First, with respect to the Commonwealth's assertion that a mandatory filing fee properly limits ballot access to serious candidates, we note, as the District Court did,
see Belitskus, 243 F.Supp.2d 179 at 183–84, that the
Bullock Court found such fees to be “extraordinarily ill-fitted to that goal” due to the availability of other means for protecting such interests.
Bullock, 405 U.S. at 146, 92 S.Ct. 849. Indeed, courts in subsequent cases have repeatedly held that mandatory fees do not, in and of themselves, properly separate out spurious candidates.
See, e.g., Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 964, 102 S.Ct. 2836, 73 L.Ed.2d 508 (1982) (“Economic status is not a measure of a prospective candidate's qualifications to hold elective office, and a filing fee alone is an inadequate test of whether a candidacy is serious or spurious.”);
Lubin, 415 U.S. at 717, 94 S.Ct. 1315 (“Filing fees, however large, do not, in and of themselves, test the genuineness of a candidacy or the extent of the voter support of an aspirant for public office. A large filing fee may serve the legitimate function of keeping ballots manageable but, standing alone, it is not a certain test of whether the candidacy is serious or spurious.”);
Fulani, 973 F.2d at 1547 (states “cannot use [a signature verification fee] to decide who deserves to be on the ballot,” as “a party's ability to pay a verification fee is not rationally related to whether that party has a modicum of support”);
Dixon v. Maryland State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws, 878 F.2d 776, 784 (4th Cir.1989) (noting that mandatory fees “bar neither a wealthy frivolous candidate, who can afford the fee, nor a destitute one, who is entitled to a waiver”).