Taylor v. Beckham | Cases | Westlaw

It is obviously essential to the independence of the states, and to their peace and tranquillity, that their power to prescribe the qualifications of their own officers, the tenure of their offices, *571 the manner of their election, and the grounds on which, the tribunals before which, and the mode in which, such elections may be contested, should be exclusive and free from external interference, except so far as plainly provided by the Constitution of the United States.

And where controversies over the election of state officers have reached the state courts in the manner provided by, and been there determined in accordance with, the state Constitutions and laws, the cases must necessarily be rare in which the interference of this court can properly be invoked.

In Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. Thayer, 143 U. S. 155, 36 L. ed. 108, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 375, which was a proceeding in quo warranto, in which the supreme court of Nebraska had held that James E. Boyd had not been for two years preceding his election a citizen of the United States, and hence that under the Constitution of the state he was not eligible to the office of governor, this court took jurisdiction because the conclusion of the state court involved the denial of a right or privilege under the Constitution and laws of the United States, upon which the determination of whether Boyd was a citizen of the United States or not depended, and therefore jurisdiction to review a decision against such right or privilege necessarily existed in this tribunal. Missouri v. Andriano, 138 U. S. 496, 34 L. ed. 1012, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 385. And we said: ‘Each state has the power to prescribe the qualifications of its officers and the manner in which they shall be chosen and the title to offices shall be tried, whether in the judicial courts or otherwise. But when the trial is in the courts, it is a ‘case,’ and if a defense is interposed under the Constitution or laws of the United States, and is overruled, then, as in any other case decided by the highest court of a state, this court has jurisdiction by writ of error.'

So in Kennard v. Louisiana ex rel. Morgan, 92 U. S. 480, 23 L. ed. 478, concerning the right of Kennard to the office of associate justice of the supreme court of Louisiana, jurisdiction was taken on the ground that the constitutionality of the statute under which the disputed title to office was tried was drawn in question. The court, speaking by Mr. Chief Justice Waite, said: ‘The question before us is, not whether the courts below, having jurisdiction of the case and the parties, have followed the law, but whether *572 the law, if followed, would have furnished Kennard the protection guaranteed by the Constitution. Irregularities and mere errors in the proceedings can only be corrected in the state courts. Our authority does not **899 extend beyond an examination of the power of the courts below to proceed at all.’

The writ in Foster v. Kansas ex rel. Johnston, 112 U. S. 201, 28 L. ed. 629, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 8, 97, rested on the same ground.

In each of the foregoing cases the determination of the right to the offices in dispute was reposed in the judicial courts, and no question was expressly considered by this court as to whether the right to a public office of a state was or was not protected by the 14th Amendment.

In Wilson v. North Carolina, 169 U. S. 586, 42 L. ed. 865, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 435, the governor of North Carolina had suspended plaintiff in error as railroad commissioner under a statute of that state, and the state supreme court had held the action of the governor a valid exercise of the power conferred upon him, and that it was due process of law within the meaning of the Constitution. A writ of error from this court to review that judgment was granted, and on hearing was dismissed. Mr. Justice Peckham, in delivering the opinion, said: ‘The controversy relates exclusively to the title to a state office, created by a statute of the state, and to the rights of one who was elected to the office so created. Those rights are to be measured by the statute and by the Constitution of the state, excepting in so far as they may be protected by any provision of the Federal Constitution. Authorities are not required to support the general proposition that in the consideration of the Constitution or laws of a state this court follows the construction given to those instruments by the highest court of the state. The exceptions to this rule do not embrace the case now before us. We are therefore concluded by the decision of the supreme court of North Carolina as to the proper construction of the statute itself, and that as construed it does not violate the Constitution of the state. The only question for us to review is whether the state, through the action of its governor and judiciary, has deprived the plaintiff in error of his property without due process of law, or denied to him the equal protection of the laws. We are of opinion *573 that the plaintiff in error was not deprived of any right guaranteed to him by the Federal Constitution, by reason of the proceedings before the governor under the statute above mentioned, and resulting in his suspension from office. The procedure was in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the state. It was taken under a valid statute creating a state office in a constitutional manner, as the state court has held. What kind and how much of a hearing the officer should have before suspension by the governor was a matter for the state legislature to determine, having regard to the Constitution of the state. The procedure provided by a valid state law for the purpose of changing the incumbent of a state office will not, in general, involve any question for review by this court. A law of that kind does but provide for the carrying out and enforcement of the policy of the state with reference to its political and internal administration, and a decision of the state court in regard to its construction and validity will generally be conclusive here. The facts would have to be most rare and exceptional which would give rise, in a case of this nature, to a Federal question. . . . In its internal administration the state (so far as concerns the Federal government) has entire freedom of choice as to the creation of an office for purely state purposes, and of the terms upon which it shall be held by the persons filling the office. And in such matters the decision of the state court, that the procedure by which an officer has been suspended or removed from office was regular and was under a constitutional and valid statute, must generally be conclusive in this court. . . . Upon the case made by the plaintiff in error, the Federal question which he attempts to raise is so unfounded in substance that we are justified in saying that it does not really exist; that there is no fair color for claiming that his rights under the Federal Constitution have been violated, either by depriving him of his property without due process of law, or by denying him the equal protection of the laws.’

