PLC Global Finance update for February 2011: United States | Practical Law

PLC Global Finance update for February 2011: United States | Practical Law

The United States update for February 2011 for the PLC Global Finance multi-jurisdictional monthly e-mail.

PLC Global Finance update for February 2011: United States

Practical Law UK Articles 8-504-9257 (Approx. 6 pages)

PLC Global Finance update for February 2011: United States

by Shearman & Sterling LLP
Published on 28 Feb 2011USA (National/Federal)
The United States update for February 2011 for the PLC Global Finance multi-jurisdictional monthly e-mail.

New "contingent capital" requirements of Basel III

Gregg L. Rozansky and Hilary Allen
On 13 January 2011, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision finalised new requirements for preferred stock and debt instruments to qualify as regulatory capital for internationally active banks under the new "Basel III" capital and liquidity standards. Under the requirements, so-called non-common stock Tier 1 and any Tier 2 capital instruments would need to incorporate an untested "write down" or conversion feature intended to ensure that their holders would incur any losses before taxpayers and other creditors.
Basel III is scheduled to be implemented into law in each of the United States and the European Union by 1 January 2013. Banks and securities market participants should pay close attention to the Basel III rulemaking process in important jurisdictions, as Basel Committee member nations determine how to translate the new standards into law.

Background

In response to the financial crisis, the Basel Committee (an international supervisory group with members from 27 countries) undertook "Basel II" to raise and tighten minimum bank capital requirements under the existing international bank capital accord. The Basel Committee released a near final version of its amendments to Basel II, referred to as Basel III, in December 2010. The December release, "Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems", set out a list of several requirements that capital instruments would need to meet in order to qualify as non-common or so-called Additional Tier 1 (generally speaking, perpetual preferred stock and debt instruments), and/or Tier 2 (mainly subordinated debt) capital.
On 13 January 2011, the Basel Committee issued a statement describing the further requirement addressed in this article, which the Basel Committee referred to as "minimum requirements to ensure loss absorbency at the point of non-viability" and characterised as a "final element" of Basel III. While the Committee did not use the specific term "contingent capital" to describe the requirement, the term has been attached to the proposal as its requires capital instruments to be automatically converted into equity or written down, when a predetermined "trigger event" occurs (for example; the hallmark characteristic of a "contingent capital" instrument).

The new “loss absorbency” requirement

Under the new "loss absorbency" requirement, all Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments would either need to:
  • Contractually incorporate a mandatory write-down or conversion into common equity feature.
  • If certain conditions are met, be subject to a statutory regime that produces the same outcome as the contractual approach.
Whether required by contract or national law, the instruments would have to be either written off or converted into common equity upon the occurrence of a "trigger event2. Basel III grants national supervisors with the exclusive authority to call a "trigger event" for these instruments (rather than, for example, a market- or capital-ratio-based trigger approach).
More specifically, a trigger event is the earlier decision by a home country regulator of the bank issuer of the capital instrument:
  • To write off the instrument, under circumstances where the bank would no longer be viable (or solvent) as a going concern without such write-off.
  • To make a public sector injection of capital, or equivalent support, without which the bank would have become non-viable.
The Basel III "loss absorbency" requirement is specifically designed to ensure that holders of Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments would fully absorb losses before taxpayers in the event government assistance is provided to the issuing bank. In these cases, holders could either lose the entire value of their investment (for example, a write-off) or, alternatively, receive some amount of common stock of the bank or the bank's parent company (for example, a conversion and recapitalisation of the bank). Whether the instrument would be written off or converted into common stock would depend either upon the terms and conditions of the instrument and/or the applicable law of the home country of the bank. In cases where the holder receives common stock for the instrument, the stock must be issued prior to any public sector injection of capital in order to ensure that the government’s interests are not diluted by the conversion.
As noted above, the scheduled date for implementation of Basel III is 1 January 2013. In this regard, Basel III specifically requires:
  • Capital instruments issued on or after that date to conform with all of the eligibility requirements for regulatory capital treatment (including the "loss absorbency" requirement).
  • Existing Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments that do not conform to be phased out over a 10 year period, with 90% recognition of such instruments commencing 1 January 2013, 80% recognition commencing 1 January 2014, 70% recognition commencing 1 January 2015, and so on.
As a practical matter, this means that Basel III requires existing "hybrid" instruments (preferred stock and debt) issued by internationally active banks to be phased out as regulatory capital over time by 2023, unless the terms/conditions of such instruments are modified as necessary in order to ensure their conformance with the "loss absorbency" requirement.

