A type of judicial deference typically afforded to an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute that the agency is responsible for enforcing. The doctrine was articulated in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under Chevron, a reviewing court generally defers to an administrative agency's interpretation of the statute if:

For examples of how the courts apply Chevron deference, see Practice Note, Excepted Benefits and Legal Update, Federal Court Instructs EEOC to Reconsider Final ADA/GINA Wellness Regulations.

By contrast, administrative agency interpretations that are not the result of a formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking (for example, interpretations stated in opinion letters, technical releases, policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines) are less likely to receive Chevron deference (Christiansen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)).

In May 2023, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether it should overrule or clarify the extent to which deference is owed to administrative agencies (Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 143 S. Ct. 2429 (2023); see also 45 F.4th 359 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (upholding an administrative rule issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service requiring the fishing industry to fund an at-sea monitoring program in New England fisheries)). The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case in January 2024. The ruling could have important implications for practice areas, such as employee benefits and others, that are highly regulated by federal administrative agencies.