1972 | Shoplifting | 2 years | ||
1973 | Burglary | 5 years | ||
1977 | Second Degree Sexual Assault | 7 years, each | ||
robbery | count, concurrent | |||
burglary | ||||
1980 | Armed Robbery | 25 years | ||
1982 | Aggravated Assault | 25 years | ||
armed Robbery | ||||
attempted Armed Robbery | ||||
assault on a Law Enforcement Officer | ||||
1995 | Burglary | 6 years |
The Court instructs the Jury that it must be emphasized that the procedure that you must follow is not a mere counting process of a certain number of aggravating circumstances versus the number of mitigating circumstances. Rather, you must apply your reasoned judgment as to whether this situation calls for life imprisonment without parole, life imprisonment or whether it requires the imposition of death, in light of the totality of the circumstances present.
The Court instructs the Jury that at this hearing, the State may elect to stand on the case made at the guilt hearing and you may consider the evidence *645 presented during the guilt phase of this trial together with the evidence presented at the sentencing phase in deciding whether the Defendant shall be sentenced to death, life imprisonment without parole, or life imprisonment.
At the sentencing hearing, the question to be decided by the jury is whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment. At this hearing, the State may elect to stand on the case made at the first hearing, if before the same jury, or may reintroduce any part of the evidence adduced at the first hearing which it considers to be relevant to the particular question of whether the defendant shall suffer death or be sentenced to life imprisonment. Jackson v. State, 337 So.2d at 1256. See also Evans v. State, 725 So.2d 613, , ¶ 395–97 (Miss.1997); Holland v. State, 705 So.2d 307, 350 (Miss.1997); Williams v. State, 684 So.2d 1179, 1207 (Miss.1996); Davis v. State, 660 So.2d 1228, 1253–54 (Miss.1995); Mack v. State, 650 So.2d 1289, 1323–24 (Miss.1994); Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263, 1301 (Miss.1994); In re Jordan, 390 So.2d 584, 585 (Miss.1980). Further, this Court has held that it is “preferable” for the State to move for the reintroduction of the evidence produced at the guilt phase at the beginning of the sentencing phase. Mack v. State, 650 So.2d 1289, 1323–24 (Miss.1994).
The Court instructs the Jury that if the State has resorted, in any way or in the least, to circumstantial evidence to maintain its theory of guilt of the Defendant, then the evidence for the State and every part and parcel of it must be so strong as to establish the guilt of the Defendant not only beyond every reasonable doubt, but the evidence must be so strong as to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis, or supposition, except that of guilt.
The Court instructs the jury that if there be any facts or circumstances in this case acceptable to two reasonable interpretations, one favorable and the other unfavorable to the Defendant, and when the jurors have considered such facts and circumstances with all the other evidence, there is a reasonable doubt as to the correct interpretation, the jury must resolve such doubt in favor of the Defendant and place upon such facts or circumstances the interpretation favorable to the Defendant.
At the outset of a trial the Defendant is presumed to be wholly innocent of the whole crime charged, he is not required to prove himself innocent or put on any evidence at all. In considering testimony in the case you must look at the testimony and view it in the light of that presumption which the law clothes the Defendant with, that he is wholly innocent, and it is a presumption that abides with him throughout the trial of the case until the evidence convinces you to the contrary beyond all reasonable doubt of his guilt, and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis consistent with his innocence.
A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components. First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.
The argument is the familiar “stacking” argument that the state can elevate murder to felony murder and then, using the same circumstances, can elevate the crime to capital murder with two aggravating circumstances. As pointed out in Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1317, 1337 (Miss.1987), this Court has consistently rejected this argument. Minnick v. State, 551 So.2d at 96–97. The United States Supreme Court has confirmed that this practice does not render a death sentence unconstitutional.
[T]he Count II sexual battery charge is a separate and distinct act. In Count I, the sexual battery involved the act of penetrating the victim's anus with a bat. The Count II sexual battery charge involved the act of penetrating the victim's anus with Blue's penis. Second, there is no proof that the sexual battery used as an aggravating circumstance was that found in Count II. Even if the Count II act of sexual battery was used as an aggravating circumstance, as the State asserts, aggravating circumstances carry no penalty. The only purpose aggravating circumstances serve is to narrow the class of individuals most worthy of receiving the death penalty and to furnish guidance to the jury in determining whether to impose a sentence of death in a capital murder case. The class has been narrowed sufficiently in Blue's case.
The Court instructs the jury that the killing of a human being without malice, by the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of another, shall be manslaughter. In the event that you do not find the Defendant guilty of Capital Murder as charged, nor murder, but do believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence that the Defendant is guilty of manslaughter, then it is your sworn duty to find the Defendant guilty of manslaughter.
The Court instructs the jury that you need not find any mitigating circumstances in order to return a sentence of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole. A life sentence without eligibility for parole may be returned regardless of the evidence.
FN* Case was originally affirmed in this Court but on remand from U.S. Supreme Court, case was remanded by this Court for a new sentencing hearing.
FN* Case was originally affirmed in this Court but on remand from U.S. Supreme Court, case was remanded by this Court for a new sentencing hearing.
End of Document | © 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. |