Additionally, while plaintiff claims to be bringing this suit “individually and on behalf of voters of Philadelphia,” he alleges no redressable injury to the voters—only to himself. According to his theory of the case, the only aggrieved parties are himself as an unsuccessful candidate and any absentee voters whose votes were allegedly mishandled during the vote-counting process. However, as he does not allege that the “voters of Philadelphia,” whoever they may be,
were injured by the absentee ballot process, he has not established an injury in fact for that claim and therefore lacks standing for their claim as well. The prudential principles support that he cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of the voters. The claim plaintiff alleges on behalf of these voters, even if substantiated, would amount to a “ ‘generalized grievance’ shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens” and is not sufficient to confer standing.
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975);
see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, noting that the injury must be “concrete and particularized;”
Whitmore v. Arkansas 495 U.S. 149, 160, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990), holding that “the ‘generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance’ ... is an inadequate basis on which to grant” standing;
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984), noting that “an asserted right to have the Government act in accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone, to confer jurisdiction on a federal court”;
Public Interest Research Group v. Magnesium Elektron, 123 F.3d 111, 121 (3d Cir.1997), stating that “[t]he legal ‘right’ to have corporations obey environmental laws cannot, by itself, support standing.”