Open questions for national/regional implementation

Basel member states, such as the US and the European Union, have pledged to apply the Basel III framework in their respective countries. Nonetheless, since Basel III is not legally binding in any jurisdiction, the precise manner in which the new standards will be applied in member states will be determined through future regional and national rulemaking. The fact that there is not yet an established market or proven legal framework for securities with the required "loss absorbency" feature, coupled with the fact that the new requirement leaves several issues open to national interpretation, suggests that there will almost certainly be regional variation in its adoption. For example, variations in the implementation of the requirement may reflect differing national and regional laws and attitudes towards:
  • Protections afforded to common stock owners against the dilution of their shares.
  • Rights of creditors to receive compensation for their interests.
  • Use of taxpayer funds to rescue an operating bank (for example, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act generally restricts the US government from using taxpayer funds to rescue a bank unless government assistance is provided on a system-wide basis).
The following aspects of the Basel III "loss absorbency" requirement appear particularly likely to be subject to some national/regional variation:
  • The type of public assistance to banks that would be considered a “public sector injection of capital, or equivalent support” which would trigger a “write off” or conversion.
  • The standard that would be used for identifying "internationally active" banks subject to the "loss absorbency" requirement.
  • Whether the "loss absorbency" requirement would be implemented through a nation's statutory resolution regime or be used as a tool to avoid resolution/liquidation.
  • To the extent a trigger event is called and the Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments are converted into common equity, the mechanism and time by which the conversion rate will be determined.

Conclusion

The Basel III "loss absorbency" requirement raises numerous complicated questions that will need to be addressed by Basel Committee members from both a practical and legal standpoint. For example, implications of the requirement will need to be evaluated from both a financial markets perspective and from the perspective of existing tax laws, accounting treatment, bankruptcy laws, corporate laws, and banking laws. As a consequence, it will almost certainly take some time and effort to create sufficient confidence in the legal treatment and marketability of Basel III-compliant Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments before any sizeable market in them will form.

SEC finalises rules on say-on-pay voting

Amy B. Gitlitz and Doreen E. Lillienfeld
On 25 January 2011, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued final rules implementing the say-on-pay provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.
The Dodd-Frank Act requires:
  • A non-binding shareholder vote on executive compensation at least once every three years.
  • A non-binding shareholder vote on the frequency of the say-on-pay vote.
  • Disclosure of "golden parachute" arrangements in connection with specified change-in-control transactions.
  • A non-binding shareholder vote on golden parachute arrangements in connection with these change-in-control transactions.
In October 2010, the SEC issued proposed rules implementing these provisions. The final rules are largely consistent with the proposed rules. The following summarises the key provisions of the final rules.

Say-on-pay vote

The say-on-pay vote covers the compensation of the issuer's named executive officers as disclosed in the annual proxy statement. The final rules did not specify the format or wording for the proposal; however, the resolution must clearly indicate that the say-on-pay vote is to approve the compensation of executives, as disclosed pursuant to Item 402 of Regulation S-K. The final rules do provide an example of a compliant resolution. In addition, issuers must:
  • Disclose that they are holding a separate shareholder vote on executive compensation.
  • Briefly explain the general effect of the vote.
  • Disclose the current frequency of the vote and when the next frequency vote will be held. The rules clarify that the say-on-pay vote is required at least once every three “calendar” years.

