Local Union No. 57, Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers of America v. Boyd | Cases | Westlaw

Local Union No. 57, Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers of America v. Boyd | Cases | Westlaw

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Local Union No. 57, Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers of America v. Boyd

Supreme Court of Alabama.February 3, 1944245 Ala. 22716 So.2d 705 (Approx. 11 pages)

Local Union No. 57, Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers of America v. Boyd

Supreme Court of Alabama.February 3, 1944245 Ala. 22716 So.2d 705 (Approx. 11 pages)

245 Ala. 227
Supreme Court of Alabama.
LOCAL UNION NO. 57, BROTHERHOOD OF PAINTERS, DECORATORS AND PAPERHANGERS OF AMERICA, et al.
v.
BOYD.
6 Div. 190.
Feb. 3, 1944.
**707 *229 The appeal is from a decree overruling a demurrer to the bill. The salient averments of fact are as follows:
The Bechtel-McCone-Parsons Corporation, which was engaged in war work, entered into a contract in January, 1943, with the Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators, and Paperhangers of America, which contract provided in effect that the corporation would requisition the painters needed on the job through the local painters' union. Other provisions of the contract were to the effect: that if the union advises the contractor that any member employed on the project is no longer in good standing, the contractor shall release such defaulting workman and substitute a member in good standing in the union; that there shall be no strikes or lockouts on account of any labor dispute; that all disputes be submitted to arbitration; and that there be no limitation placed upon the amount of work any workman shall perform. Persons in confidential relationships, such as superintendent, were subject to employment by the contractor without regard to union membership. The contractor was to be the sole judge of the competency of the workmen, and the contract discloses upon its face that the work is a part of the war program.
Work was begun about February 1st, 1943, on the modification of aircraft. On that date the contractor corporation employed complainant as superintendent at a salary of $114.38 per week, and from that time, up to and including May 1st following, he served in that capacity and was recognized and treated as superintendent of painters by Local Union No. 57, as well as by the officers on the job, although he was erroneously carried on the payroll of the corporation as “general paint foreman.”
The Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators, and Paperhangers of America, above referred to, (here for brevity designated the national organization) has its home office in the City of LaFayette, Indiana. It is a voluntary, unincorporated labor organization, widespread, and designed to organize as one union all painters, decorators, and paperhangers in the United States. It is comprised of an unlimited number of local unions and subordinate bodies subject to its laws and usages. It has chartered from time to time various labor unions, and is affiliated with the American Federation of Labor. Local Union No. 57 is a voluntary, unincorporated labor organization, doing business and having its principal office in Jefferson County, Alabama. Local 57 (to so designate for brevity) was chartered several years ago by the national organization, and has jurisdiction over all workmen in Jefferson County who are members of the national organization.
Complainant has, for a period of approximately twenty-five years, been a member in good standing of the national organization, and for the past seven years has been affiliated with Local 57 in Birmingham, paying all fees, dues, and assessments required of him, aggregating about $2,500.
The bill charges that, by virtue of the activity of Local 57, and the use of what is commonly known as a “defense fund,” it is practically impossible for one not a member in good standing of the national *230 organization to obtain employment or earn a living as a painter in Jefferson County, and that this condition has existed for several years preceding the filing of the **708 bill. By virtue of his membership in the national organization and his affiliation with Local 57, and the payment of all assessments, fees, and dues, complainant is entitled to certain property rights–such as death and disability benefits, as well as benefits for the death of the member's wife, and sick and burial benefits as well. Extracts from the laws of the national and local union are set out, all of which show benefits of a very substantial character, each dependent upon the continuous good standing of the member.
The bill also contains extracts from the constitution and by-laws of the national organization concerning the trial of a member. As to a local union, the trial shall be by members of its executive board; and if any member of the trial board is directly interested in the proceedings, he shall refrain from sitting and a disinterested member appointed in his stead. In short, the constitution and by-laws of the national organization contemplate a fair and impartial trial, with due notice given to a member before action taken.
