Harrell v. Cane Growers' Co-op. Ass'n | Cases | Westlaw

“An act to promote, foster and encourage the intelligent and orderly marketing of agricultural products through co–operation, and to eliminate speculation and waste; and to make the distribution of agricultural products as direct as can be efficiently done between producer and consumer; and to stabilize the marketing problems of agricultural products; and for other purposes.”

“Novelty is no argument against constitutionality. Changing economic conditions, temporary or permanent, may make necessary or beneficial the right of public regulation. * * * The question comes back to what the state may do for the benefit of the community at large. Here the legislation rests on a secure foundation. * * * The struggle to meet changing conditions through new legislation constantly goes on.”

“From the very nature of things farmers cannot produce in groups. Their occupation is essentially personal and individualistic. A great manufacturing industry can consolidate under the ownership of a single corporation, with a multitude of stockholders, a great number of originally separate establishments, and thus effect economies and concentrations and acquire for itself a power in the markets where it must buy, and in the markets where it must sell, such as have not been available to agriculture. The farmer is the most individualistic and independent citizen among us. He comes nearer to being self–sufficient, but precisely because of this he has not means of co–operation, co–ordination, and consolidation which serve so usefully in other industries. A score or more manufacturers consolidate their interests under a corporate organization and attain a great increase of their power in the markets, whether they are buying or selling. The farmer, from the very mode of his life, has been estopped from these combinations; therefore, because he buys and sells as an individual, it is his fate to buy in the dearest, and sell in the cheapest, market. * * * Take co–operative marketing. American farmers are asking for, and it *539 should be possible to afford them, ample provision of law under which they may carry on in co–operative fashion those business operations which lend themselves to that method, and which, thus handled, would bring advantages to both the farmer and his consuming public.”

“Damages, of course, are of no real value. The association must have crops to market, or it will go out of business; therefore relief in *540 equity is provided, and it is an essential point in this case.”

“The object was expressed in the broadest terms, so as to admit of any taxation by the Legislature, or of any provision to authorize taxation by the mayor and council of * * * Columbus, within its constitutional power to grant.”

“Because the act under which the plaintiff was operating is unconstitutional on the grounds referred to and set forth in defendant's answer; and because the contract sued *542 on is not authorized by said act, for the reasons set forth in the answer.”

“Defendant shows that the act under which the plaintiff was incorporated and the contract made in this case, pursuant thereof, are null and void, in that the same is in violation of art. 4, sec. 1, par. 4, of the Constitution, in that it was the intention of the plaintiff and the members forming the same to combine all of the cane products grown in southwest Georgia, so as to be able to fix the price at which the same would be sold, and to be able to effect a corner of the syrup manufactured in southwest Georgia, so as to enable the association to dictate the price to be paid for said syrup by the canners who depended upon said crop for their material to operate their canneries.”

“Defendant shows that sections 3, 4, and 5 of said act under which the plaintiff was incorporated is unconstitutional, in that the title of said act does not cover said provisions, and does not authorize the creation of an incorporation as set forth therein, and is therefore in violation of art. 3, sec. 7, par. 8, of the Constitution of Georgia.”

“Sec. 15. Be it further enacted, that the association and its members may make and execute marketing contracts, requiring the members *543 to sell, for any period of time, not over ten years, all or any specified part of their agricultural products or specified commodities exclusively to or through the association or any facilities to be created by the association. The contract may provide that the association may sell or resell the products of its members, with or without taking title thereto; and pay over to its members the resale price, after deducting all necessary selling, overhead and other costs and expenses, including interest on preferred stock, not exceeding 8 per cent. per annum, and reserves for retiring the stock, if any; and other proper reserves; and interest not exceeding eight per cent. per annum upon common stock; or other items deemed proper. The by–laws and the marketing contract may fix, as liquidated damages, specified sums to be paid by the member or stockholder to the association upon the breach by him of any provision of the marketing contract regarding the sale or delivery or withholding of products; and may further provide that the member will pay all costs, premiums for bonds, expenses and fees in case any action is brought upon the contract by the association; and any such provisions shall be valid and enforceable in the courts of this state. In the event of any such breach or threatened breach of such marketing contract by a member, the association shall be entitled to an injunction to prevent the further breach of the contract, and to a decree of specific performance thereof. Pending the adjudication of such an action and upon filing a verified complaint showing the breach or threatened breach, and upon filing a sufficient bond, the association shall be entitled to a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against the member.”

