The only compelling governmental interest
that would justify the application of
§ 441b to the defendant's Special Election Editions, to wit, the prevention of real or apparent corruption, has not been shown by plaintiff to be implicated here. The danger that the newsletters might, like large campaign contributions, “secure a political
quid pro quo from current and potential office holders”,
Buckley v. Valeo, supra 424 U.S. at 26, 96 S.Ct. at 638, or create political debts,
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, supra at 788, fn. 26, 98 S.Ct. at 1422 fn. 26, or “pose a perceived threat of actual or potential corruption,”
California Medical Assn. v. FEC, 1981, 453 U.S. 182, 101 S.Ct. 2712, 69 L.Ed.2d 567, concurring opinion of Blackmun, J. at 203, has not been shown. The election editions were accurate tabulations of all candidates' positions on three public issues espoused by MCFL, without express advocacy of the election of a particular candidate. The costs of their composition and distribution were made without the cooperation, consultation, request or suggestion of any candidate, see
§ 431(17) of the Act, and hence independent expenditures, a fact which
Buckley v. Valeo, supra 424 U.S. at 47, 96 S.Ct. at 648, quoted
ante at fn. 5, says “alleviates
the danger that expenditures will be given as a
quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.” (emphasis added). In our opinion, this independence under the circumstances of the instant case not merely alleviates “the danger” which is an essential predicate to curtailment of MCFL's First Amendment freedoms—it eliminates it.