Bohannan, however, argues that his claim is timely because the statute of limitations was tolled while he exhausted administrative remedies available.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
Section 1997e(a) requires that prisoners exhaust administrative remedies before filing
§ 1983 claims regarding the conditions of their confinement.
Id. (“No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under
section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”). Bohannan's argument is unpersuasive, however, because Bohannan does not qualify as a prisoner, a point discussed earlier.
See supra Part III.C. Under the exhaustion of remedies provision, a prisoner is “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.”
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h). As this Court determined above—and Bohannan previously argued—Bohannan was civilly committed; his detention is not the result of a violation of criminal law or the terms of parole, probation, or any other program. Bohannan is thus not a prisoner and the administrative exhaustion provision does not apply. The statute of limitations for Bohannan's claim expired on March 9, 2011, at the latest. Therefore, this claim is time barred and dismissal was appropriate.