the so-called "McDonnell Douglas quartet" of cases.
On August 3, 2015, in Littlejohn v. City of New York, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that pleading requirements in the US Supreme Court's Ashcroft v. Iqbal decision, that a complaint contain facts stating a plausible claim, apply to Title VII employment discrimination complaints. The court also held that Iqbal's plausibility requirement does not affect the temporary presumption of discriminatory motivation that benefits plaintiffs during the prima facie phase in employment discrimination cases under the so-called "McDonnell Douglas quartet" of cases. The court vacated the district court's dismissal of a municipal employee's disparate treatment claim under Title VII, Section 1981 and Section 1983, finding that the employee's factual allegations sufficiently met the plausibility requirement. The court also vacated the district court's dismissal of the employee's retaliation claim, holding that when an employee actively supports other employees' assertion of their Title VII rights or personally complains or criticizes the employer's discriminatory employment practices, such activity is protected under the opposition clause of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision. (No. 14-1395-CV, (2d Cir. Aug. 3, 2015).)

Background

Dawn F. Littlejohn, an African-American woman, worked as the Director for the Equal Employment Opportunity Office of the New York City Administration for Children's Services (ACS). Beginning in December 2009, Littlejohn began to have difficulty with her supervisor, ACS Chief of Staff Amy Baker, who was white. Littlejohn alleged in her complaint that Baker:
  • Sought negative information about Littlejohn from another employee.
  • Physically distanced herself from Littlejohn at meetings.
  • Required Littlejohn to report to her twice a week instead of on an as-needed basis.
  • Unnecessarily reprimanded Littlejohn and displayed impatience and harshness with her.
  • Diminished her job duties.
  • Ultimately replaced her at meetings with a white employee.
In 2010, during a process in which ACS was merging with another city agency, Littlejohn complained to Baker and to ACS Commissioner John Mattingly, about their failure to follow anti-discrimination policies and procedures during the merger process. Littlejohn also complained about the lack of African-American employees in ACS management positions and about pay disparities between African-American and white employees. In 2011, Littlejohn was transferred to a different office within ACS, resulting in a demotion and pay cut. Littlejohn was replaced in the EEO office by a less-qualified white employee. In her new capacity, Littlejohn reported to an African-American male, Brandon Stradford, who Littlejohn claimed sexually harassed her.
In 2012, Littlejohn filed a racial discrimination charge with the EEOC. In 2013, after receiving a notice of right to sue from the EEOC, she filed a lawsuit in US District Court against the City of New York, Baker, Mattingly and Stradford alleging she was subjected to a hostile work environment and disparate treatment based on her race, and was retaliated against for complaining about discrimination, in violation of Title VII, Section 1981 and Section 1983. She also alleged she was sexually harassed in violation of Title VII. In 2014, the district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss all claims, finding that Littlejohn failed to:
  • Adequately plead her Title VII hostile work environment, disparate treatment and retaliation claims.
  • Exhaust her administrative remedies on her sexual harassment claim.
  • Allege personal responsibility by the individual defendants on her Section 1981 and 1983 claims.
Littlejohn appealed.