“The Fourteenth Amendment in no way undertakes to control the power of a state to determine by what process legal rights may be asserted or legal obligations be enforced, provided the method of procedure adopted for these purposes gives reasonable notice and affords fair opportunity to be heard before the issues are decided. This being the case, it was obviously not a right, privilege, or immunity of a citizen of the United States to have a controversy in the state court prosecuted or determined by one form of action instead of by another. It is also equally evident, provided the form sanctioned by the state law gives notice and affords an opportunity to be heard, that the mere question of whether it was by a motion or ordinary action in no way rendered the proceeding not due process of law within the constitutional meaning of those words.”

“The Legislature not infrequently extends the jurisdiction of courts, both of law and of equity, to new cases, and it assigns them to the one court or the other in conformity with the remedy each is accustomed to administer. * * * It is true that heretofore the rule in equity has been not to exercise its jurisdiction to restrain nuisances, unless a serious public injury has been shown to exist––an injury not remediable in the ordinary tribunals. * * * The reason is that the remedy at law has been found adequate. Here, however, we are dealing, not with the jurisdiction ordinarily exercised by this court, but with a jurisdiction conferred by statute. To deny the constitutional validity of the act is to assert that the Legisture cannot afford what is undoubtedly an appropriate remedy for a new and threatening wrong; that it may, indeed, punish, but * * * cannot prevent.”

“If it is competent for the Legislature to accomplish these objects, by any mode of judicial proceeding, it may as well be done in the form of a bill in equity as in any other. It seems to be a well–settled rule that, where the Legislature have the power to provide redress for either a public or private wrong, the remedy or mode of redress is wholly a subject of legislative discretion. If an injunction is better adapted to accomplish the objects proposed than any other form of judicial process, there seems [to be] no reason why the Legislature should not have power to direct it.”

“The General Assembly of this state shall have no power to authorize any corporation to buy shares of stock in any other corporation in this state or elsewhere, or to make any contract, or agreement whatever, with any such corporation, which may have the effect, or be intended to have the effect, to defeat or lessen competition in their respective businesses, or to encourage monopoly; and all such contracts and agreements shall be illegal and void.”

“But if, considered with reference to the situation, business, and objects of the parties, and in the light of all the surrounding circumstances with reference to which the contract was made, the restraint contracted for appears to have been for a just and honest purpose, for the protection of the legitimate interests of the party in whose favor it is imposed, reasonable as between them, and not specially injurious to the public, the restraint will be held valid. The true test, therefore, of the validity of such a contract is, whether it is supported by a sufficient consideration, and whether the restraint is reasonable.”

“We do not see how a better test can be applied to the question whether reasonable or not than by considering whether the restraint is such only as to afford a fair protection to the interest of the party in whose favor it is given, and not so large as to interfere with the interest of the public. Whatever restraint is larger than necessary to the protection of the parties can be of no benefit to either; it can only be oppressive; and, if oppressive, it is in the eye of the law unreasonable. Whatever is injurious to the interest of the public is void on the ground of public policy.”

“It has often been held that monopolies may be created, even in such business as may fall within the ordinary callings of life, where an indiscriminate conduct thereof by individuals under certain circumstances and in certain places might be injurious to the common welfare. These principles are fully discussed in Tiedeman's Limitations of Police Power, § 105.”

“There is some conflict of authority upon the right of a Legislature or a municipality to create a monopoly in a business legal per se, and which requires no license from the state in order to enable individuals to engage therein; but the weight of authority as well as reason seems to us to sustain the view that wherever such a power is exercised in the interests of the public health or morals, it is legitimately within the police powers of a state.”

“As has been often pointed out, one who seeks to set aside a State anti–trust statute as repugnant to the federal Constitution must show that he is within the class with respect to whom the act is unconstitutional, and that the alleged unconstitutional feature injures him. The objection that such a statute unlawfully discriminates in favor of certain classes cannot be raised by a member of the favored class, nor by any one not affected by the invalid portion of the act.”

“One attacking the constitutionality of a state statute must show that he is within the class whose constitutional rights are injuriously affected by the statute.”

“As has been often pointed out, one who seeks to set aside a state statute as repugnant to the federal Constitution must show that he is within the class with respect to whom the act is unconstitutional, and that the alleged unconstitutional feature injures him.”

“If it [the act] could be held to be discriminatory it is clear that that question cannot be raised by the defendant. He has not been discriminated against. He has not been denied any privilege or immunity that is granted to any other person or class of persons, nor has he been denied the equal protection of the law.”