The demurrer in this case does not raise what it seems to me is the most serious objection to the suit, namely, the question of jurisdiction. The demurrer may possibly by construed as presenting that issue, but it is doubtful. The plaintiff does not content himself with the averment that he was wrongfully and maliciously or illegally deprived of the right to vote in a national election, accompanied with the further averment that he was qualified to vote under the constitution and laws of the United States and of the state of Tennessee, so as to bring the case within the ruling in
Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 61, 21 Sup.Ct. 17, 45 L.Ed. 84. On the contrary, the declaration goes further than this, and avers specifically, and throughout impliedly shows, that the plaintiff was denied no right secured to him under the constitution and laws of the United States, but, on the contrary, avers that his right to vote was fully acknowledged, provided he would comply with the statute of the state called the ‘Dortch Law,‘ which regulates the exercise of the elective franchise in this state. It is distinctly averred, and is plainly evident, that plaintiff was denied the right to vote because he expressly refused to comply with this statute of the state called the ‘Dortch Law,‘ upon the ground that an act of the general assembly (chapter 163, Act 1899), extending the Dortch law to the district of plaintiff's residence, is unconstitutional as applied to the district in, and the precinct at, which the plaintiff was attempting to vote. The action in no wise depends upon the theory or proposition that the Dortch law in its general application is unconstitutional. On the contrary, the constitutionality of the act has been declared by the supreme court of the state (
Cook v. State, 90 Tenn. 408, 16 S.W. 471), and such a conclusion is accepted by the courts of the United
States (Mason v. Missouri, 179 U.S. 328, 21 Sup.Ct. 125, 45 L.Ed 214).