The grounds on which our jurisdiction is sought to be maintained in the present case are set forth in the errors assigned, to the effect, in substance: (1) That the action of the general assembly in the matter of these contests deprived plaintiffs in *574 error of their offices without due process of law. (2) That the action of the general assembly deprived the people of Kentucky of the right to choose their own representatives, secured by the guarantee of the Federal Constitution of a republican form of government to every state, and deprived them of their political liberty without due process of law.

For more than a hundred years the Constitution of Kentucky has provided that contested elections for governor and lieutenant governor shall be determined by the general assembly. In 1799, by a committee, ‘to be selected from both houses of the general assembly, and formed and regulated in such manner as shall be directed by law’ [Const. art. 3, § 27]; since 1850, ‘by both houses of the general assembly, according to such regulations as may be established by law’ [Const. art. 3, § 24].

The highest court of the state has often held, and, in the present case has again declared, that under these constitutional provisions the power of the general assembly to determine the result is exclusive, and that its decision is not open to judicial review. Batman v. Megowan, 1 Met. (Ky.) 533; Stine v. Berry, 96 Ky. 63, 27 S. W. 809.³

The statute enacted for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the Constitution into **900 effect has been in existence in substance since 1799, 1 Morehead, and Brown, 593–4; Rev. Stat. Ky. 1852, chap. 32, art. 7, § 1, p. 294. Many of the states have similar constitutional provisions and similar statutes.

We do not understand this statute to be assailed as in any manner obnoxious to constituional objection, but that plaintiffs in error complain of the action of the general assembly under the statute and of the judgment of the state courts declining to disturb that action.

It was earnestly pressed at the bar that all the proceedings were void for want of jurisdiction apparent on the face of the record; that under the Constitution and statute, as there was no question of an equal number of votes or of the legal *575 qualifications of the candidates, the action of the general assembly could only be invoked by a contest as to which of the parties had received the highest number of legal votes; but that the notices put forward a case, not of the election of the contestants, but of no election at all, which the contest boards and the general assembly had no jurisdiction to deal with. The notices were, however, exceedingly broad, and set up a variety of grounds, and specifically stated that the contestants would ask the boards of contest and the general assembly to determine that they were legally and rightfully elected governor and lieutenant governor at the said election and that the contestees were not. And the determination of the boards and of the general assembly was that contestants had received the highest number of legal votes cast for any candidate for said offices at said election, and were duly and legally elected governor and lieutenant governor,—a determination which adjudged the notices to be sufficient, and which did not include any matter not within the jurisdiction of the tribunal.

