(1) the degree to which the prosecutor's remarks have a tendency to mislead the jury and to prejudice the accused; (2) whether the remarks were isolated or extensive; (3) absent the remarks, the strength of competent proof introduced to establish the guilt of the accused; and (4) whether the comments were deliberately placed before the jury to divert attention to extraneous matters.
[I]t is sometimes the duty of the Court to admonish or warn an attorney who out of zeal for his or her cause does something which is not in keeping with the rules of evidence or procedure. If this should happen, do not permit this to have any effect on your evaluation of the merits of any evidence that comes before you.
it is the duty of the Court to admonish an attorney who out of zeal for his or her cause does something which the Court believes is not in keeping with the Rules of Evidence or Procedure. You are ... to draw absolutely no inference against the side to whom an admonition of the Court may have been addressed during the trial of this case.
Now, ladies and gentlemen, let me say one more word about reasonable doubt. You've heard the concept of reasonable doubt. During the closing arguments [counsel for Reep] attempted to define the word reasonable doubt. The law for the Court is simple. The Court is not permitted to attempt to define the word reasonable doubt.... And that is because the courts have found that the definition is a selfevident definition and there is no better way of explaining the concept. All efforts to explain reasonable doubt simply lead[ ] to more confusion. So you're not bound to accept [counsel's] definitions of reasonable doubt. So not even the Court is going to attempt to give you that definition. So we're telling you to rely on your reasonable understanding of the concept of the word reasonable doubt. It's a selfevident definition.
[I]t remains within our discretion to determine whether the district court error warrants reversal. Our discretion is appropriately exercised only when failure to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice, such as when a defendant is actually innocent or the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
[The record did] not provide any indication of what sentence the district court would have imposed had it exercised its discretion under § 3553(a), treating the guidelines as merely advisory. Thus, although it is certainly possible that Hughes will receive the same sentence on remand, there is nothing in the record to compel such a conclusion. This possibility is not enough to dissuade us from noticing the error.
It's the guidelines. There's not much I can say in this case. The guidelines say life and therefore, it's life. I understand that. There's not much I can say. I can't point to much mitigation, extenuation or anything else at this stage of the game, even if I had it because the guidelines say life.
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