While
§ 34–1–2–2 Second does not expressly refer to state police officers, it seems obvious to us, even without judicial interpretation, that state police officers are public officers. However, we need not base our conclusion that a police officer is a public officer within the meaning of
§ 34–1–2–2 Second on our own interpretation of the term, for it has already been judicially construed to include police officers.
Bottos v. Avakian, 477 F.Supp. 610 (N.D.Ind.1979). The
Bottos court defined a public officer by the nature of the duties attached to the position. It noted that a public officer was one who held an office having special duties prescribed by law to serve a public purpose, and that those duties were invested with “some of the functions pertinent to sovereignty.”
Id. at 614 (citations omitted). It concluded that since a police officer had the duties to preserve the peace, protect and arrest offenders, suppress riots, protect the rights of persons and property, inspect all places of business under license, and enforce and prevent the violation of all ordinances and laws in force, a police officer was a public officer. We find that analysis compelling and adopt it here.