Ballarini, in Behalf of Lodge 1327, Intern. Ass'n of Machinists, Production & Aeronautical Workers v. Schlage Lock Co. | Cases | Westlaw

Ballarini, in Behalf of Lodge 1327, Intern. Ass'n of Machinists, Production & Aeronautical Workers v. Schlage Lock Co. | Cases | Westlaw

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Ballarini, in Behalf of Lodge 1327, Intern. Ass'n of Machinists, Production & Aeronautical Workers v. Schlage Lock Co.

Appellate Department, Superior Court, San Francisco County, California.November 17, 1950100 Cal.App.2d Supp. 859226 P.2d 771 (Approx. 8 pages)

Ballarini, in Behalf of Lodge 1327, Intern. Ass'n of Machinists, Production & Aeronautical Workers v. Schlage Lock Co.

Appellate Department, Superior Court, San Francisco County, California.November 17, 1950100 Cal.App.2d Supp. 859226 P.2d 771 (Approx. 8 pages)

100 Cal.App.2d Supp. 859
Appellate Department, Superior Court, San Francisco County, California.
BALLARINI, in Behalf of LODGE 1327, INTERNATIONAL ASS'N OF MACHINISTS, PRODUCTION & AERONAUTICAL WORKERS
v.
SCHLAGE LOCK CO. et al.
No. 2074.
Nov. 17, 1950.

Attorneys and Law Firms

**772 *860 Littler, Coakley & Lauritzen, San Francisco, for appellants.
Elmer P. Delany, San Francisco, for respondent.

Opinion

KAUFMAN, Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Municipal Court in favor of plaintiff and respondent upholding the validity and constitutionality of Section 5699 of the Elections Code of the State of California.
*861 Said Elections Code Section reads as follows: ‘Every voter shall, on the day of every general, direct primary or presidential primary election at which he is entitled to vote, be entitled to absent himself from any service or employment in which he is then engaged for two consecutive hours between the time of opening and the time of closing the polls. The voter shall not, because of so absenting himself, be liable to any penalty, nor shall any deduction be made on account of such absence from his usual salary or wages.’
The record before us shows that plaintiff is a member of Lodge 1327 Association of Machinists, and prosecutes this action as an assignee and on behalf of forty-eight assignor members of the Association who took time off (two hours) on November 8, 1948, a general election day falling within the provisions of Elections Code, § 5699. This action is to recover their wages for the time taken off pursuant to the provisions of Elections Code, § 5699.
Appellants, who are the employers of the forty-eight members of the Machinists Association contend that Elections Code, § 5699 is void and unconstitutional in so far as it provides that no deduction shall be made on account of the worker's absence on election day from his salary or wages.
Similar election code provisions contained in the laws of sister states have been passed upon by the courts of those **773 states and such provisions have been upheld in some states and declared void in others.
Our Elections Code Section 5699 was first adopted by the Legislature in 1891, and has been on our statute books ever since. It has never until now been under attack before our courts.
In considering the validity of such a statute it is well to note that the state may exercise its police power whenever the public interests demand it, and in this particular, a large discretion is necessarily vested in the Legislature to determine not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. See Barrett v. State, 220 N. Y. 423, 116 N.E. 99, L.R.A.1918C, 400; People v. Ford Motor Co., 271 App.Div. 141, 63 N.Y.S.2d 697, 698.
To justify the state in thus interposing its authority on behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the *862 means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of that purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 14 S.Ct. 499, 38 L.Ed. 385.
The State of California is, of course, entitled to take measures to deal with the rights of its citizens to exercise the legislative franchise, a subject matter which, under our form of Government, is all important and is itself a primary act of sovereignty. Surely, any law that has for its purpose the insuring of a full and free performance of the right of elective franchise is in the public interest and tends to promote the general welfare of all of the citizens of the State. Such a law would be a proper exercise of the State's police power.
In passing on the validity of the statute here involved we must have in mind that there is a strong presumption that the statute is constitutional.
‘A legislative body, in exercise of its police power, has a broad discretion to determine the measures necessary for protection of public interests. The determination of a need for a mode of exercising the power is for the legislative body, and courts will not hold enactments invalid unless they are palpably unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, having no tendency to promote the public welfare, safety, morals, or general welfare. Every presumption is in favor of reasonableness of the law and its validity.
‘Courts are not concerned with the wisdom or policy of laws enacted under police power and cannot substitute their judgment for that of a legislative body. If different minds might differ as to the reasonableness of a regulation, the law must be upheld.’
Bearing in mind that the statute here under consideration has been on the books since 1891, can it not be said that all employment contracts, either oral or written, express or implied, are entered into subject to said statute and in effect incorporating the terms of said statute.
‘The police power of the state, being in its nature a continuous one, must ever be reposed somewhere, and cannot be barred or suspended by contract or irrepealable law; and it is to be presumed that parties contract in contemplation of the inherent right of the state to exercise the police power that the sovereign always reserves to itself for the protection *863 of peace, safety, health, and morals, and its effect cannot be nullified in advance by making contracts inconsistent with its enforcement.’
‘All applicable laws in existence when an agreement is made necessarily enter into it and form a part of it as fully as if they were expressly referred to and incorporated in its terms'.
**774 The settled law of the land at the time a contract is made becomes a part of it and must be read into it.
In Brown v. Ferdon, 5 Cal.2d 226, 231, 54 P.2d 712, 714 the Court said: ‘It is settled that all the laws of a state existing at the time a contract is made, which effect the rights of the parties to the contract, enter into and become a part of it, and are as obligatory upon all courts which assume to give a remedy on such contracts as if they were referred to or incorporated in the terms of the contract.’
In Gardner v. Rich Mfg. Co., 68 Cal.App.2d 725, 730, 158 P.2d 23, the Court held: Orders of the Railroad Commission establishing and fixing schedules of minimum rates, rules and regulations become a part of every contract between a highway contract carrier and the shipper.
In Keating v. Preston, 42 Cal.App.2d 110, 111, 108 P.2d 479, the Court held, in construing a lease: ‘Penal Code, section 337a, relating to pool selling, bookmaking, etc., is deemed to constitute a part of a lease of premises for use in the restaurant business.’
It is, therefore, our considered opinion that Elections Code, Section 5699 is valid and constitutional because:
1. It is a valid exercise of the state's police power as being in the public interest and promoting the public welfare and,
2. Said Election Code is as much a part of every employment contract entered into and to be performed in the State of California as though expressly incorporated in said employment contract.
Appellant makes the additional contention that on the trial in the Court below some fourteen of plaintiff's assignors failed to appear and that the record is barren of any evidence as to whether they took any time off for the purpose of voting on election day. With this contention we agree, and we find *864 from the record that these assignors were allowed $18.67 in the lower court's judgment. The judgment must, therefore, be reduced by this amount.
In view of the foregoing the judgment of the lower Court is reduced to the sum of $80.02, and as so reduced it must be, and it is hereby affirmed.
GRIFFIN, P. J., and MURPHY, J., concur.

All Citations

100 Cal.App.2d Supp. 859, 226 P.2d 771
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