The responsibility of the States for the regulation of domestic relations is an important indicator of the substantial societal impact the State's classifications have in the daily lives and customs of its people.
Less measurable, but certainly of no less significance, is the shattering effect this collection of views has on the root principles of stare decisis, federalism, judicial restraint and—most importantly—separation of powers....In a democracy the first indicator of the public's attitude must always be found in the legislative *919 judgments of the people's chosen representatives.
First, where as here, the language of the applicable provision provides great leeway and where the underlying social policies are felt to be of vital importance, the temptation to read personal preference into the Constitution is understandably great.... But it is not the business of this Court to pronounce policy. It must observe a fastidious regard for limitations on its own power, and this precludes the Court giving effect to its own notions of what is wise or politic.
It seems to me that the sweeping judicial action undertaken today reflects a basic lack of faith and confidence in the democratic process.
This analysis is fundamentally flawed because it fails to take into account that the “marriage” that has long been recognized by the Supreme Court as a fundamental right is distinct from the newly purposed relationship of a “same-sex marriage.” And this failure is even more pronounced by the majority's acknowledgment that same-sex marriage is a new notion that has not been recognized for “most of our country's history.” Moreover, the majority fails to explain how this new notion became incorporated into the traditional definition of marriage except by linguistic manipulation.
[W]here, as here, the language of the applicable provision provides great leeway and where the underlying social policies are felt to be of vital importance, the temptation to read personal preference into the Constitution is understandably great.... But it is not the business of this Court to pronounce policy. It must observe a fastidious regard for limitations on its own power, and this precludes the Court's giving effect to its own notions of what is wise or politic.
[O]n this issue we should defer. To be sure, the constant refrain in these cases has been that the States' justifications are not advanced by excluding same-gender couples from marriage. But that is a matter of opinion; any “improvement” on the classification should be left to the state political process.
Though the Plaintiffs would weigh the interests of the State differently and discount the procreation, childrearing, *927 and caution rationales, that prerogative belongs to the electorate and their representatives.... We should resist the temptation to become philosopher-kings, imposing our views under the guise of constitutional interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Because there is no fundamental right to same-sex marriage and there are rational reasons for not recognizing it, just as there are rational reasons for recognizing it, I conclude that we, the Third Branch, must allow the States to enact legislation on the subject in accordance with their political processes. The U.S. Constitution does not, in my judgment, restrict the States' policy choices on this issue. If given the choice, some States will surely recognize same-sex marriage and some will surely not. But that is, to be sure, the beauty of federalism.
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