Hunter attempts to draw an analogy to
Brush v. San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co., 315 F.Supp. 577 (N.D.Cal. 1970) (appeal pending, No. 26,666, 9 th Cir.), in which it was held that § 704(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S. C. § 2000e-3, does not include newspapers in its proscription of discriminatory employment advertisements.
Brush, however, is inapposite, because the section there involved is fundamentally different from our
§ 3604(c) in that the 1964 Act specifically lists the persons regulated: “an employer, labor organization, or employment agency.” The
Brush court held that a newspaper was none of these and that, under the maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, it did not fall within the Act's restriction. Moreover,
Brush relied on a clear statement in the legislative history of the 1964 Act that newspapers were not required to exercise any control or supervision over the advertisements they published. In contrast to the section construed in
Brush, no restriction in scope appears on the face of
§ 3604(c). Unlike other sections of the Fair Housing title,
§ 3604(c) does not provide any specific exemptions or designate the persons covered, but rather, as the court below noted, applies on its face to “anyone” printing or publishing illegal advertisements.
Brush is, therefore, not persuasive in interpreting the instant section.