Here, there are no such “danger signs.” First, unlike in
Randall, Austin's contribution limit is per election, not per election cycle, meaning that it is reset between general and runoff elections.
Compare id. (finding danger sign present where limit was per election cycle, including primary and general elections)
with Austin, Tex. Code, Art. III, § 8(A)(1) (establishing contribution limit “per election”)
and id. Art. I, § 2-2-7(A) (“A general election, special election, and a runoff election each have ... separate campaign periods for purposes of City Charter Article III, Section 8....”). Second, the $350 limit is on par with limits imposed in other states and localities and upheld by other courts.
See Randall, 548 U.S. at 250, 126 S.Ct. 2479 (finding danger sign where limit at issue was below those imposed by other states and upheld in the past). For example, in
Shrink Mo. the Supreme Court upheld Missouri's $275 limit—which, adjusted for inflation, was equivalent to approximately $390 at the time this appeal was filed—on contributions to candidates for any office representing fewer than 100,000 people.
See 528 U.S. at 383, 120 S.Ct. 897;
see also Frank v. City of Akron, 290 F.3d 813, 818 (6th Cir. 2002) (upholding limits of $100 on contributions to candidates for ward council member and $300 on contributions to candidates for at-large council member and mayor in city of approximately 217,000). Austin's $350 limit on contributions to candidates for city council, who represent districts of approximately 100,000 people, is not so low by comparison as to raise suspicion.
Furthermore, and unlike the limit at issue in
Randall, Austin's contribution limit is indexed for inflation.
Compare 548 U.S. at 251–52, 126 S.Ct. 2479 (finding danger sign where contribution limit was lower than those upheld in prior cases and not indexed for inflation)
with Austin, Tex. Code, Art. III, § 8(A)(1) (stating that contribution limit shall be adjusted annually in accordance with the Consumer Price Index).