Jones relies on a Ninth Circuit decision,
Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir.1992) (en banc), in which the Court held that a
§ 1983 cause of action exists against officials who purposely planned to deprive criminal suspects of their
Miranda rights in order to coerce involuntary confessions. However, as observed by the Third Circuit, the
Cooper case broke new ground, and was decided under an unusual fact situation.
Giuffre, 31 F.3d at 1256. In
Cooper, the defendant law enforcement officers admitted they engaged in a pre-existing interrogation plan whereby they ignored the suspect's repeated requests to speak with an attorney, deliberately infringed on his right to remain silent, and relentlessly interrogated him in an attempt to extract a confession.
963 F.2d at 1223–32. As noted by the dissent in
Cooper, the majority acted with “zeal to respond forcefully to deplorable police conduct in [that] case.”
963 F.2d at 1256 (Brunetti, J., dissenting). We agree with the dissent that “the majority has departed from the clear requirements for
§ 1983 actions.”
Id. Rather, “[b]ecause the violation of the
Miranda procedure alone is not a violation of the Fifth Amendment, a remedy under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not available.”
Id. at 1253 (Brunetti, J., dissenting).