On appeal, the State identifies two interests that it has in the enforcement of
O.C.G.A. § 45-5-3.2: (1) ensuring the enforcement of valid laws, and (2) avoiding chaos and uncertainty in the State's election procedures. Given the Supreme Court of Georgia's answer to the certified question, we conclude that the preliminary injunction does not interfere with the first interest—the enforcement of
valid laws—because
O.C.G.A. § 45-5-3.2, as applied here, is invalid.
See Kemp, 849 S.E.2d at 668. As to the second interest, the State has not shown that the district court clearly erred by finding that the preliminary injunction would not cause chaos and uncertainty in the State's election procedures.
See Gonzalez, 470 F. Supp. 3d at 1351–52 (finding “no harm to the Governor if his appointee must run for office in 2020 to maintain his or her seat” and noting that the Secretary “[took] the position that as long as the relief comes in advance” of certain statutory and administrative deadlines, “the burden on the Secretary will be minimal”).