Johnson v. Knorr | Cases | Westlaw

*1 Presently before the Court is defendant David Knorr's (“Agent Knorr's”) motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 54), and plaintiff Gamal Johnson's (“plaintiff's”) response thereto (Doc. No. 57). For the following reasons, this Court grants Agent Knorr's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's § 1983 claim and remands plaintiff's remaining state law claims to the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The facts of this case are thoroughly presented in the Court's October 28, 2003 Memorandum and Order (Doc. No. 24), and are only briefly summarized here. See Johnson v. Knorr, (E.D.Pa. Oct.28, 2003).

The following facts are presented in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the non-moving party. On September 6, 2002, plaintiff Gamal Johnson (“plaintiff”), a parolee, witnessed another parolee having what appeared to be a seizure in the waiting room of the Philadelphia Office of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole. (See Am. Compl., at ¶ 48). Plaintiff asked defendant Agent David Knorr (“Agent Knorr”), a Philadelphia parole officer, to help the seizure victim. (See Pl. Dep., at 32-34; Am. Compl., at ¶ 4). Rather than coming to the aid of the seizure victim, Agent Knorr responded in a hostile manner, asking plaintiff “who the f ––– are you” and pushing plaintiff hard enough to knock him backwards. (Id., at 36-38; Am Compl., at ¶ 5). Agent Knorr then continued to push and verbally berate plaintiff, who eventually warned Agent Knorr that “[he] better call some other people out of the back or something, but don't put your hands on me.” (Id., at 44-45; Am. Compl., at ¶ 5-6).

Following plaintiff's warning, Agent Knorr instructed plaintiff to walk through the waiting room door and into the interview rooms. (Id., at 45-46; Knorr Dep., at 18). Plaintiff started to comply with Agent Knorr's command, but, before plaintiff could reach the door, Agent Knorr again pushed plaintiff from behind, causing the door to slam into Agent William Jones (“Agent Jones”), who was on the opposite side of the door about to enter the waiting room. (Id., at 45-47; Am. Compl., at ¶ 6). Plaintiff was immediately handcuffed, arrested, and transported to the 9^th District of the Philadelphia police station. (Id., at 47-49; Am. Compl., at ¶ 7).

Plaintiff contends that after his arrest, Agent Knorr fabricated a story concerning the events in the waiting room to the investigating detective, Detective Ronald Dove (“Detective Dove”) (See Am. Compl., at ¶ 7). Specifically, plaintiff asserts that Agent Knorr falsely told Detective Dove that plaintiff impeded Agent Knorr's efforts to assist the seizure victim, that plaintiff pushed and threatened Agent Knorr in the waiting room, and that plaintiff perpetrated an assault against Agent Jones by slamming the waiting room door into him. This narrative, according to plaintiff, led to the filing of charges of terroristic threats, simple assault, aggravated assault, and recklessly endangering another person against plaintiff; indeed, the prosecuting attorney testified that she made her decision to charge plaintiff based upon Agent Knorr's statements to the investigating detective. (See Am. Compl., at ¶ 9; Melissa Francis Dep., at 22-23). The charges were subsequently dismissed at the preliminary hearing on October 18, 2000. (See Am. Compl., at ¶ 12).

*2 On May 31, 2001, plaintiff filed a complaint in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas against Agent Knorr, Agent Jones, two unidentified police officers, the Department of Probation and Parole of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and the City of Philadelphia. (See Compl., attached as Ex. A to Pl. Response to Def. Supplemental Mot. For SJ., at ¶¶ 2-7). Plaintiff asserted a § 1983 claim for alleged violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments and state law claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, assault and battery, and punitive damages. (Id.). The matter was removed to federal court on July 6, 2001. (Doc. No. 1).

The City of Philadelphia was dismissed from this case on September 20, 2001. (Doc. No. 12). On October 28, 2004, following the completion of discovery, the Court entered summary judgment in favor of the Department of Probation and Parole and Agent Jones on the grounds of qualified immunity and sovereign immunity. (See October 28, 2004 Opinion, Doc. No. 24, at 11-14). However, the Court denied the motion as to Agent Knorr, finding that the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Agent Knorr fabricated evidence of an assault precluded a judicial determination of the applicability of such doctrines at the summary judgment stage. (Id., at 8-11).