We repeat, then, that the contention is that, although the statute furnished due process of law, the general assembly in adminstering the statute denied it; and that the court of appeals in holding to the rule that where a mode of contesting elections is specifically provided by the Constitution or laws of a state, that mode is exclusive, and in holding that, as the power to determine was vested in the general assembly of Kentucky, the decision of that body was not subject to judicial revision, denied a right claimed under the Federal Constitution. The court of appeals did, indeed, adjudge that the case did not come within the 14th Amendment, because the right to hold the office of governor or lieutenant governor of Kentucky was not property in itself, and, being created by the state Constitution, was conferred and held solely in accordance with the terms of that instrument and laws passed pursuant thereto, so that, in respect of an elective office, a determination of the result of an election, in the manner provided, adverse to a claimant, could not be regarded as a deprivation forbidden by that amendment.

*576 The view that public office is not property has been generally entertained in this country.

In Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402, 416, 13 L. ed. 472, 478, Butler and others by virtue of a statute of the state of Pennsylvania had been appointed canal commissioners for a term of one year with a compensation of $4 per diem, but during their incumbency another statute was passed whereby the compensation was reduced to $3, and it was claimed that their contract rights were thereby infringed. The court drew a distinction between such a situation and that of a contract by which ‘perfect rights, certain definite, fixed private rights of property, are vested;’ and said: ‘These are clearly distinguishable from measures or engagements adopted or undertaken by the body politic or state government for the benefit of all, and from the necessity of the case, and according to universal understanding, to be varied or discontinued as the public good shall require. The selection of officers, who are nothing more than agents for the effectuating of such public purposes, is matter of public convenience or necessity, and so, too, are the periods for the appointment of such agents; but neither the one nor the other of these arrangements can constitute any obligation to continue such agents, or to reappoint them, after the measures which brought them into being shall have been found useless, shall have been fulfilled, or shall have been abrogated as even detrimental to the well being of the public. . . . It follows, then, upon principle, that in every perfect or competent government there must exist a general power to enact and to repeal laws, and to create, and change or discontinue, the agents designated for the execution of those laws. Such a power is indispensable for the preservation of the body politic, and for the safety of the individuals of the community. It is true that this power, or the extent of its exercise, may be controlled by the higher organic law or Constitution of the state, as is the case in some instances in the state Constitutions.’

In Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U. S. 99, 104, 33 L. ed. 825, 827, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 431, 432, Mr. Justice Lamar stated the primary question in the case to be ‘whether an officer appointed for a definite time or during good behavior had any vested interest or contract right in his office of *577 which Congress could not deprive him.’ And he said, speaking for the court: ‘The question is not novel. There seems to be but little difficulty in deciding that there was no such interest or right.’ Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402, 13 L. ed. 472; Newton v. Mahoning County Comrs. 100 U. S. 548, 25 L. ed. 710; Blake v. United States, 106 U. S. 227, 26 L. ed. 462; and many other cases.

The decisions are numerous to the effect that public offices are mere agencies or trusts, and not property as such. Nor are the salary and emoluments property, secured by contract, but compensation for services actually rendered. Nor does the fact that a constitution may forbid the legislature **901 from abolishing a public office or diminishing the salary thereof during the term of the incumbent change its character or make it property. True, the restrictions limit the power of the legislature to deal with the office, but even such restrictions may be removed by constitutional amendment. In short, generally speaking, the nature of the relation of a public officer to the public is inconsistent with either a property or a contract right.⁴

The court of appeals not only held that the office of governor or of lieutenant governor was not property under the Constitution of Kentucky; but, moreover, that court was of opinion that the decision of these contested elections did not deprive plaintiffs in error of any pre-existing right.

Our system of elections was unknown to the common law, and the whole subject is regulated by constitutions and statutes passed thereunder. In the view of the court of appeals the mode of contesting elections was part of the machinery for ascertaining the result of the election, and hence the rights of the officer who held the certificate of the state board of canvassers ‘were provisional or temporary until the determination of the result of the election as provided in the Constitution, *578 and upon that determination, if adverse to him, they ceased altogether.’ In fact, the statute provided that when the ‘incumbent is adjudged not to be entitled his powers shall immediately cease,’ and under the Constitution the holder of the certificate manifestly held it for the time being subject to the issue of a contest if initiated.

It is clear that the judgment of the court of appeals, in declining to go behind the decision of the tribunal vested by the state Constitution and laws with the ultimate determination of the right to these offices, denied no right secured by the 14th Amendment.