Outcome

The Second Circuit:
  • Vacated the district court's dismissal of Littlejohn's:
    • Title VII disparate treatment and retaliation claims;
    • Section 1981 and Section 1983 disparate treatment claim against Baker; and
    • Section 1981 retaliation claim against Baker.
  • Affirmed the dismissal of Littlejohn's other claims, including the sexual harassment and hostile work environment claims.
  • Held that:
    • the pleading requirement in the Supreme Court's Ashcroft v. Iqbal decision that a complaint contain facts stating a claim that is plausible on its face applies to Title VII employment discrimination complaints; and
    • Iqbal's plausibility requirement does not affect the temporary presumption of discriminatory motivation that benefits plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases under the so-called "McDonnell Douglas quartet" of cases.
The Second Circuit examined relevant US Supreme Court decisions addressing a plaintiff's prima facie case in employment discrimination cases, noting that:
  • McDonnell Douglas and three subsequent Supreme Court cases established relaxed prima facie requirements for a plaintiff alleging employment discrimination in which the plaintiff gains the benefit of a temporary presumption that the employer acted with discriminatory motives. At that point the burden of production shifts to the employer and the employer must then come forward with a non-discriminatory reason for taking an adverse employment action against the plaintiff. When the employer does so, the temporary presumption drops out and the plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer's non-discriminatory reason was not the actual reason. (McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000).)
  • The Supreme Court cases left unclear how much evidence a plaintiff needs to satisfy its initial burden and shift the burden of production to the employer, indicating that the burden was:
    • not onerous; and
    • minimal.
    (Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 506.)
  • Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A. held that McDonnell Douglas and its line of cases establishing the prima facie elements in employment discrimination cases were about "an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement." The Second Circuit understood Swierkiewicz as holding that a plaintiff is not required to plead facts supporting even a minimal inference of discriminatory intent. (534 U.S. 506 (2002).)
  • Ashcroft v. Iqbal, a case that did not involve employment discrimination, held that overcoming a motion to dismiss requires a complaint to contain sufficient facts to state a claim that is "plausible on its face” (556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
  • An open question remained as to whether Iqbal's plausibility requirement applies to Title VII cases within the McDonnell Douglas framework.
  • Iqbal was a broad ruling in which the Supreme Court gave no indication that it should not apply to McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework cases.
  • The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework is not incompatible with a requirement that a complaint contain sufficient facts to make its claim plausible.
The Second Circuit addressed the temporary presumption of discriminatory motivation from which a plaintiff benefits at the initial stage of an employment discrimination case. It also addressed the sufficiency of facts that need to be plead in a complaint based on Iqbal now that Iqbal was being held to apply to employment discrimination cases. The court noted that:
  • The temporary presumption:
    • reduces the facts needed to be pled under Iqbal; and
    • benefits the plaintiff in the complaint by giving the plaintiff a minimal burden to show discriminatory intent at the pleading stage of the case.
  • Iqbal does not require a plaintiff to allege facts in the complaint that give plausible support to the ultimate question of whether the adverse employment action was attributable to discrimination. Plaintiff is only required to allege facts in the complaint that give plausible support to a minimal inference of discriminatory motivation, given the reduced prima facie requirements under McDonnell Douglas.
  • Littlejohn's complaint alleged sufficient facts to make plausible her claim that her demotion occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory motivation by ACS. As a result, the district court's dismissal of Littlejohn's disparate treatment claim against the City under Title VII was unwarranted.
On the issue of which individual defendants must defend Littlejohn's disparate treatment claim, the Second Circuit found that Littlejohn's disparate treatment claims:
On Littlejohn's retaliation claim, the Second Circuit noted that:
Consistent with its analysis of Section 704(a) and the Crawford and Sumner opinions, the Second Circuit held that:
  • When an employee, as part of her job duties, reports or investigates other employees' complaints of discrimination, that by itself is not protected activity under Section 704(a)'s opposition clause.
  • When an employee (even an employee who has job responsibilities to investigate discrimination complaints) actively supports other employees' assertion of their Title VII rights or personally complains or criticizes the employer's discriminatory employment practices, such activity is protected under § 704(a)'s opposition clause.
The Second Circuit found that Littlejohn engaged in protected activity under the opposition clause by:
  • Repeatedly objecting and complaining to Baker and Mattingly about their failure to follow proper anti-discrimination policies and procedures in making personnel decisions during ACS's merger with another city agency.
  • Stepping outside her role as EEO Director to advocate for other minority employees.
The court also found that Littlejohn sufficiently plead a causal connection between her protected activity and the adverse employment action because her demotion closely followed her complaints about discrimination. As a result, the court vacated the dismissal of Littlejohn's retaliation claim against the City under Title VII and against Defendant Baker under Section 1981. The court dismissed Littlejohn's retaliation claim against Mattingly and Stradford, because neither individual was involved in her demotion.
On Littlejohn's remaining claims, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Littlejohn's:

Practical Implications

The Second Circuit's decision in Littlejohn confirms that Iqbal's plausibility standard applies to Title VII employment discrimination cases falling within the McDonnell Douglas framework. That standard aided Littlejohn in salvaging her disparate treatment claims but it remains to be seen how the standard will be applied in other cases, whether other circuits will fall in line with the Second Circuit on this issue, and also whether the US Supreme Court will ultimately weigh in.