Nardini v. Hackett | Cases | Westlaw

*1 Plaintiffs Angela Nardini and her husband Dominic Nardini have filed this civil action alleging claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful arrest, malicious prosecution and use of excessive force, as well as state law claims for assault, battery, negligence, intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress, false arrest and false imprisonment.¹ Defendants are Ridley Township Police Officers Joseph Hackett, Sergeant Petruzzio, John Doe # 1, John Doe # 2, (the “Individual Defendants”), and Ridley Township, a Municipal Corporation. Presently before the court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 7) and Plaintiffs' response thereto (Doc. No. 8). For the reasons that follow, the Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to Counts I and II of the Complaint. The remaining Counts of the Complaint are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

For purposes of this Motion we must view the relevant facts and inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs.² On October 13, 1998, at approximately 3:20 a.m., Plaintiffs received a cellular telephone call from their son. The son explained that he had just been pulled over at MacDade Blvd. and South Avenue by Ridley Township police officers. The Nardinis immediately went to the area where their son's vehicle had been stopped in order to assist him.

Upon arriving at the location, Angela Nardini got out of her vehicle, approached the officers on the scene and asked why her son had been pulled over. The officers informed Angela Nardini that because her son was over 21, the nature of his detention was “none of her business.” They instructed her to return to her vehicle. Ms. Nardini did not return to her vehicle but instead persisted with her questioning. In her deposition testimony, Ms. Nardini admitted that she was “loud” and “agitated,” but insisted that she was not “screaming.”

Ms. Nardini then approached one of the police cars and attempted to get information from Officer Hackett, who was sitting in his vehicle writing her son's traffic citation. Initially, Officer Hackett ignored Ms. Nardini. She persisted. Officer Hackett warned Ms. Nardini two times through the open window of the squad car that if she did not cease her questioning and return to her vehicle, she would be arrested. Ms. Nardini ignored these explicit warnings and continued to demand that Officer Hackett answer her questions. In response, Officer Hackett got out of his car and grabbed Ms. Nardini by the arm in an attempt to arrest her. Ms. Nardini pulled her arm away and told Officer Hackett to “get off of me.” She then walked to her own vehicle and got into the passenger side front seat. At this time, two officers who had just arrived on the scene opened the passenger side door and removed Ms. Nardini from the car. Dominic Nardini testified at his deposition that Ms. Nardini resisted the officers' attempts to remove her from the car. Ms. Nardini was taken into custody.

*2 After removing her from the vehicle, the police pushed Ms. Nardini against the car and instructed her to place her hands behind her back. She did so while informing the police that she was being treated for carpal tunnel syndrome. The police handcuffed Ms. Nardini and placed her in a police car. She was taken to the Ridley Township police station where she was placed in a cell. Many hours later she was arraigned by a magistrate on charges of Obstructing Administration of Law or Other Governmental Function, Resisting Arrest, Disorderly Conduct, and Aggravated Assault. Bail was set and Ms. Nardini was released. The charges against Ms. Nardini were ultimately disposed of in the Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition Program (ARD) by the Delaware County Court. Ms. Nardini filed this civil action on October 5, 2000.

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must view facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Siegel Transfer, Inc. v. Carrier Express, Inc., 54 F.3d 1125, 1127 (3d Cir.1995). The moving party bears the burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact is in dispute. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585 n. 10, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Once the moving party has carried its initial burden, the non-moving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, but must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

Angela Nardini brings claims for excessive force, false arrest, and malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a cause of action under § 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) that the defendants acted under color of state law; and (2) that their actions deprived plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or federal statutes. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 184 (3d Cir.1993). The Individual Defendants, as employees of Ridley Township, were acting under color of state law at the time of this incident. Therefore, the issue that must be determined is whether their actions deprived Angela Nardini of her federally protected rights.

Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that the Individual Defendants violated Angela Nardini's constitutionally protected rights by subjecting her to false arrest and malicious prosecution.³

Arrests made by police officers are classic seizures within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (“It must be recognized that whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person.”). Warrantless public arrests do not violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments if they are based upon probable cause to believe that the person arrested has committed a felony or upon probable cause to believe that the person has committed a misdemeanor in the officer's presence. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 422–24, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976). To prevail on a claim for false arrest under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that the police arrested her without probable cause. Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 634 (3d Cir.1995); Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir.1988) (“The proper inquiry in a section 1983 claim based on false arrest .. is not whether the person arrested in fact committed the offense but whether the arresting officers had probable cause to believe the person arrested had committed the offense.”) The existence of probable cause to arrest a plaintiff is fatal to a § 1983 claim based upon false arrest.