The bill makes as party defendant some thirty-three members of Local 57, who are denominated “conspirators” and include among the number the vice-president, the financial secretary, the recording secretary, the chairman of the trustees, and business agent, of Local 57. It is charged that these defendants, soon after complainant was employed as superintendent and had started upon the performance of his duties, “wrongfully and maliciously combined, conspired, confederated, and agreed together, to cause appellee to lost his job, and began to devise ways and means of accomplishing that result.”
In handling the paint work on the job complainant had five foremen of painters working under him. On March 12th, 1943, one of the named conspirators, a member of Local 57, was discharged by his foreman for loafing. Complainant approved his discharge, and thereafter three other of the named conspirators started dissension among the painters. Meetings were held on the job during work hours at times when they should have been performing their duties, and these conspirators would go from painter to painter and talk about the discharge and interfere with the work of said painters, endeavoring to dissatisfy them with the treatment they were receiving. Some of the named conspirators, in furtherance of the aforesaid conspiracy, came to complainant's office and used abusive language towards him in the presence of others, because he had appointed one Gibson as foreman on the job.
At a meeting of Local 57, and in furtherance of the conspiracy, it is charged that one of the conspirators made a motion to strike on the job in violation of the contract, and in violation of the constitution of the national organization. The bill further charges that the conspirators entered into a conspiracy to slow down the painting work on the job, and some of them told the painters to slow down, that the job would not last long at the rate they were going; and that some of them “maliciously ran their fingers through plastered joints on sheetrock that had been freshly plastered and painted, which necessitated the work being done over and slowed down said job, and in furtherance of said conspiracy, said conspirators or some of them, maliciously poured or mixed paint of one color with paint of a different color, so as to render it unusable on the job, which necessitated the procurement of additional paint and delay and slowing down of the work on the job.”
It is further charged that, in furtherance of the conspiracy, the named conspirators, or some of them, assembled in the union hall, or in its anteroom, where meetings of said Local 57 were held, and signed a petition on the stationery of Local 57 addressed to the contractor corporation, in which they demanded that complainant and two named foremen be discharged. This was not an authorized or official meeting of said Local 57, and the demand was made on its stationery for the purpose of misleading the corporation and causing it to believe the action taken in said meeting was official action of said Local 57. The instrument so signed was delivered to the corporation by the business agent of Local 57, all of which was in furtherance of the aforesaid conspiracy. Following the delivery of this instrument, complainant continued to perform his duties on the job. The bill than charges that the conspirators, observing their lack of success in the attempt to cause complainant to lose employment, wrongfully and maliciously conspired to file a fictitious charge against him in Local 57 and have him expelled as a *231 member of the national organization by said Local 57. The bill then sets out the charge made against the complainant by one of the conspirators, setting up a violation **709 of Sec. 45 of the by-laws of the local union. The punishment fixed by this bylaw was the imposition of a fine, or expulsion from the union. Complainant was given notice that the charges would be heard on April 7th, 1943.
Complainant protested against anyone serving on the trial board who was interested in the proceedings, naming four members so interested. Thereupon, that particular trial was discontinued, the chairman of the board stating: “It's off.” Complainant heard nothing further of the matter until 5:30 P. M. on April 14th, 1943, at which time he received a letter under the seal of Local 57 to the effect that they would proceed with his trial, which letter was delivered to him about thirty minutes before the time set for the trial. He nevertheless appeared, and observed on the trial committee five members who were interested in the proceedings and disqualified to sit, each being a member of the conspiracy who caused complainant to lose his employment with the corporation, and each knowing that the charge was not filed in good faith but was for the purpose of ousting him from his employment by expulsion from Local 57. In addition to this, two of the members sitting were not members of the executive board, and neither of them had been appointed to the trial board by the president of the local. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding complainant's protest at being put on trial before such a trial board, the trial proceeded with a stenographic report of the testimony of each witness and all that occurred, all being attached as an exhibit to the bill.
