[t]respassing on, physically invading, entering without consent, damaging, sitting in, blocking, impeding or obstructing access to, ingress into or egress from any part of the Planned Parenthood facility ..., including the entrances and exits, the parking lots ..., and any of the clinic's or parking lots' entrances and driveways.6
Demonstrating within one-hundred (100) feet from either side of or in front of any doorway entrance or exit, parking lot, parking lot entrance or exit, driveway, or driveway entrance or exit at [any of the] clinics[s] or parking lots.
The power to suppress one concedes the power to suppress all.... The doctrine of the constitution must prevail in this state, which clothes the citizen with liberty to speak, write, or publish his opinion on any and all subjects.
freedom of speech will necessarily end when supervision by a court of equity of the expressions and sentiments of the individual is allowed to begin.
So long as the pickets did not physically obstruct the spur tracks and thereby nullify or seriously impair the right of the railways to use the street, they had the same right to use the streets as the railways had.
The authoritarianism and unresponsiveness of Mexico to [certain] attempts to exercise and establish protection of free speech were a contributing factor to Texas' revolution and independence.
[A]nd no law shall ever be passed curtailing a liberty of speech, or of the press.
to discuss public men and public measures with the utmost freedom, to denounce without restraint what he believed to be wrong, and to advocate with vigor and fervor what he conceived to be right.34
confronted by the unaccustomed fact that the frank expression of his opinions as to public policy and the acts of those in authority was liable to be construed as treason.35
Every person shall be at liberty to speak, write or publish his opinions on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege; and no law shall ever be passed curtailing the liberty of speech or of the press. In prosecutions for the publications of papers, investigating the conduct of officers, or men in public capacity, or when the matter published is proper for public information, the truth thereof may be given in evidence. And in all indictments for libels, the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the court, as in other cases.
[W]here blasphemous, immoral, treasonable, schismatical, seditious, or scandalous libels are punished by English law ... the liberty of the press, properly understood, is by no means infringed or violated. The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matters when published. Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public: to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press: but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequences of his own temerity.... Thus the will of individuals is still left free; the abuse only of that free will is the object of legal punishment. Neither is any restraint hereby laid upon freedom of thought or inquiry; liberty of private sentiment is still left; the disseminating or making public of bad sentiments, destructive of the ends of society, is the crime which society corrects.
The last right we shall mention, regards the freedom of the press. The importance of this consists, besides the advancement *21 of truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiment on the administration of Government, its ready communication of thoughts between subjects, and its consequential promotion of union among them, whereby oppressive officials are shamed into more honorable and just means of conducting affairs.
Nor does the opinion of the unconstitutionality and consequent nullity of [the Sedition Act of 1798] remove all restraint from the overwhelming torrent of slander which is confounding all vice and virtue, all truth and falsehood in the US. The power to do that is fully possessed by the several state legislatures. It was reserved to them, and was denied to the general government, by the constitution according to our construction of it. While we deny that Congress have a right to controul [sic] the freedom of the press, we have ever asserted the right of the states, and their exclusive right, to do so.... In general the state laws appear to have made the presses responsible for slander as far as is consistent with their useful freedom.
The purpose of this provision is to preserve what we call “liberty of speech” and the “freedom of the press,” and at the same time hold all persons accountable to the law for the misuse of that liberty or freedom. Responsibility for the abuse of that privilege is as fully emphasized by its language as that the privilege itself shall be free from all species of restraint ... Punishment for the abuse of the right, not prevention of its exercise, is what the provision contemplates.
appl[ying] only to the passage of laws restraining freedom of speech or press and ... not by its terms afford[ing] protection ... against restrictions upon the exercise of those rights which government officials may impose whether or not sanctioned by law.
The two independent clauses ... are related to each other with [the liberty and responsibility formulation] expressing the right to free speech and the second stating the entity, the state, against whom the right is shielded.
In prosecutions for the publications of papers investigating the conduct of officers, or men in a public capacity, or where the matter published is proper for public information, the truth thereof may be given in evidence.
I would not diminish the liberty of the press: I would have it as free as the winds of heaven; I would put no clog upon it. But let this liberty be employed with discretion. You give every one the right to bear arms for his own defence: but does it follow that he has the right to slay his neighbor in all cases?
It has never been the theory of free institutions that the citizen could say only what courts or legislatures might license him to say, or that his sentiments on any subject or concerning any person should be supervised before he could utter *27 them.... Liberty of speech will end when such control begins.
Freedom of expression may not be restricted solely on grounds that its exercise will have the effect of providing imminent and irreparable harm. Restraints may be imposed only if the injunctive *28 relief encompasses the least restrictive means of protecting against the alleged harmful effect.
In its zeal to maintain its own prosperous status quo, the ... Texas establishment tended to ignore, repress, or attack individuals and groups with different values.... This uncompromising stance on behalf of the Texas power structure may have created its own antithesis—a strong, colorful tradition of iconoclastic journalism. By stifling a reasonable range of dissent, the Texas establishment may have forced individualist writers to more radical stands and more flamboyant rhetoric.
[H]istorical analysis is only a starting point. The constitution of our state is an organic document. [citation omitted] In no way must our understanding of its guarantees be frozen in the past. Rather, our concept of freedom of expression continues to evolve over time.
[T]he government's ability to permissibly restrict expressive conduct is very limited: the government may enforce reasonable time, place, and manner regulations as long as the restrictions [1] are content neutral, [2] are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and [3] leave open alternative channels of communication. Additional restrictions such as an absolute prohibition on a particular type of expression will be upheld only if narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling government interest.
[W]here, and how [the Relators] might speak, but not what [they] might say. The challenged sections ... make no mention whatsoever of abortion or any substantive issue.... In fact, the [restraining orders] could apply equally to protests which supported abortion as well as to protests which opposed abortion, or indeed, to protests supporting or opposing any other cause.
Fourth: The right of freely communicating their thoughts and opinions.
[w]herever the court has authority to grant the writ of injunction, no matter what irregularities may attend the granting thereof, or however erroneously the court may have acted in granting the same, as long as the injunction exists, undissolved, it must be obeyed, and for a violation thereof the party will be held in contempt. If, however, the court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter involved, or if it has exceeded its power, by granting an injunction in a matter beyond its jurisdiction, the injunction will be treated as absolutely void, and defendants in such case cannot be punished for contempt for its alleged violation.
a belief that in the fair administration of justice no man can be a judge in his own case, however exalted his station, however righteous his motives, irrespective of his race, color, politics, or religion.... One may sympathize with the petitioners' impatient commitment to their cause. But respect for judicial process is a small price to pay for the civilizing hand of law, which alone can give abiding meaning to constitutional freedoms.
[I]nstead of moving to modify or dissolve the [order], and instead of seeking to have a hearing on same, relator appears to have fully acquiesced in the action of the court until [the time at which he violated the order]. If the restraining order was too broad and included matters of doubtful validity, it was clearly the duty of relator to obey same and to seek a modification or dissolution.
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