But it is said that the 14th Amendment must be read with § 4 of article 4 of the Constitution, providing that: ‘The United States shall guarantee to every state in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion, and, on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened), against domestic violence.’ It is argued that when the state of Kentucky entered the Union, the people ‘surrendered their right of forcible revolution in state affairs,’ and received in lieu thereof a distinct pledge to the people of the state of the guaranty of a republican form of government, and of protection against invasion and against domestic violence; that the distinguishing feature of that form of government is the right of the people to choose their own officers for governmental administration; that this was denied by the action of the general assembly in this instance; and, in effect, that this court has jurisdiction to enforce that guaranty, albeit the judiciary of Kentucky was unable to do so because of the division of the powers of government. And yet the writ before us was granted under § 709 of the Revised Statutes to revise the judgment of the state court on the ground that a constitutional right was decided against by that court.

It was long ago settled that the enforcement of this guaranty belonged to the political department. Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 12 L. ed. 581. In that case it was held that the question, which of the two opposing governments of Rhode Island, namely, the charter government or the government established by a *579 voluntary convention, was the legitimate one, was a question for the determination of the political department; and when that department had decided, the courts were bound to take notice of the decision and follow it; and also that as the supreme court of Rhode Island, holding constitutional authority not in dispute, had decided the point, the well-settled rule applied that the courts of the United States adopt and follow the decisions of the state courts on questions which concern merely the Constitution and laws of the state.

We had occasion to refer to Luther v. Borden in Re Duncan, 139 U. S. 449, 461, 35 L. ed. 219, 224, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 573, and we there observed: ‘Mr. Webster's argument in that case took a wider sweep, and contained a masterly statement of the American system of government as recognizing that the people are the source of all political power, but that, as the exercise of governmental powers immediately by the people themselves is impracticable, they must be exercised by representatives of the people; that the basis of representation is suffrage; that the right of suffrage must be protected and its exercise prescribed by previous law, and the results ascertained by some certain rule; that through its regulated exercise each man's power tells in the Constitution of the government and in the enactment of laws; that the people limit themselves in regard to the qualifications of electors and the qualifications of the elected, and to certain forms for the conduct of elections; that our liberty is the liberty secured by the regular action of popular power, taking place and ascertained in accordance with legal and authentic modes; and that the Constitution and laws do not proceed on the ground of revolution or any right of revolution, but on the idea of results achieved by orderly action under the authority of existing governments, proceedings outside of which are not contemplated by our institutions. Webster's Works, vol. 6, p. 217. . . . The state of Texas is in full possession of its faculties as **902 a member of the Union, and its legislative, executive, and judicial departments are peacefully operating by the orderly and settled methods prescribed by its fundamental law. Whether certain statutes have or have not binding force it is for the state to determine, and that *580 determination in itself involves no infraction of the Constitution of the United States, and raises no Federal question giving the courts of the United States jurisdiction.’

These observations are applicable here. The commonwealth of Kentucky is in full possession of its faculties as a member of the Union, and no exigency has arisen requiring the interference of the general government to enforce the guaranties of the Constitution, or to repel invasion, or to put down domestic violence. In the eye of the Constitution, the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the state are peacefully operating by the orderly and settled methods prescribed by its fundamental law, notwithstanding there may be difficulties and disturbances arising from the pendency and determination of these contests. This very case shows that this is so, for those who assert that they were aggrieved by the action of the general assembly properly accepted the only appropriate remedy which, under the law, was within the reach of the parties. That this proved ineffectual as to them, even though their grounds of complaint may have been in fact well founded, was the result of the Constitution and laws under which they lived and by which they were bound. Any remedy beside that is to be found in the august tribunal of the people, which is continually sitting, and over whose judgments on the conduct of public functionaries the courts exercise no control.

We must decline to take jurisdiction on the ground of deprivation of rights embraced by the 14th Amendment, without due process of law, or of the violation of the guaranty of a republican form of government by reason of similar deprivation.