On April 18th, 1943, the board found complainant guilty, and imposed a fine of $100. Complainant was not notified until April 24th, when he received a letter from the financial secretary of Local 57. In this letter he was informed that if an appeal was desired, he must first pay the fine imposed; and on April 28th, 1943, preparatory to taking an appeal, as provided by the constitution of the national organization, he paid under protest the $100 fine and received a receipt therefor from the secretary of Local 57. The bill then charges that, on that date, after he had paid the fine and received the receipt, the conspirators, or some of them, discovering that he was preparing to appeal to the general executive board of the national organization, and in furtherance of the aforesaid conspiracy and for the purpose of expelling complainant from said Local 57 and causing him to lose his employment, said conspirators, or some of them, constituting a majority of those present at a meeting held on April 28th, 1943, undertook to rescind the previous action of Local 57 and to expel complainant from membership in said Local 57 by making and voting a motion to rescind the action of the previous meeting assessing a $100 fine as per the trial board's recommendation, and to reconsider the matter and expel complainant from the national organization. Complainant was not present at this meeting, and had no notice whatever of any intention on the part of anyone to bring the matter of his trial or fine up for reconsideration. He had no notice that Local 57 had any intention of undertaking to expel or to consider his expulsion. He was under suspension, and had been so notified to that effect in the letter of April 24th, until his fine of $100 was paid, and was not allowed and had no right to attend the meeting until said fine was paid.
The first he knew of the action of expulsion was May 1st, 1943, when he received a carbon copy of a letter from the recording secretary of the local lodge to the general secretary and treasurer of the national organization. Local 57 caused a copy of this letter–which is set out in the bill and states the matter of expulsion of complainant from the Brotherhood–duly signed by the recording secretary and under the seal of Local 57, to be delivered to the corporation on May 1st, 1943; and after receiving this letter the corporate authorities took the position that, under the contract with the national organization, complainant could no longer work for the corporation if in truth and fact he had been expelled from said Local 57. The corporation thereafter declined to allow complainant to perform duties until this matter of membership in Local 57 was straightened out. Local 57 now claims that complainant has been lawfully expelled from membership, and that by reason thereof he has forfeited his death, disability, and burial benefits, his right to receive the official journal, his right to operate under a paid-up card, and all other *232 rights and benefits to which he was entitled under the constitution of the national organization and the by-laws of Local 57.
By reason of the fact that the sentence of expulsion is not superseded pending his appeal, should anything happen to him **710 while said appeal is pending, his separate and several benefits enumerated above would be jeopardized, if not lost.
The bill further charges that his trial was wholly illegal; that he is not guilty of the charge made against him; and that the Local 57 was without any authority, after the imposition of a fine, to rescind the action of the trial board and enter an order of expulsion without his presence or knowledge. Complainant further charges that, as a direct consequence of his wrongful and malicious expulsion, he is being deprived of the opportunity to earn a livelihood in the only way in which he is qualified to do so; that he has sustained irreparable injury and damage by being regarded in the community as an expelled member of Local 57; that he has lost $114.38 each week since May 1st, 1943, which he would have earned but for his aforesaid wrongful and malicious expulsion; that he is ready, willing, and able to perform the duties of his employment; and that his employer is ready, willing, and anxious for him to do so, but is of the opinion that to allow him to do so while he is under expulsion would be tantamount to a breach of its contract with the national organization, and would result in labor trouble on said job.
