Bailey v. Abington | Cases | Westlaw

There is no allegation in the complaint against Bob Bailey individually, and he would, of course, have no authority individually to require the Senate to do anything. The decree, therefore, restraining him individually was erroneous.

It will be observed that § 3 of the amendment provides that the Board shall from time to time divide the state into convenient senatorial districts in such manner that the Senate shall be based upon the inhabitants of the state, each senator representing, as nearly as practicable, an equal *179 number thereof. We think it is clear from this section that it was the intention of the people, in adopting this statute, to divide the state into convenient senatorial districts and to provide for the number of representatives in each county, and manifestly the reason for their using the expression “from time to time” was to indicate that this apportionment should be made when, and only when, there was a change in the population so that, without a reapportionment, the senator would not represent the number specified.

The seventeen senators who are appellees in this case were elected at the last election for four years. This amendment provides that they shall be elected for four years until the next reapportionment hereunder. There has been no reapportionment, no necessity or occasion for any; there has been no change in population that makes it necessary or advisable; and to require them to determine by lot, under the circumstances, would limit the term of office of some of the senators, who were elected for four years, to only two years. It would also have the effect of extending the term of other senators to six years. Evidently the people, in adopting this amendment, did not intend that such an unreasonable thing should happen. It was not the intention of the amendment to select by lot except after an apportionment or reapportionment, and when there has been no reapportionment, we think it would be unreasonable to hold that a procedure should be followed that would reduce the term of some of the senators to two years, and necessarily extend the term of others to six years, when they were all elected for four years.

“It often happens that the true intention of the lawmaking body, though obvious, is not expressed by the language employed in a statute when that language is given its literal meaning. In such cases, the carrying out of the legislative intention, which, as we have seen, is the prime and sole object of all rules of construction, can only be accomplished by departure from the literal interpretation of the language employed. Hence, the courts are not always confined to the literal meaning of a statute; the real purpose and intent of the legislature will prevail over the literal import of the words. When the intention of a statute is plainly discernible from its provisions that intention is as obligatory as the letter of the statute, and will even prevail over the strict letter. The reason of the law, as indicated by its general terms, should prevail over its letter, when the plain purpose of the act will be defeated by strict adherence to its verbiage. It is frequently the case that, in order to harmonize conflicting provisions and to effectuate the intention and purpose of the lawmaking power, courts must either restrict or enlarge the ordinary meaning of words. The legislative intention, as collected from an examination of the whole as well as the separate parts of a statute, will prevail over the literal import of particular terms, and will control the strict letter of the statute, where an adherence to such strict letter would lead to injustice, to absurdity, or contradictory provisions. It is an old and unshaken rule in the construction of statutes that the intention of a remedial statute will always prevail over the literal sense of its terms, and therefore when the expression is special or particular, but the reason is general, the expression should be deemed general. It is also an old and well established rule of the common law, applicable to all written instruments, that ‘verba intentioni, none contra, debent inservire’; that is to say, words ought to be more subservient to the intent, and not the intent to the words. Every statute, it has been said, should be expounded, not according to the letter, but *180 according to the meaning; for he who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin deep into its meaning.” 25 R.C.L. 967, 968.

“In pursuance of the general object of giving effect to the intention of the legislature, the courts are not controlled by the literal meaning of the language of the statute, but the spirit or intention of the law prevails over the letter thereof, it being generally recognized that whatever is within the spirit of the statute is within the statute although it is not within the letter thereof, while that which is within the letter, although not within the spirit, is not within the statute. Effect will be given the real intention even though contrary to the letter of the law. The rule of construction according to the spirit of the law is especially applicable where adherence to the letter would result in absurdity or injustice, or would lead to contradictions, or would defeat the plain purpose of the act, or where the provision was inserted through inadvertence. In following this rule, words may be modified or rejected and others substituted, or words and phrases may be transposed. So the meaning of general language may be restrained by the spirit or reason of the statute, and may be construed to admit implied exceptions.” 59 C.J. 964 et seq.

“Apportionment” and “reapportionment” used in the amendment necessarily mean the dividing of the state into districts so that each district has a certain population, and dividing the representatives and senators so that each county shall have representation according to its population.

“The fundamental purpose in construing a constitutional provision is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the framers and of the people who adopted it. The court, therefore, should constantly keep in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. Effect should be given to the purpose indicated by a fair interpretation of the language used. The intent may be shown by implications as well as by express provisions.” 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law, § 16, 51.

The rules governing the construction of constitutional amendments are the same as those governing the construction of statutes. We are of the opinion that by the adoption of Amendment No. 23, the people intended to correct certain evils that then existed; some counties with a small population having more representatives than others with a larger population; and the same was true as to senatorial districts. This evil was corrected by the apportionment provided for, but if construed as contended for by appellant, we would not only correct that evil, but create a worse one. We do not think that the legislature intended that the amendment should be so construed as to deprive persons who were elected for four years of two years of their terms, and give others, who were elected for four years, a six year term.