place[s] a condition on the recipient of the subsidy rather than on the particular program or service, thus effectively prohibiting the recipient from engaging in the protected conduct outside the scope of the federally funded program.
*1466 When a court reviews an agency's construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.[ ] If however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute,[ ] as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.[ ]
An action to enforce any liability created under this section may be brought in the district court of the United States in the district in which the complainant resides, or has his principal place of business, or in which the agency records are situated, or in the District of Columbia, without regard to the amount in controversy.
When disclosure of information which applies to a particular individual is sought from Government records, courts must determine whether release of the information would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of that person's privacy.
In this case, the allegations are much more specific: the applicants have complained that the challenged investigative activity will have the concrete effects of dissuading some YSA delegates from participating actively in the convention and leading to possible loss of employment for those who are identified as being in attendance. Whether the claimed “chill” is substantial or not is still subject to question. The specificity of the injury claimed by the applicants is sufficient, under Laird, to satisfy the requirements of Article III.
artistic excellence and artistic merit are the criteria by which applications are judged, taking into consideration general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public.
the university is a traditional sphere of free expression so fundamental to the functioning of our society that the Government's ability to control speech within that sphere by means of conditions attached to the expenditure of funds is restricted by the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines of the First Amendment.
It has long been recognized that the First Amendment needs breathing space and that statutes attempting to restrict or burden the exercise of First Amendment rights must be narrowly drawn and represent a considered legislative judgment that a particular mode of expression has to give way to other compelling needs of society.
the fact that given speech is thought by many to be highly offensive, either because it espouses political, religious, racial or other doctrines which to many are most abhorrent,[ ] or because of its use of “indecent” words,[ ] does not, absent a showing of likely and imminent antisocial *1476 conduct arising from such speech, constitute a ground for abridging speech.
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