Federal Reserve Issues Report on Adoption of US Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) | Practical Law

Federal Reserve Issues Report on Adoption of US Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) | Practical Law

The Federal Reserve Board (FRB) issued a report on considerations related to potential issuance of a US central bank digital currency (CBDC). The report is the first step in the public discussion between the FRB and stakeholders regarding issuance of a US CBDC, though the FRB does not take a position in the report on whether or not it may issue a USD CBDC.

Federal Reserve Issues Report on Adoption of US Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC)

Practical Law Legal Update w-034-1976 (Approx. 6 pages)

Federal Reserve Issues Report on Adoption of US Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC)

by Practical Law Finance
Published on 24 Jan 2022USA (National/Federal)
The Federal Reserve Board (FRB) issued a report on considerations related to potential issuance of a US central bank digital currency (CBDC). The report is the first step in the public discussion between the FRB and stakeholders regarding issuance of a US CBDC, though the FRB does not take a position in the report on whether or not it may issue a USD CBDC.
On January 20, 2022, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) issued a report on considerations related to potential issuance of a US central bank digital currency (CBDC). The report is the first step in the public discussion between the FRB and stakeholders regarding issuance of a US CBDC, though the FRB does not take a position in the report on whether or not it may issue a USD CBDC. For purposes of the report, CBDC is defined as "a digital liability of a central bank that is widely available to the general public."
The FRB is considering how a US CBDC might fit within the US monetary and payment landscape. The critical question is whether introduction of a US CBDC would provide a superior option to other payment methods. After studying CBDCs for several years, the FRB has concluded that any US CBDC should:
  • Provide benefits to households, businesses, and the overall economy that exceed any costs and risks.
  • Yield such benefits more effectively than alternative methods.
  • Complement, rather than replace, current forms of money and methods for providing financial services.
  • Protect consumer privacy.
  • Protect against criminal activity.
  • Have broad support from key stakeholders.
The initial analysis by the FRB suggests that a US CBDC, if created, would best serve the needs of the US by being:
  • Privacy-protected. There would be a need to strike a balance between privacy rights of consumers and the transparency necessary to deter criminal activity.
  • Intermediated. The Federal Reserve Act does not authorize direct Federal Reserve accounts for individuals, therefore:
    • potential intermediaries could be commercial banks and regular nonbank financial service providers; and
    • such an intermediary model would make use of the private sector's existing privacy- and identity-management frameworks, leverage the private sector's ability to innovate, and reduce the prospects of destabilizing disruptions to the US financial system.
  • Widely-transferable. For a CBDC to be a widely accessible means of payment, it would need to be easily transferable between customers of different intermediaries.
  • Identity-verified. A US CBDC would need to comply with rules that financial institutions in the US are subject to, which are designed to combat laundering and financing of terrorism. In practice, this would mean that a CBDC intermediary would need to verify the identity of a person accessing a CBDC, similar to the manner in which banks and other financial institutions currently verify the identities of their customers.
The report identifies the following potential benefits of a US CBDC:
  • Safely meet future needs and demands for payment services. A US CBDC:
    • Would offer the general public broad access to digital money that is free from credit risk and liquidity risk.
    • Could mitigate some of the risks of digital money while supporting private-sector innovation.
    • Might help to level the playing field in payment innovation for private sector firms of all sizes.
    • Might generate new capabilities to meet the evolving speed and efficiency requirements of the digital economy.
  • Improvements to cross border payments. A US CBDC could potentially streamline cross-border payments by using new technology, introducing simplified distribution channels, and creating additional opportunities for cross-jurisdictional collaboration and interoperability.
  • Support the international role of the US dollar. A US CBDC could preserve the dominant international role of the US dollar, if it were issued and became preferred in an atmosphere where foreign countries and currency unions have also introduced CBDCs.
  • Financial inclusion. For economically vulnerable households and communities, a US CBDC may provide more access to financial markets, which is a high priority for the FRB. For private-sector electronic transaction accounts, a US CBDC could promote financial inclusion by:
    • facilitating access digital payments;
    • enabling rapid and cost-effective payment of taxes;
    • enabling rapid and cost-effective delivery of wages, tax refunds, and other federal payments;
    • providing a secure way for people to save; and
    • promoting access to credit.
  • Extend public access to safe central bank money. Currently, cash is only the central bank currency available to the general public. The FRB is considering a CBDC as means to expand safe payment options.
The report identifies the potential risks and policy considerations of a US CBDC as:
  • Changes to financial market structure. The structure of the US financial system would essentially change with the introduction of a US CBDC, by altering the roles and responsibilities of the private sector and the central bank.
  • Safety and stability of the financial system. Because central bank money is the safest form of money, a widely accessible CBDC would be attractive to risk-averse users, especially during times of financial stress. Traditional measures such as prudential supervision, government deposit insurance, and access to central bank liquidity may be insufficient to prevent large outflows of commercial bank deposits into CBDC in the event of a financial panic.
  • Efficacy of monetary policy implementation. The design of a US CBDC would influence how it might affect monetary policy. The Federal Reserve currently works under an "ample reserves" monetary policy, under which the Federal Reserve exercises control over the federal funds rate and other short-term interest rates through the setting of administrative rates. The current policy does not require active management of supple of reserves. The introduction of a US CBDC could affect monetary policy implementation and interest rate control by altering the supply of reserves in the banking system.
  • Privacy and data protection and the prevention of financial crimes. Concerns in this area include:
    • consumer privacy. In the same way commercial bank and nonbank money transactions generate user data, a CBDC would also generate user data and create the same consumer concerns.
    • prevention of financial crime. A US CBDC would need to be designed in a manner that complies with rules for financial institutions that are designed to prevent money laundering and combat the financing of terrorism.
  • Operational resilience and cybersecurity. The infrastructure for a US CBDC would need to be resilient against threats and vigilant against bad actors.
The report purposefully does not advance a specific policy outcome regarding a US CBDC and takes no position on the ultimate desirability of a US CBDC. However, the report notes that a US CBDC would not require a mechanism like deposit insurance to maintain public confidence, nor would a US CBDC depend on backing by an underlying asset pool to maintain its value. The report does conclude that a US CBDC would be the safest digital asset available to general public with no associated credit or liquidity risk.
The report states that the FRB does not intend to proceed with the issuance of a US CBDC without clear support from the executive and legislative branches, preferably in the form of a specific law. The FRB will seek input from a wide range of stakeholders that might use a US CBDC or might be affected by its introduction. The Fed's decision to leave the issue to Congress means issuance of a US CBDC would likely still be several years away.
Included in the report is a list of 21 questions for these stakeholders – 14 of the questions address CBDC benefits, risk, and policy considerations and 7 questions address the design of a CBDC. Deadline for public comment on Federal Reserve report on adoption of a US CBDC is May 20, 2022.