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Brown v. Long Beach Police Dept.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.July 16, 2004105 Fed.Appx. 549 (Approx. 3 pages)

Brown v. Long Beach Police Dept.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.July 16, 2004105 Fed.Appx. 549 (Approx. 3 pages)

105 Fed.Appx. 549
This case was not selected for publication in the Federal Reporter.
Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter See Fed. Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 generally governing citation of judicial decisions issued on or after Jan. 1, 2007. See also Fifth Circuit Rules 28.7, 47.5.3, 47.5.4. (Find CTA5 Rule 28 and Find CTA5 Rule 47)
United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
Marie BROWN, Mother and Next Friend of Nicole Brown, Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
LONG BEACH POLICE DEPARTMENT; et al., Defendants,
Anthony Kallas, Defendant–Appellant.
No. 03–60902Summary Calendar.
July 16, 2004.

Attorneys and Law Firms

*550 William Carl Miller, Miller, Fowlkes, Farrior & Alldredge, Biloxi, MS, for Plaintiff–Appellee.
Edward Coleman Taylor, Daniel, Coker, Horton & Bell, Gulfport, MS, for Defendant–Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, USDC No. 1:02–CV–697.
Before SMITH, DeMOSS and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

PER CURIAM:*
**1 Officer Anthony Kallas appeals the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint on the basis of qualified immunity. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Officer Kallas argues that there was no evidence that he violated any clearly established constitutional rights of Nicole Brown and that even if his tackling of Brown was unconstitutional, there was no caselaw indicating as much at the time of the arrest.
Qualified immunity shields police officers from suit “unless their conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right.” Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621, 623 (5th Cir.2003). Brown, a teenage girl weighing less than 100 pounds with no known history of violence, alleged that when she fled from Officer Kallas, a 300 pound man who was attempting to arrest her for truancy, he chased and tackled her and her pelvis was broken as a result of the tackle. As the facts are not in dispute, it does not appear beyond doubt that Brown will be unable to prove the elements of an excessive force claim. See Rochon v. City of Angola, 122 F.3d 319, 320 (5th Cir.1997); Ikerd v. Blair, 101 F.3d 430, 433–34 (5th Cir.1996).
Officer Kallas argues that the right was not “clearly established” at the time of the arrest. See Mace, 333 F.3d at 623. Although there was no caselaw expressly prohibiting the tackling of a fleeing teenage girl weighing less than 100 pounds, there was no caselaw permitting it, and the right under the Fourth Amendment to be free from the excessive use of force by law enforcement officers was clearly established. *551 See Ikerd, 101 F.3d at 433–34. It does not appear beyond doubt that Brown will be unable to prove that Officer Kallas' actions were objectively unreasonable, especially in light of the nonviolent nature of the offense for which he was arresting her (truancy) and the apparent lack of threat she posed to anyone. See Gutierrez v. City of San Antonio, 139 F.3d 441, 447 (5th Cir.1998). The district court did not err in denying Officer Kallas' motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity.
AFFIRMED.

All Citations

105 Fed.Appx. 549,

Footnotes

Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
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