Today we agree with both of our sister circuits and the district court in this case, which concluded that it was “difficult to conceive of any reasonable interpretation of Section 2 that does not involve abrogation of the state's immunity.” The VRA, as amended, clearly expresses an intent to allow private parties to sue the States. The language of § 2 and § 3, read together, imposes direct liability on States for discrimination in voting and explicitly provides remedies to private parties to address violations under the statute. Unlike the general authorizations in the statutes at issue in
Atascadero and
Welch, § 2
specifically forbids “any
State” from imposing a practice that would deny any citizen the right to vote on account of race.
52 U.S.C. § 10301 (emphasis added);
see Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 246, 105 S.Ct. 3142;
Welch, 483 U.S. at 476, 107 S.Ct. 2941. And § 3 repeatedly refers to proceedings initiated by “the Attorney General
or an aggrieved person” to enforce § 2 or other provisions of the VRA.
52 U.S.C. § 10302(a),
(b), and
(c). Thus, read as a whole, the VRA makes it clear that Congress intended to permit “aggrieved person[s]” to bring proceedings against “any State or political subdivision.”
Indeed, like the statute at issue in
Seminole Tribe, the VRA is a carefully designed remedial statute—one that is predicated upon suits against States.
See 517 U.S. at 57, 116 S.Ct. 1114. It is implausible that Congress designed a statute that primarily prohibits certain state conduct, made that statute enforceable by private parties, but did not intend for private parties to be able to sue States.