(Citation omitted). Applying this formula, the Court has upheld governmental procedures denying hearings before the deprivation occurs when alternative procedures are deemed adequate to protect the personal interest at stake. See, e. g., Ingraham v. Wright, supra (child may be subjected to corporal punishment in public school without prior hearing);
Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (upholding Social Security Administration's provision for notice and an opportunity to introduce rebutting evidence, but no evidentiary hearing, prior to termination of federal disability benefits);
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 40 L.Ed.2d 15 (1974) (upholding statutory procedure for dismissing Civil Service employees which provided for hearing after dismissal). In contrast to those cases, however, this action does not involve “a significant intrusion into an area of primary educational responsibility,”
Ingraham v. Wright, supra, 430 U.S. at 682, 97 S.Ct. at 1418, or the risk that efficiency of the civil service would be jeopardized by “(p)rolonged retention of a disruptive or otherwise unsatisfactory employee,”
Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, 416 U.S. at 168, 94 S.Ct. at 1651 (Powell, J., concurring), or a substantial government expense that “come(s) out of the pockets of the deserving.” Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. 348, 96 S.Ct. 909. The CSC has stated that “(i)f in the course of (a competitive service) investigation CSC learns derogatory information of such a nature that it considers the applicant unsuitable, it so advises the applicant and provides him or her with an opportunity to rebut the derogatory information,” but for applicants in other categories, such as White House Fellows, the CSC merely conducts an investigation without providing notice and an opportunity to be heard. Defendants' Memorandum I at 4; see
5 C.F.R. s 731.302 (1977).
This is not a case, therefore, where the government's interest measured by the “fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional . . . procedural requirement would entail” outweighs the private interest injured by the government's actions in view of “the risk of an erroneous deprivation” and the “probable value . . . of additional or substitute procedural safeguards.” See
Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. at 334-35, 96 S.Ct. at 903. When the information collected, reported, and disclosed by the CSC is sufficiently damaging to threaten the future employment opportunities of a non-competitive service applicant, such as Doe, the procedural protections already granted to the competitive service candidate are constitutionally required.