Complainant further avers that he has resided in the Birmingham district for approximately twenty-five years, and is without means of obtaining employment in other jurisdictions; that he is lawfully entitled to membership in the national organization and in said Local 57; and that he is being wrongfully and maliciously prevented from following his usual occupation in the city and district in which he lives; and that as a proximate consequence he is daily suffering irreparable injury and damage.
It further appears that, on May 10th, 1943, complainant appealed to the general executive board of the national organization from the action of said Local 57 in assessing a fine against him of $100, and also from the action of Local 57 in expelling him, and transmitted to the general secretary and treasurer his appeal in the case and a transcript of the proceedings in the trial before the board, furnishing a copy thereof to the recording secretary of Local 57. On the same date he wrote to the general president of the national organization, and also the general secretary and treasurer. The general president replied, in substance, that he could only act in strict accordance with the provisions of the constitution, and the only instructions that he could issue would be those in conformity with the decision of the general executive board after they had officially acted. The bill further discloses that the next regular meeting of the general executive board was to be held on July 15th, 1943, in LaFayette, Indiana, and complainant charges that to delay him in resuming work until that time would result in irreparable injury and damage and great financial loss.
Complainant has not been discharged by the corporation, but has been laid off by it for fear of labor trouble on the job; and he will not be permitted to return to his job until notice to the corporation that the order of expulsion has been rescinded, and that he is in good standing; that he is needed on the job every day, that his absence is materially interfering with the war effort of the United States; that he is unable to earn a living for himself and family in Birmingham as a painter until he is allowed to resume his job.
On May 14th, 1943, the general vice-president of the national organization ordered one Gill to investigate the trouble between complainant and Local 57; and after investigation, Gill reported that complainant's trial and expulsion were unconstitutional. Thereupon, the general vice-president telegraphed Gill that, in view of the undisputed fact that the trial procedure in complainant's case was in violation of Sec. 287 of the general constitution in that directly interested members served on the trial board, he should instruct the office of Local 57 to reinstate complainant, until and unless the trial is held in conformity with the constitution. The president of the national organization likewise informed Gill that the president and secretary had reached the conclusion that the trial was void, and that Local 57 be directed to reinstate the complainant as a beneficial member in good standing. Complainant charges that, notwithstanding said orders and directions from national officials, said Local 57 has failed or refused to do so; and that said conspirators, or some of *233 them, have stated that if complainant were reinstated, more charges would be filed against him, and that he would be expelled; and that others have stated that the fight to get complainant out of said Local 57 “had not started good yet.”
**711 The bill further charges that these conspirators have, by their conduct, so intimidated the other members of Local 57 (the membership being about 300) that they do not attend the meetings and take no part in the business of the local union; that in fact the membership have permitted the affairs of Local 57 to be conducted, and its business operated, by the named conspirators, who have full charge of the local union. Complainant avers, therefore, that so long as this element is in charge and control and dominates the affairs of Local 57, it will be practically impossible to reinstate him in said organization without judicial aid, inasmuch as a large majority of the members will not attend its meetings for fear of being intimidated or insulted by all, or some, of these conspirators. It is further alleged that the conspirators, or some of them, have threatened and are threatening to give the corporation labor trouble if complainant is reinstated in his position, and are threatening to cause the painters on the job who are members of Local 57 to strike in violation of their contract, and to cease or slow down work.
Complainant seeks mandatory injunction requiring his reinstatement as a member of Local 57 and of the national organization, and damages for his malicious and wrongful expulsion from the Brotherhood, and for other and general relief.