Say-on-pay frequency vote

The final rules also did not specify the format or wording for the frequency vote, but do require issuers to:
  • State that they are holding a separate shareholder advisory vote on the frequency of the say-on-pay vote.
  • Briefly explain the general effect of the vote.
  • Disclose the current frequency of the vote and when the next frequency vote will be held.
If an issuer's board of directors includes a recommendation on the frequency of the vote, the proxy statement must clearly state that shareholders are voting to approve the actual frequency and not the board of directors' recommendation. The proposed rules specify a format for the proxy card with respect to the frequency vote.

Additional say-on-pay matters

  • Say-on-pay and frequency votes are only required at annual or special meetings at which directors are to be elected.
  • Issuers are required to address in their subsequent proxy statement whether and, if so, how their compensation policies and decisions have taken into account the results of the most recent say-on-pay vote.
  • Issuers may vote uninstructed proxies in accordance with management's recommendation on the frequency vote only if they:
    • include a recommendation for the frequency vote;
    • permit abstentions on the proxy card; and
    • include language as to how uninstructed shares will be voted.
  • Issuers must disclose their decision as to how frequently they will conduct their say-on-pay votes on an amendment to the Form 8-K, disclosing the results of the frequency vote. The amendment must be filed within 150 calendar days following the meeting, but in no event later than 60 calendar days prior to the deadline for submitting shareholder proposals for the next annual meeting.
  • TARP entities and foreign private issuers are exempted from the say-on-pay and frequency votes.
  • Say-on-pay and frequency votes are executive compensation matters and brokers therefore may not vote uninstructed shares on these matters.

Disclosure of golden parachutes

Proposed new Item 402(t) to Regulation S-K specifies a tabular format for the golden parachute disclosure. The aggregate dollar values of the following elements of compensation separately must be quantified in the seven columns of the table:
  • Cash severance payments.
  • Stock awards for which vesting is accelerated; in-the-money stock options for which vesting is accelerated; and cash payments made upon cancellation of stock and option awards.
  • Pension and nonqualified deferred compensation benefit enhancements.
  • Perquisites and other personal benefits (for example, health and welfare), even if de minimis.
  • Tax gross-ups.
  • Other compensation.
  • The total amount payable in connection with the transaction.
Issuers may add additional columns or rows to the table to distinguish forms of compensation as long as the disclosure is not misleading. The disclosure is required with respect to all named executive officers in the most recent SEC filing, although issuers are permitted to add additional officers. The disclosure is required for all initial filings made on or after 25 April 2011.
The Item 402(t) table is to be accompanied by narrative and footnote disclosure describing:
  • Any material conditions or obligations to receipt, including restrictive covenants.
  • The specific circumstances that trigger payment.
  • Whether the payments will be made in a lump sum or instalments, and the duration of the payments.
  • What party will make the payments.
  • Any other material factors.
This disclosure is required in proxy and consent solicitations, registration statements on Forms S-4 and F-4, going private transactions, third-party tender offers and similar transactions. If the target company is a foreign private issuer, no disclosure is required.

Vote on golden parachutes

The golden parachute vote is only applicable for proxy and consent solicitations and not the additional transactions described above. Moreover, the vote is only required when the actual transaction is up for approval, as opposed to other proposals in connection with transaction (for example; an increase in the number of shares or a reverse stock split). The vote is required for all initial filings on and after 25 April 2011.
Compensation and arrangements are not subject to the golden parachute vote if they were subject to a prior general say-on-pay vote. In order to take advantage of this exemption, an issuer must have voluntarily included disclosure regarding the change-in-control arrangements in its annual meeting proxy statement in accordance with Item 402(t). In the event that compensation arrangements that were not subject to a prior say-on-pay vote were in place at the time of a transaction, issuers would need to segregate the required disclosure into two tables meeting the requirements of Item 402(t) showing the total amounts payable under all arrangements and just those amounts payable under new arrangements subject to the current vote. The final rules clarified that changes in compensation previously approved:
  • To reflect price movement in the issuer’s common stock.
  • That result in a reduction in the value of the total compensation will not trigger a new advisory vote.
Subsequent changes in compensation due to the addition of a new named executive officer, additional equity grants and salary increases must be subject to the golden parachute vote.
Additional information regarding the final rules can be found here.