*3 While it is clear that a claim for malicious prosecution can be brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the law governing the basis upon which a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim may be brought is not so clear. Defendants have suggested and several courts in this district have concluded that claims for malicious prosecution under § 1983 may be based only upon the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Ogborne v. Brown, , at ^*7 (E.D.Pa. June 13, 2000); Gatter v. Zappile, 67 F.Supp.2d 515, 519 n. 6 (E.D.Pa.1999); Taylor v. City of Philadelphia, , at ^*7–8 (E. D.Pa. April 1, 1998). We are persuaded by the view expressed in Martin v. City of Philadelphia, , at ^*4 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 7, 2000), where the court, citing the Third Circuit's decision in Torres v. McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169 (3d Cir .1998), concluded that a district court analyzing a malicious prosecution claim allegedly based on the Fourteenth Amendment must first determine whether Plaintiff's claim is governed by an explicit constitutional provision. If so, a malicious prosecution claim based upon the Fourteenth Amendment is precluded.

A review of the instant Complaint reveals that Plaintiff's claims center around her arrest, allegedly without probable cause to suspect any wrongdoing on her part, and the alleged excessive force used by the police in effectuating that arrest. Ms. Nardini was physically restrained, placed in handcuffs, taken in a squad car to the police department and held in a cell for hours awaiting arraignment before a magistrate. She was released on bail and ultimately, with her consent, was placed in the County's ARD Program by the Delaware County Court. Ms. Nardini's claims clearly stem from a classic seizure and are governed by the Fourth Amendment. See Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 220–23 (3d Cir.1998).⁴ Because Plaintiff's claim is governed by an explicit constitutional provision, it may not be based on Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process.

Where a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution is grounded in the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must establish the common law elements of the tort and a deprivation of liberty that is consistent with the concept of a “seizure.” See Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir.1998); Colbert v. Angstadt, , at ^*2 (E.D.Pa. April 24, 2001) (citing Gallo ). The common law elements for malicious prosecution require that: “(1) the defendant initiate a criminal proceeding; (2) which ends in plaintiff's favor; (3) which was initiated without probable cause; and (4) the defendant acts maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the defendant to justice.” Lee v. Mihalich, 847 F.2d 66, 69–70 (3d Cir.1988) (emphasis added); Thomas v. Larson, , at ^*10 n. 38 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 27, 2001). As in the case of false arrest, in order to prevail on her claim for malicious prosecution, Plaintiff must show that she was arrested without probable cause. In addition, Plaintiff must show that the criminal proceedings instituted against her terminated favorably.

*4 The issue of whether an ARD disposition is a termination favorable to plaintiff for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim has been addressed by our federal and state courts. Both have concluded that such a disposition is not sufficiently favorable to satisfy the common law requirements for malicious prosecution. see Davis v. Chubb/Pac. Indem. Group, 493 F.Supp. 89 (1980); Junod v. Bader, 458 A.2d 251 (Pa.Super.Ct.1983). Hence, Plaintiff's § 1983 claim based on malicious prosecution must fail on this basis alone.

The issue of whether a prosecution was initiated without probable cause depends upon whether, at the time of the arrest, “the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge ... were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [arrestee] had committed or was committing an offense.” Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). “Probable cause to arrest requires more than mere suspicion; however, it does not require that the officer have evidence sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482–83 (3d Cir.1995). In this case, based upon Plaintiff Angela Nardini's own testimony, the police had probable cause to arrest her for Obstructing Administration of Law or Other Governmental Function and Disorderly Conduct.

Disorderly Conduct is defined in § 5503(a) of the Pennsylvania Criminal Code, in pertinent part, as follows:

Obstructing Administration of Law or Other Governmental Function is defined in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5101, in pertinent part, as follows:

Plaintiffs have provided no evidence to counter Defendants' assertion of probable cause to arrest. Plaintiffs' position seems to be that even if Ms. Nardini was loud and agitated and even if she persisted in her attempts to talk to the police and thereby interfered with what they were doing and even if she refused to comply with the officers' instructions, this does not constitute probable cause to arrest for Disorderly Conduct or Obstructing the Administration of Law. We disagree. Accordingly, we will grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to the § 1983 claims against the Individual Defendants for false arrest and malicious prosecution.

Angela Nardini has also asserted a claim under § 1983 for excessive force.⁶ Defendants argue that a) the force used against Ms. Nardini does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation; and b) that they are entitled to qualified immunity.

When a defendant in a § 1983 case asserts the defense of qualified immunity, a district court's first task is to decide whether or not the defendant's actions rise to the level of a constitutional or statutory violation. Saucier v. Katz, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (2001); Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 298 (3d Cir.2000). If no constitutional right would have been violated if the allegations were established, there is no necessity for further inquiry concerning qualified immunity. Saucier v. Katz, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (2001). If, however, the plaintiff's allegations meet the threshold, a court must then proceed to the question of qualified immunity, i.e., whether, as a legal matter, “a reasonable public official would know that his or her specific conduct violated clearly established rights.” Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d 116, 121 (3d Cir.1996).

Looking first to the question of whether there is a Fourth Amendment violation, the question of whether the police officers used excessive force depends on whether the officers' actions were “objectively reasonable” in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137–139 (1978).

