PLC Global Finance update for January 2010: Germany | Practical Law

PLC Global Finance update for January 2010: Germany | Practical Law

The Germany update for January 2010 for the PLC Global Finance multi-jurisdictional monthly e-mail.

PLC Global Finance update for January 2010: Germany

Practical Law UK Articles 7-501-2985 (Approx. 6 pages)

PLC Global Finance update for January 2010: Germany

by Simmons & Simmons
Published on 26 Jan 2010Germany
The Germany update for January 2010 for the PLC Global Finance multi-jurisdictional monthly e-mail.

Review of 2009/What to expect in 2010

The financial markets in Germany 2009 and outlook for 2010

Reinhard Bunjes and Sandra Pfister
State of the German economy and financial markets
Like many other countries, Germany has had a very difficult 2009. Statistics show that the German GDP shrunk by 5% over the course of the year (the largest decrease since WWII), although the situation stabilised towards the end of the year.
German stock markets started rather weak in 2009 after a serious downturn in the second half of 2008 in response to the Lehman insolvency. Beginning the year at 4,856.85 points, the German DAX (which tracks the price development of the 30 largest and most actively traded German equities) reached a three-year low in March 2009 at 3,666.41 points, but rebounded to more than 6,000 points before the 2009 year-end.
The difficult conditions on the stock markets made conditions unattractive for IPOs and new share issues and placements. Consequently, in 2009 no major IPO took place on the Frankfurt stock exchange, with the three most serious candidates, Hochtief Concessions, Unitymedia and Scan Energy, cancelling at the last moment because of market conditions. For several listed companies, new issues and placements proved unavoidable - not so much despite, but rather because of the financial crisis. So, firms like Infineon, Heidelberg Zement and Premiere issued new shares merely to stay in business.
Regulatory changes in the financial sector in 2009
The regulatory reform which was at the centre of attention in the first quarter of 2009 was the Financial Market Stabilisation Act (Act), which is aimed at stabilising the financial system.
  • The Act introduced tools to help financial institutions overcome the liquidity crisis by recapitalisations through:
  • The acquisition of shareholdings or silent partnerships in the institutions by a government-held institution.
  • Government-backed guarantees for debt instruments issued by the financial institutions.
  • The option of selling off risky securities.
The financial aid available under the Act was capped at EUR480 billion. However, this amount has not been used in full. While most financial institutions that had been hesitant at the start to file for help under the Act slowly started to come around in early 2009, the financial support actually granted by the responsible special fund (SoFFin) only reached about half of the available maximum amount, almost all of this in the form of government-backed guarantees for debt instruments.
Furthermore, a major part of the support had to be used to stabilise a single bank, Hypo Real Estate (HRE). The situation of HRE appeared so critical that the German federal government decided to find a way to take over all shares in HRE. Ultimately, this lead to legislation allowing for disownment of shareholders - the so-called "Rescue Takeover Act" (Rettungsübernahmegesetz). This legislation was an unprecedented step and subject to intense discussion but finally was adopted in March 2009.
Filing for support by SoFFin is purely voluntary, and it comes at a price. Financial institutions accepting support must:
  • Compensate SoFFin in line with market standards for recapitalisations and guarantees.
  • Accept supervision of their business management. and
  • (Possibly) reduce or forsake certain business risks or dealings in specific products or markets.
Furthermore, compensation of the individual members of the financial institutions' corporate bodies had to be limited to EUR500,000 at most.
Support measures for financial institutions also comprised a bad bank scheme which was initiated in July 2009. This scheme allows banks and other financial institutions to offload specific "toxic" assets, so relieving future pressures on their equity. In consideration for the transfer of those assets to special purpose vehicles, the vehicles will issue bonds to the transferring entity backed by the transferred assets, and these bonds may be eligible for guarantees from SoFFin.
Even after the relevant legislation had been passed, bad banks had a slow start in Germany. As of today, only one bank, WestLB, actually has started to establish one, and the support this would mean for WestLB is currently under review by the European Commission. In addition, on 20 January 2010, HRE filed for the establishment of a huge bad bank into which it is proposing to off-load EUR210 billion worth of toxic assets.
Even apart from financial support for financial institutions, legislative measures in respect of financial institutions on the national (that is, non-European) level were mostly triggered by the financial crisis. As a reaction to reports on misleading or incomplete investment advice, an act passed by the German parliament in July 2009 aims at improving the enforceability of claims by investors arising from such misleading or incomplete advice. The key component of this act is a new requirement for institutions to prepare a detailed written report of the investment advice they provide to their retail clients. This must be signed by the person providing the advice and be sent to the client before entering into any business trade based on the advice. The client may waive this requirement if the conversation takes place on the telephone and demand immediate execution of his orders and in this case the bank must send the report immediately after executing the trade.
Outlook – additional regulatory reform
The financial crisis is likely to continue to be the driving force for legislation on the financial markets in Germany in 2010. For example, the German Government is expected to transfer the recommendations of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) on compensation standards into national law in the first half of 2010.
Driven by the impression that bonuses paid by banks to their managers and investment staff had been partly responsible for the crisis on the financial markets, the FSB had made certain recommendations on the design of compensation schemes. These recommendations are aimed, in particular, at the compensation of staff who are in a position to expose the company to high risks (so-called "risk-takers"). These recommendations include that:
  • The relationship between fixed and variable compensation should be reasonable while maintaining the role of variable compensation as an incentive.
  • Variable compensation should not only depend on the person's contribution but also on the institution's overall success.
  • Depending on the person's position in the institution and their tasks, a substantial share of the variable compensation should depend on the sustained development of the institution and be paid out over a period of three years.
With the economic situation appearing to be slowly recovering, the times for special measures at the national level may come to an end in 2010. This leaves room for the implementation of European legislation such as the proposed Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers. Itself a reaction to the financial markets crisis, this Directive aims at putting managers of funds that are not harmonised under comprehensive supervision and is specially directed towards hedge funds. This Directive is still in discussion and may not enter into force before 2011.
Although further regulatory reactions to the financial crisis will be discussed both at the European and the domestic German level, it is as yet unclear where such discussions will lead.

