Third, the district court correctly concluded that the
section 2 preconditions to suit existed. First, the court's finding that blacks in St. Louis have the
potential to elect a candidate of their choice for citywide election is supported by substantial evidence. To require Roberts to prove that the percentage of blacks living in St. Louis is high enough to necessarily control the outcome of all citywide elections is not consistent with
Thornburg. Id. at 50 n. 17, 106 S.Ct. at 2766 n. 17. (“Unless minority voters possess the
potential to elect representatives in the absence of the challenged structure or practice, they cannot claim to have been injured by that structure or practice.”) (emphasis in original). Moreover, it is not consistent with the predominant purpose of the Voting Rights Act to enforce the right to vote of any person regardless of race or color. H.R.Rep. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
reprinted in 1965 U.S.CODE CONG. & ADMIN.News 2437, 2437. Thus, the district court did not err when it concluded that it “has not been directed to and is unable to find any cases requiring that the minority population actually constitute a majority in the relevant voting unit.”
Roberts, 679 F.Supp. at 1530. Furthermore, there is no doubt that substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that legally significant, racially polarized voting exists in St. Louis.