Al Raschid v. News Syndicate Co. | Cases | Westlaw

We agree with the Appellate Division that proceedings before the immigration authorities are not judicial proceedings. The administration of the immigration laws is vested in a Commissioner General of Immigration who is an officer in the Department of Labor and performs his duties under the direction of the Secretary of Labor. U. S. Code Annotated, tit. 8, §§ 101, 102. The duties of the Commissioners of Immigration and other immigration officials are administrative in character to be prescribed in detail by regulations prepared under the direction or with the approval of the Secretary of Labor (section 108). Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651, 12 S. Ct. 336, 35 L. Ed. 1146; White v. Gregory (C. C. A.) 213 F. 768; United States v. Greenawalt (D. C.) 213 F. 901. See, in point, Hayashida v. Kakimoto, 132 Cal. App. 743, 23 P.(2d) 311; Bodwell v. Osgood, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 379, 15 Am. Dec. 228; Burt v. Smith, 181 N. Y. 1, 73 N. E. 495, 2 Ann. Cas. 576.

Neither does the plaintiff say that the defendant instigated or prosecuted any action even if the proceeding were of a judicial nature; merely that it gave false information. This is not enough. Barry v. Third Avenue R. R. Co., 51 App. Div. 385, 64 N. Y. S. 615.

So much for the appellant's insistence that this is an action for malicious prosecutions. **714 Whatever we may call it an action does lie, however, if the complaint states any facts showing a wrong which the law recognizes and will redress. One may not be liable for malicious prosecutions and yet be legally responsible for maliciously circulating or giving false information resulting in intentional *4 injury to another. Even a lawful act done solely out of malice and ill will to injure another may be actionable. Beardsley v. Kilmer, 236 N. Y. 80, 140 N. E. 203, 27 A. L. R. 1411. ‘A man has a right to give advice, but advice given for the sole purpose of injuring another's business and effective on a large scale, might create a cause of action.’ American Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 256 U. S. 350, 358, 41 S. Ct. 499, 500, 65 L. Ed. 983. An action will lie for knowingly and intentionally and without reasonable justification or excuse inducing a breach of contract. Lamb v. S. Cheney & Son, 227 N. Y. 418, 125 N. E. 817; Hornstein v. Podwitz, 254 N. Y. 443, 173 N. E. 674, 84 A. L. R. 1; Campbell v. Gates, 236 N. Y. 457, 141 N. E. 914. Where one set up a barber shop for the sole purpose of injuring the plaintiff's business and driving him out of it—the wrongdoer being wealthy and not interested in the business itself—and diverted customers from the plaintiff solely for the accomplishment of his malevolent purpose, an action lies against him. Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N. W. 946, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 599, 131 Am. St. Rep. 446, 16 Ann. Cas. 807.

If the appellant had told us what the false information was he might have stated a good cause of action. He says the defendant maliciously without any justifiable excuse gave false information to the immigration officials which caused his arrest and wrongful deportation to his damage. We must know, however, what the information *5 was. Even in libel and slander, which are actions founded in malice, the words written or spoken must be pleaded. The information may have been harmless and the statement that it caused his arrest a mere conclusion or surmise not a fact. A complaint must contain a concise statement of the material facts which must be proved upon the trial. Civil Practice Act, § 241. For this omission the pleading is bad.