Financial institutions

Compensation standards for credit institutions and financial services providers in Germany

Reinhard Bunjes and Jochen Kindermann
The Circular
Following development by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) of the Principles of Sound Compensation Packages (Principles) during the course of the G20 summit in 2009, on 21 December 2009, the German Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht) (BaFin) published its Circular 22/2009 concerning regulatory requirements for compensation systems of credit institutions (Kreditinstitute) and financial services providers (Finanzdienstleistungsinstitute) (Circular).
The provisions of the Circular apply to credit institutions and financial services providers as defined in section 1(1b) of the German Banking Act (Kreditwesengesetz) (KWG) and branch offices of non-EEA domiciled institutions that conduct banking business or provide financial services in Germany (section 53(1,) KWG) – collectively, the "relevant institutions". The requirements stipulated in the Circular apply to the entire group of companies and as such the Circular may be applicable worldwide in some cases.
The Circular stipulates requirements in respect of the organisation of remuneration paid to certain employees and members of governing bodies and takes a "risk based approach" which is mostly consistent with the previously issued minimum requirements for risk management (Mindestanforderungen an das Risikomanagement) (MaRisk) published 14 August 2009. Above all, the provisions set out in the Circular are aimed at creating a system of effective risk management and so preventing a relevant institution from creating compensation systems that expose it to disproportionately higher risks. This includes:
  • Compensation schemes for staff engaged in finance and risk controlling may not be based on the same parameters as the compensation schemes controlled by these persons as any such parallel parameters may result in conflicts of interest.
  • Moreover, the Circular requires significant relevant institutions to place greater emphasis on variable compensation paid to senior executives (including members of the management) and other employees whose actions have a material impact on the risk exposure of the relevant institution (that is, individuals who, as a result of their seniority, authority to sign on behalf of the relevant institution and/or nature of their occupation, are able to expose a relevant institution to high risk, such as securities dealers, investment bankers and so on (risk-takers)).
    In respect of risk-takers, the significant relevant institution must ensure that the compensation system for those persons is designed such that:
    • while maintaining a variable compensation component as an effective incentive mechanism, it is ensured that the proportion between fixed and variable compensation is reasonable;
    • guaranteed variable compensation components are only allowed during the first year of employment;
    • variable compensation components are not just dependent on the risk-taker's individual success, but also on the overall success of the significant relevant institution;
    • depending on the risk-taker's position and its assigned tasks within the relevant institution, at least 50% of the variable compensation must be tied into the sustainable growth of the significant relevant institution (for example by including stock compensation);
    • depending on the risk-taker's position and their assigned tasks within the relevant institution, at least 40% of the variable compensation may only be paid out over a period of three years, with actual payment depending on the sustainability of the risk-taker's contribution to the significant relevant institution's success;
    • negative contributions to success (penalties) become relevant and so, in certain circumstances, result in variable compensation components being cut altogether.
  • Compensation schemes for significant relevant institutions must be put under the supervision of a compensation committee which will supervise the design and development of the schemes, identify deficiencies of the schemes and keep management updated on the scheme's performance.
The Draft Bill
On 15 January 2010, the German Ministry of Finance (Bundesministerium der Finanzen) issued a draft bill relating to the regulatory requirements for compensation schemes of credit institutions and insurance companies (Draft Bill). In line with BaFin's expectations that the Circular will not differ materially from the ultimate parliamentary act implementing the FSB Principles, the Draft Bill follows the provisions of the Circular while adding the following two propositions:
  • BaFin will be authorised, in part or in whole, to prohibit the payment of variable compensation components where the relevant institution's equity capital (Eigenmittel) or liquidity (Liquidität) is insufficient.
  • BaFin will further be authorized to take measures pursuant to section 45b KWG against the relevant institution; namely, require the affected relevant institution to increase its equity capital and/or to make amendments to the compensation scheme.

Reporting by financial leasing institutions of exposures in excess of EUR1 million

Sandra Pfister
On 7 December 2009, the German Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht) (BaFin) and the German Federal Reserve Bank (Bundesbank) (Reserve Bank) issued common guidelines on the calculation basis for reporting by financial leasing institutions of exposures in excess of EUR1 million (so-called "Millionenkreditmeldung" (notification).
Under the current regime, the exposure value for notifications is calculated based on (current calculation basis):
  • the (net) book value ((Rest)Buchwert) of the relevant leasing asset; plus
  • any specific provision (Einzelwertberichtigung); less
  • positions incurred as a result of the performance (Erfüllung) or disposal (Veräußerung) of leasing receivables.
However, based on Commission Directive 2009/83/EC of 27 July 2009 amending certain Annexes to Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions as regards technical provisions concerning risk management (Directive), commencing not later than 31 December 2010, the exposure value for notifications will be the present cash value of the discounted minimum lease payments ("Barwert der Mindestleasingzahlungen") ("CRD Amendment Directive calculation basis").
In anticipation of the amendments resulting from the Directive, BaFin and the Reserve Bank, in consultation with the Federal Ministry of Finance (Bundesministerium der Finanzen), have decided that for notification dates from 15 January 2010 onward, financial leasing institutions may chose whether they want to base notifications on the current calculation basis or the CRD Amendment Directive calculation basis. However, once a financial leasing institution has elected for one or the other calculation basis, it is obligated to continue to use that calculation basis for all four notification dates in 2010.