As remarked by Chief Justice Taney in Luther v. Borden: ‘The high power has been conferred on this court of passing judgment upon the acts of the state sovereignties, and of the legislative and executive branches of the Federal government, and of determining whether they are beyond the limits of power marked out for them respectively by the Constitution of the United States. This tribunal, therefore, should be the last to overstep the boundaries which limit its own jurisdiction. And while it should always be ready to meet any question confided *581 to it by the Constitution, it is equally its duty not to pass beyond its appropriate sphere of action, and to take care not to involve itself in discussions which properly belong to other forums.’

Writ of error dismissed.

I am unable to concur in all that is said by the Chief Justice in the opinion just announced, and will state briefly wherein I dissent.

An office to which a salary is attached, in a case in which the controversy is only as to which of two parties is entitled thereto, has been adjudged by this court, and rightfully, to be property within the scope of that clause of the 14th Amendment, which forbids a state to ‘deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.’ In Kennard v. Louisiana ex rel. Morgan, 92 U. S. 480, 23 L. ed. 478, Kennard was appointed a justice of the supreme court of Louisiana. Morgan claimed to be entitled thereto, and brought suit to settle the title to the office. The supreme court of the state decided in favor of Morgan, and Kennard sued out a writ of error from this court on the ground that the judgment had deprived him of his office without due process of law, in violation of the foregoing provision of the 14th Amendment. Of course, neither life nor liberty were involved, and the jurisdiction of this court could be sustained only on the ground that the property of Kennard was taken from him, as alleged, without due process of law. This court unanimously sustained the jurisdiction, but, on examination of the procedings, found that there had been due process of law, and therefore affirmed the judgment of the supreme court of Louisiana. In Foster v. Kansas ex rel. Johnston, 112 U. S. 201, 28 L. ed. 629, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 8, 97, the supreme court of Kansas had, in quo warranto proceedings, ousted Foster from the office of county attorney of Saline county, and there was presented a motion to dismiss as well *582 as one to affirm. This court unanimously held that the motion to dismiss must be overruled, saying (p. 206, L. ed. p. 697, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 98):

‘As the question of the constitutionality of the statute was directly raised by the defendant, and decided against him by the court, we have jurisdiction, and the motion to dismiss must be overruled.’

At the same time it affirmed the decision of the supreme court of the state on the ground that the proceedings showed due process of law. In Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. Thayer, 143 U. S. 135, 36 L. ed. 103, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 375, the supreme court of Nebraska had, in an appropriate action, rendered judgment ousting Boyd from the office of governor of the state, and placing Thayer in possession. On error to this court we took jurisdiction of the case, and reversed the judgment of the supreme court of Nebraska, thus restoring Boyd to the office from which he had been ousted by the judgment of that court. In that case there was a dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Field on the ground of jurisdiction, he saying (p. 182, L. ed. p. 116, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 389):

‘I dissent from the judgment just rendered. I do not think that this court has any jurisdiction to determine a disputed question as to the right to the governorship of a state, however that question may be decided by its authorities.’

In the late case of Wilson v. North Carolina, 169 U. S. 586, 42 L. ed. 865, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 435, in which the judgment of the supreme **903 court of the state confirming the action of governor in suspending a railroad commissioner was sustained and the writ of error dismissed, the dismissal was not placed on the ground that the office, with its salary, was not property to be protected by the 14th Amendment, but, as said Mr. Justice Peckham, speaking for the court (p. 595, L. ed. p. 871, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 439):

‘Upon the case made by the plaintiff in error, the Federal question which he attempts to raise is so unfounded in substance that we are justified in saying that it does not really exist; that there is no fair color for claiming that his rights under the Federal Constitution have been violated, either by depriving him of his property without due process of law, or by denying him the equal protection of the laws.’

We have thus, in four cases, coming at successive times through *583 a period of twenty-five years, had before us the question of the validity of judgments of the highest courts of separate states taking office from one person and giving it to another, in three of which we unhesitatingly sustained our jurisdiction to review such judgments, two of which we affirmed on the ground that the proceedings in the state court disclosed due process of law, and that, therefore, the rights of the plaintiff in error were not infringed; in the third of which we held that the proceedings could not be sustained, and reversed the judgment of the state court ousting one person from the high office of governor of the state and giving it to another; and in the fourth of which, while we dismissed the writ of error, it was not on the ground that there was no property involved, but because the reasons assigned for a review were so frivolous as not to call for consideration. Such a series of decisions should not now be disturbed, except upon very cogent and satisfactory reasons. And this case, it must be borne in mind, is exactly like the others,—a proceeding in error to review the judgment of the highest court of a state in an action to remove an incumbent from his office.