Attorneys and Law Firms

Beddow, Ray & Jones, of Birmingham, for appellants.
Horace C. Wilkinson, of Birmingham, for appellee.

Opinion

*234 GARDNER, Chief Justice.
Upon consideration of demurrer to the bill, it is of course understood that averments of fact are considered as admitted to be true. These facts are alleged in the bill with much particularity, and with the exhibit thereto, constituted a rather lengthy pleading. This was justified upon the theory that complainant was seeking a preliminary mandatory injunction, where the rule requires that the case be a very strong and urgent one to induce the court to issue the writ. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Kelley, 77 N.J.Eq. 129, 75 A. 758, 140 Am.St.Rep. 541; Powhatan Coal & Coke Co. v. Ritz, 60 W. Va. 395, 56 S.E. 257, 9 L.R.A.,N.S., 1225; 28 Am.Jur. p. 214. The salient features of the bill appear in the report of the case and need no repetition here.
Of course, it is well understood that courts are indisposed to interfere with the internal management of an unincorporated, voluntary association as is here involved. We have held that the right of a voluntary association to interpret and administer its own rules and regulations is as sacred as the right to make them, and there is no presumption against just and correct action or conduct on the part of its supervising or appellate authorities and tribunals. However, in line with the current of authority elsewhere, this court has held that such associations must act in good faith, and not violate the laws of the land or any inalienable right of their members. The constitution, laws, and regulations of such associations are in the nature of a contract between it and its members, and they, as well as the association, are bound thereby; and the expulsion of a member, if for cause within the jurisdiction of the tribunal of the association by which it is pronounced, after notice and opportunity to be heard and a trial conducted in accordance with the constitution, laws, and regulations of the association, is conclusive upon the civil courts. But, as we have previously observed, the courts are largely in accord that such associations must act in good faith. These principles were recognized in Grand Int. Brotherhood v. Green, 210 Ala. 496, 98 So. 569; and reiterated in Shaup v. Grand Int. Brotherhood, 223 Ala. 202, 135 So. 327; and News Employees Benevolent Society v. Agricola, 240 Ala. 668, 200 So. 748.
The above cases also clearly demonstrate, in connection with the facts alleged in the bill, that complainant's membership in the national organization and in Local 57 was a valuable property right. Though *235 this conclusion seems to be questioned in brief of counsel for defendants, we think it is too well disclosed from the averments of the bill to call for further discussion here. The case of Lenmann v. State Board of Pub. Accountancy, 208 Ala. 185, 94 So. 94, upon which counsel for defendants lay some stress, is not analogous as to the facts, and is inapplicable to the situation here presented.
But complainant had involved another valuable right; i. e., the right of every individual to accept and retain employment without malicious interference by third persons. This right was recognized and enforced in **712 United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Millonas, 206 Ala. 147, 89 So. 732, 29 A.L.R. 520; the principle of which was followed in the more recent case of Carter v. Knapp Motor Co., 243 Ala. 600, 11 So.2d 383, 144 A.L.R. 1177, wherein this court recognized that the right to conduct one's business without wrongful interference of others is a valuable property right which will be protected, if necessary, by injunctive process. See also Bowen v. Morris, 219 Ala. 689, 123 So. 222, 223. Under all these authorities, therefore, complainant shows a wrongful and malicious interference with a valuable property right, not only as a member of the national organization and Local 57, but also as an individual seeking to earn a livelihood.
It is clear enough, we think, from the averments of the bill, that complainant had no complete and adequate remedy at law. Certainly, a suit for damages would have availed him little. In Bowen v. Morris, supra, we observed that the matter of “awaiting the uncertainties as to quantum of damages, the delay in recovery which within itself, in a case like this, may increase them, are matters going to the adequacy of legal remedies.” This language is peculiarly applicable as to complainant's employment by the contractor corporation; and as to his membership in the Brotherhood, the averments of the bill disclose a practical impossibility for ascertainment of the damages due to his expulsion. For twenty-five years he had been a member of the organization in good standing. He is a resident of the Birmingham district, and from the averments of the bill his membership is essential in order to get employment. All of this is proper to be considered, too, in connection with his damaged reputation as an expelled member.
Clearly enough, also, the remedy by mandamus pursued in the case of Weatherly v. Medical & Surgical Society, 76 Ala. 567, would not furnish complainant adequate relief in a case of this character. The bill discloses that the contractor corporation was anxious for him to resume his work, and that he was greatly needed on the job. It was a war emergency contract where avoidance of delay was essential. The courts have very generally granted equitable relief in cases of this character. Fritz v. Knaub, 57 Misc. 405, 103 N.Y.S. 1003; Matter of Brown v. Supreme Court I. O. F., 176 N.Y. 132, 68 N.E. 145; Rueb v. Rehder, 24 N.M. 534, 174 P. 992, 1 A.L.R. 423; Independent Order, etc., of America v. Wilkes, 98 Miss. 179, 53 So. 493, 52 L.R.A.,N.S., 817; Gilmore v. Palmer, 109 Misc. 552, 179 N. Y.S. 1.
