The purpose of [the ban] is to promote public safety and welfare by regulating signs in keeping with the following objectives: (1) [t]hat the design, construction, installation, repair and maintenance of signs will not interfere with traffic safety or otherwise endanger public safety, (2) [t]hat the regulations will provide reasonable protection to the visual environment while providing adequate conditions for meeting sign users['] needs; (3) [t]hat incompatibility between signs and their surroundings will be reduced; (4) [t]hat both the public and sign users will benefit from signs having improved legibility, readability and visibility; (5) [t]hat consideration will be given to equalizing the opportunity for messages to be displayed, and (6) [t]hat adequacy of message opportunity will be available to sign users without dominating the visual appearance of the area.
References in memoranda and declarations to a need for discovery do not qualify as motions under Rule 56(f). Rule 56(f) requires affidavits setting forth the particular facts expected from the movant's discovery. Failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 56(f) is a proper ground for denying discovery and proceeding to summary judgment.
While it is no doubt fair to assume that more advertising would have some impact on overall demand for gambling, it is also reasonable to assume that much of that advertising would merely channel gamblers to one casino rather than another. More important, any measure of the effectiveness of the Government's attempt to minimize the social costs of gambling cannot ignore Congress' simultaneous encouragement of tribal casino gambling, which may well be growing at a rate exceeding any increase in gambling or compulsive gambling that private casino advertising could produce.
We need not resolve the question whether any lack of evidence in the record fails to satisfy the standard of proof under Central Hudson, however, because the flaw in the Government's case is more fundamental: The operation of [18 U.S.C.] § 1304 and its attendant regulatory regime is so pierced by exemptions and inconsistencies that the Government cannot hope to exonerate it.
There can be no question that a prohibition on the erection of billboards infringes freedom of speech: The exceptions do not create the infringement, rather the general prohibition does. But the exceptions to the general prohibition are of great significance in assessing the strength of the city's interest in prohibiting billboards.
More important, any measure of the effectiveness of the Government's attempt to minimize the social costs of gambling cannot ignore Congress' simultaneous encouragement of tribal casino gambling, which may well be growing at a rate exceeding any increase in gambling or compulsive gambling that private casino advertising could produce.
The ordinance is not narrowly tailored because there are many options available to the city that would address its aesthetic, safety, and proliferation concerns without placing the significant burden on commercial speech that the ordinance does. None of these options would be less effective in promoting the asserted interests than is the complete ban on distribution of commercial handbills.
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