“A plan with larger disparities ... [than 10%] ... creates a prima facie case of discrimination and ... must be justified by the State.”
“While this percentage may well approach tolerable limits, we do not believe it exceeds them.”
“[T]he [Supreme] Court has never enunciated specific maximum variations which will invalidate a reapportionment....”
“We are doubtful ... that the deviations [for the Texas House of Representatives] evident here [about 26%] are the kind of ‘minor’ variations which Reynolds v. Sims indicated might be justified by ... the maintenance of established political subdivisions.... ... But we need not reach that constitutional question, for we are not convinced that the announced policy ... necessitated the range of deviations between legislative districts.... ... [Among other deficiencies in its findings,] the District Court [did not] articulate any satisfactory grounds for rejecting at least two other plans ..., which respected county lines but which produced substantially smaller deviations from the principles of Reynolds v. Sims. ”
“[O]vervaluation of the votes of those living here has the certain effect of ... undervaluation of the votes of those living there. The resulting discrimination against those individual voters living in disfavored areas is easily demonstrable mathematically. Their right to vote is simply not the same right to vote as that of those living in a favored part of the State. Two, five, or 10 of them must vote before the effect of their voting is equivalent to that of their favored neighbor.”
“On the undisputed facts it is obvious that a voter in the Bronx or Staten Island gets substantially more representation for his or her ballot than a voter in Brooklyn or Queens. The effect is to deprive voters in the latter boroughs of an equal opportunity to participate in the political process.”
“Nor does the city-wide presence dictate adjusting [the] methodology [to account for their alleged influence on the disproportion]. As prior decisions properly have done, the at-large representation should be eliminated from the deviation computation. That approach comports with the Board's existing theoretical relationships, with the common sense limitation on valid mathematical assessment and, ultimately, with the Supreme Court's guidance.”
“A change in the Board's composition and voting strength would be a breach of an implied condition under which [Staten Island] gave up its own self governance and entered into Greater New York in 1898 and would result in [its] residents ... being deprived of a chance to influence decisions which have a great impact upon their county's future.”
“This interest is clearly cognizable.... Each of the five vestigial county government[s] constitutes a political subdivision of the City ... deserv[ing] to have its integrity respected. ... As long as the chief executives of the county governments are representatives on the Board, there will be no necessity to compromise the integrity of these subdivisions.”
“Effective local self-government and intergovernmental cooperation are purposes of the people of the state.”
“The resources of the City ... are limited, though the demands made ... are infinite. Therefore, resource allocation is necessary. The Board ... is the one [body] which has developed systems and expertise in the resolution of conflict between local and city-wide interest.”
“Meaningful representation for the lesser populated boroughs is achieved when their borough presidents have influence and power over Board decisions [, approximately in proportion to population represented].”
“The showing required to justify population deviations is flexible, depending on the size of the deviations, the importance of the State's interests, the consistency with which the plan ... reflects those interests, and the availability of alternatives that might substantially vindicate those interests yet approximate population equality more closely.”
“Does it really make sense that [the Brooklyn] borough president, representing 31.5% of the City's population, should have 80% of the voting power of the Mayor, Comptroller [or] City Council President, all of whom have been elected by the City as a whole?”
“[The litigants are to list those contested] policies and interests which at least one defendant maintains are valid and are presently served by the Board.”
“[R]epresentative government is in essence self-government through ... elected representatives ... and every citizen has an inalienable right to full and effective participation in the political processes of his State's legislative bodies. Most citizens can achieve this participation only as qualified voters through the election of legislators to represent them. Full and effective participation by all citizens in state government requires, therefore, that each citizen have an equally effective voice in the election of members of his state legislature.”
“The heart of plaintiffs' response ... is that a Board with an equal vote for ... each borough is unnecessary to satisfy the interests.... ... Since none of the concededly valid interests requires the [present] voting dilution ..., no justification exists for deviating from one person, one vote strictures.”
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