But counsel for defendants strenuously insist the bill is without equity for its failure to disclose that complainant had exhausted his remedy within the organization. This is, of course, the generally accepted rule (4 Am.Jur. p. 475), and so recognized by this court in Grand Int. Brotherhood of L. Engineers v. Green, supra. But this rule is not without its exceptions, based upon reason and common sense. If requiring exhaustion of internal remedies would, under the circumstances, be unreasonable and a practical denial of justice, or if it is clear that exhausting its internal remedies would be a vain and useless undertaking, such a course is not a condition precedent to equitable relief. 4 Am.Jur. p. 475; note to Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Miller, 142 A.L.R. 1069. The case of Rueb v. Rehder, supra, from the New Mexico court, recognizes this exception and cites numerous authorities in its support. That court, however, goes still further and notes many cases in support of the view that, where the action of the order is without jurisdiction, or without notice or authority, it does not change the legal status of anyone, and that the obligation to appeal within the order is not imposed when the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction. One of the grounds there considered for declaring the order without jurisdiction was the failure to give the accused member proper notice after the charge was made against him.
*236 But the exigency of this case does not require us to go that far. This for the reason we think the bill clearly shows that an exhaustion of the remedies within the national organization would, as to this complainant, amount to a practical denial of justice and would be a vain and useless undertaking. The general executive board, which was to review his appeal, would not meet, in a distant city, for some time; and in response to his letter the president notified him that he could only give orders as directed by the board in due course. Counsel for defendants lay some stress upon the report of one Gill, who had been ordered to investigate the matter, and the telegrams from the president and general **713 secretary-treasurer of the national organization stating their view that the trial was illegal because the trial committee had upon its members who were directly interested in the result, and that complainant should be reinstated. Our attention is not directed to any constitutional provision or by-law of the national organization which would absolutely require Local 57 to act in obedience to these telegrams. The case was yet on appeal to the executive board which, as we understand it, was the appellate tribunal for its consideration.
But, however that may be, the bill discloses that Local 57 failed or refused to reinstate him, and that in fact the named defendants, who complainant alleges formed a conspiracy to expel him from the order so that he would be deposed as superintendent on the job, were in full control of the business and affairs of Local 57, and had reiterated their determination to see that his expulsion was brought about. These averments are also to be considered in connection with others to the effect that the named defendants, denominated in the bill as conspirators, and, as stated, in full control of Local 57, first charged complainant and placed him upon trial for a violation of Sec. 45 of the by-laws of the local union, and concluded the trial by assessing a fine of $100; and that subsequently thereto, and without notice to or knowledge of this complainant, caused the local union to rescind this action, and in complainant's absence, entered an order of expulsion so as to circumvent the effectiveness of an appeal prosecuted from the assessment of the fine. Such a procedure was contrary to fundamental principles of right and justice, and could not be sanctioned by any court. The facts alleged in the bill give added strength to the charge that so long as the named “conspirators” remain in charge of the affairs of Local 57, complainant has no prospect of regaining good standing in the order. We think the case clearly presents an exception to the general rule, and that further exhaustion of internal remedies was excused. Complainant, therefore, in our opinion, has shown a case calling for equitable intervention.
As incidental to this relief the bill also seeks damages which complainant has sustained by the wrongful and malicious conduct alleged. Based upon the maxim, “Equity delights to do justice but not by halves,” is the well-settled rule, that upon granting equitable relief, the court, in order to do complete justice, will grant incidental relief though it may be such as could be awarded at law. Bowden v. Turner, 243 Ala. 182, 8 So.2d 849. It follows, therefore, that the bill is not objectionable in this respect.
As to the objection of multifariousness, there is no universal rule established to cover all possible cases. It is largely a matter of discretion, and every case must, in a measure, be governed by what is convenient and equitable under its own peculiar facts, subject to recognized principles of equity jurisdiction. It is always proper, therefore, to exercise this discretion in such a manner as to discourage future litigation and prevent a multiplicity of suits. City of Marion v. Underwood, 231 Ala. 225, 164 So. 296; Board of Education v. Baugh, 240 Ala. 391, 199 So. 822. We think it clearly appears that the purpose of this bill is single, and under this well-recognized rule the objection of multifariousness is without merit.
Counsel for defendants insist also that the prayer of the bill goes too far in some aspects as to the injunctive relief sought. But the equity of the bill to our mind is clear, and proper relief is sought. The rule is well-established that a bill stating equity and praying for proper relief is not demurrable for the reason that a prayer for further but unwarranted relief is conjoined. Rosenau v. Powell, 173 Ala. 123, 55 So. 789; Wilks v. Wilks, 176 Ala. 151, 57 So. 776.
We have carefully considered the argument of counsel for the defendants in connection with the cited authorities, and have *237 answered as best we may the salient features of this argument in what has been said. Further discussion may well be dispensed with. It is our conclusion that the demurrer to the bill was properly overruled, and that the decree should be, and is, here affirmed.
Affirmed.
All the Justices concur.

All Citations

245 Ala. 227, 16 So.2d 705
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