Aside from these adjudications, I am clear, as a matter of principle, that an office to which a salary is attached is, as between two contestants for such office, to be considered a matter of property. I agree fully with those decisions which are referred to, and which hold that as between the state and the officeholder there is no contract right either to the term of office or the amount of salary, and that the legislature may, if not restrained by constitutional provisions, abolish the office or reduce the salary. But when the office is not disturbed, when the salary is not changed, and when under the Constitution of the state neither can be by the legislature, and the question in simply whether one shall be deprived of that office and its salary, and both given to another, a very different question is presented, and in such a case to hold that the incumbent has no property in the office, with its accompanying salary, does not commend itself to my judgment.

While not concurring in the order of dismissal, I am of opinion that the judgment of the court of appeals of Kentucky should be affirmed. The state of Kentucky has provided that *584 contests in respect to the office of governor and lieutenant governor shall be decided by the general assembly. Such provision is not uncommon, is appropriate, and reasonable. The contestants, William Goebel and J. C. W. Beckham, filed with the general assembly within due time their notices of contest. Those notices were broad enough to justify action by the general assembly and a decision setting aside the award of the canvassing board and giving to the contestants their offices. The prescribed procedure was followed, the committee authorized by statute was selected, its report made, and upon that a decision awarding to the contestant the offices. It is true that the first decision of the general assembly was made at a secret session outside its ordinary place of meeting, and without notice except to those who were supposed to be willing to concur in the report of the committee. If that ended the proceedings I should be strongly inclined to hold that the decision thus rendered could not be sustained. For when a tribunal is constituted of several members I understand that all have a right to be present, and, if any session is held elsewhere than at the appointed time and place, each one must be notified in order that he may have the opportunity of being present and contributing by his advice and opinion to the final judgment. But the record does not stop with this award of a part of the assembly in secret session, for subsequently when the general assembly was in session at its regular place of meeting, in the discharge of its ordinary duties, and at a time prescribed for its meeting, the action taken on February 2 was ratified and confirmed, both in single and joint session. Now, I agree with those members of the court of appeals of Kentucky who hold that this final action of the general assembly is conclusive. I do not ignore the many allegations of wrong, such as that the selection of the committee was not by lot, as prescribed by the laws, but was a trick on the part of the clerks of the assembly, and it must be conceded that the outcome of that drawing lends support to this allegation. Curious results sometimes happen by chance, but when those results happen so largely along the lines of the purposes of those who have control of the supposed chance, it is not strange that outsiders are apt to feel that purpose, and not *585 chance, determined the result. Be all these things as they may, the general assembly was constituted as the tribunal to conduct and supervise the contest. It approved what took place, and it is familiar law that no question can be raised in the courts as to the honesty or integrity of the members of the legislature in the discharge of their duties. Whatever of purity or honesty may be in fact lacking in the conduct of any one of them is a matter to be inquired into between his constituents and himself, and it is no part of the province of the judiciary to challenge **904 or question the integrity of his action. So we have the case of a committee apparently selected by lot, the propriety of whose action was approved by the tribunal having charge of the controversy, the report of that committee in favor of the contestants, and the judgment of the assembly, not merely at the secret session, but later, when all were present, or were called upon to be present, approving such report. This, in my opinion, constitutes due process of law within the meaning of the 14th Amendment, and I agree with the court of appeals of Kentucky that upon that award thus made by the proper tribunal, no other judgment can be entered than that which sustains it. But because, as I understand the law, this court has jurisdiction to review a judgment of the highest court of a state ousting one from his office and giving it to another, and a right to inquire whether that judgment is right or wrong in respect to any Federal question, such as due process of law, I think the writ of error should not be dismissed, but that the judgment of the court of appeals of Kentucky should be affirmed.