*6 In evaluating an excessive force claim, “[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment.” Graham, 490 U .S. at 396. Generally, the force used must rise above the de minimis level in order for a constitutional claim to arise. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977); Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1258 (11th Cir.2000). With these standards in mind, several federal courts have granted summary judgment to defendants on Fourth Amendment § 1983 excessive force claims, based upon a finding that the force applied by defendant police officers was de minimis. See, e.g., Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d at 1258 (“the application of de minimis force, without more, will not support a claim for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”); Garcia v. County of Bucks, (E.D.Pa. Mar. 27, 2001) (dismissing Fourth Amendment excessive force claim upon finding that grabbing plaintiffs coat and arms and handcuffing him in the course of his arrest was a de minimis use of force, and therefore not a violation of the Fourth Amendment); Bensinger v. Mullen, (E.D.Pa. Aug. 4, 2000) (finding that where force used by police in effectuating arrest and injuries sustained by plaintiff therefrom were de minimis, the Fourth Amendment was not violated as a matter of law); Allred v. Brown, 95 Civ. 4490, at 5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 1999) (RMB) (summary judgment granted to defendant on finding that grabbing the plaintiff and bringing him to the ground was de minimis use of force).

There is little dispute as to the amount of force that the Individual Defendants applied to Ms. Nardini in effectuating her arrest. This force entailed grabbing her arm in an initial attempt to arrest her, removing her from her vehicle while she attempted to resist, placing her against the side of her vehicle and placing her in handcuffs for transport to the police station. Ms. Nardini has alleged injuries as a result of the force used by the Defendants, including bruising on her arm and damage to her left ulnar nerve for which she is undergoing physical therapy.⁷ We must determine whether, as a matter of law, there is a genuine issue for trial.

Despite the fact that the Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that Ridley Township police officers “brutally beat and assaulted” Ms. Nardini, the record does not support anything other than the factual recitation of events described above. Plaintiffs have provided no evidence that the officers used any more force than was necessary under the circumstances. As a matter of fact, aside from general allegations of excessive force and the bald allegation that Ms. Nardini was “brutally beaten,” Plaintiffs make no specific allegation that the Defendants used excessive force in the process of grabbing her arm, removing her from her vehicle, or applying handcuffs.

We suppose that one might conclude, depending on one's sensibilities, that the police could have done things differently or could have used some lesser amount of force in restraining Ms. Nardini. However, given an arrest based on probable cause, we do not believe that a reasonable jury could conclude that the amount of force applied was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances.

*7 Even if we were to conclude that the issue of excessive force should be submitted to a jury, we would nevertheless be compelled to grant summary judgment to Defendants based upon qualified immunity. Whether an official may invoke qualified immunity “generally turns on the ‘objective legal reasonableness' of the action” as “assessed in light of the legal rules that were ‘clearly established” ’ when the action was taken. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 1038, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818–19 (1982)).

The Supreme Court's recent decision in Saucier v. Katz, 121 S .Ct. 2151 (2001), has resolved a long-standing debate within the circuits regarding whether the qualified immunity analysis with its emphasis on “objective reasonableness” is distinct from the Fourth Amendment “objective reasonableness” inquiry under Graham. In Katz, the Supreme Court concluded that the qualified immunity analysis is indeed separate and appropriate in a Fourth Amendment excessive force context. The Court noted that a qualified immunity inquiry “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.... ‘[T]he right the official is alleged to have violated must have been ‘clearly established’ in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates the right.” ' Saucier v. Katz, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (2001) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 640).

With this recent guidance from the Supreme Court, we are compelled to conclude that even if Plaintiff's allegations rise to the level of a constitutional violation, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Reasonable police officers in Individual Defendants' position could reasonably conclude that the force applied in arresting Ms. Nardini was proper and not excessive in violation of her clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. Under the circumstances, the Individual Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.

Count II of the Complaint alleges a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Ridley Township for violation of Ms. Nardini's Fourth Amendment rights. The claim alleges that Ridley Township's failure to adequately supervise, train, and/or discipline Ridley Township police officers resulted in the underlying constitutional violations by the Individual Defendants. See Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed2d 611 (1978). Because we have concluded that there was no underlying constitutional violation by the Individual Defendants, we will also grant summary judgment to Ridley Township on Plaintiff's Monell cause of action. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 1573, 89 L.Ed.2d 806 (1986) (“If a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of individual police officers, the fact that the department regulation might have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force is quite besides the point.”).

*8 Plaintiffs have alleged various state law causes of action in Counts III, IV, V, VI, VII and VIII including assault, battery, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, false arrest, false imprisonment, and punitive damages. Because we have granted summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs' federal law claims against all of the Defendants, we exercise our discretion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any surviving state law claims.

For the foregoing reasons, summary judgment will be granted in favor of Defendants on Counts I and II of Plaintiffs' Complaint. We decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' remaining state law claims.

An appropriate Order follows.

AND NOW, this 19 ^th day of September, 2001, upon consideration of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 7), and Plaintiffs' Response thereto (Doc. No. 8), it is ORDERED that Defendants' Motion is GRANTED as to the claims contained in Count I and Count II of Plaintiff's Complaint and Judgment is entered in favor of Defendants on Counts I and II. All of the remaining state law claims contained in Counts III through VIII are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

And It Is So Ordered