On June 10, 2004, prior to trial, this Court revisited the issue of whether Agent Knorr's conduct rose to the level of a constitutional violation. (See June 10, 2004 Opinion, Doc. No. 42, at 2). The Court treated plaintiff's § 1983 claim as proceeding solely under the theory that Agent Knorr's fabrication of evidence led to plaintiff's false arrest on assault charges in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (Id.). Applying the Third Circuit precedent of Barnha v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809 (3d Cir.1994), and the doctrine that probable cause need only exist as to any offense that could be charged under the circumstances, the Court granted summary judgment to Agent Knorr. (Id., at 3-5). In addition, the Court refused to allow plaintiff to amend his complaint to assert a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim under the Fourth Amendment, reasoning that plaintiff's request was untimely and prejudicial. (Id., at 7).

Plaintiff promptly appealed, and, on May 10, 2005, the United States Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. See Johnson v. Knorr, 130 Fed. Appx. 552 (3d Cir.2005). The Third Circuit concluded that the Court properly dismissed plaintiff's § 1983 false arrest claim pursuant to Barna because Agent Knorr had probable cause to believe that plaintiff committed the crime of making terroristic threats. Id. at 554. However, the Third Circuit reversed this Court's refusal to permit plaintiff the opportunity to amend his complaint to assert a malicious prosecution claim. Id. at 555.

On May 26, 2005, plaintiff filed an amended complaint against Agent Knorr. (Doc. No. 48). Plaintiff's amended complaint asserts the same causes of action as contained in plaintiff's original complaint, but adds both a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim and a malicious prosecution tort claim under Pennsylvania law. (See Am. Compl., at ¶¶ 16, 24). Defendant answered the complaint on July 1, 2005. (Doc. No. 52). Following an abbreviated discovery period, Agent Knorr filed a motion for summary judgment on September 9, 2005. (Doc. No. 54). Plaintiff filed his response on October 5, 2005. (Doc. No. 57).

*3 In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must determine whether “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Arnold Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 786 F.2d 564, 568 (3d Cir.1986). Only facts that may affect the outcome of a case are “material.” Anderson, 477 U.S. 248. All reasonable inferences from the record are drawn in favor of the non-movant. See id. at 256.

The movant has the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of genuine issues of material fact. This “burden ... may be discharged by ‘showing’ that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catreet, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Once this burden is discharged, the non-movant must then establish the existence of each element on which it bears the burden of proof. See J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc., 909 F.2d 1524, 1531 (3d Cir.1990). A plaintiff cannot avert summary judgment with speculation or by resting on the allegations in his pleadings, but rather must present competent evidence from which a jury could reasonably find in her favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. for M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 252 (3d Cir.1999); Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir.1989); Woods v. Bentsen, 889 F.Supp. 179, 184 (E.D.Pa.1995).

Agent Knorr seeks summary judgment on plaintiff's § 1983 malicious prosecution claim and plaintiff's various state law claims. First, Agent Knorr asserts that plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim fails as a matter of law for any of three independent reasons: (i) no constitutional violation occurred; (ii) Agent Knorr is entitled to qualified immunity from damages, as his conduct was objectively reasonable from the perspective of a reasonable officer; and (iii) an arresting officer cannot be liable under a malicious prosecution theory for the prosecutor's decision to charge a criminal defendant. (See Pl. Br., at 6-10). Second, with respect to plaintiff's state law claims, Agent Knorr contends that these claims are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, as codified in 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 2310. (Id., at 12-13).

Section 1983 does not create substantive rights, but, instead, provides a remedy for the violation of rights created by federal law. Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 48 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir.1995). To make out a prima facie case of liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish: (1) that a person deprived plaintiff of a federally protected constitutional or statutory right; and (2) that the person who deprived plaintiff of that right acted under color of state law. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; see also Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-156, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978).

*4 Before assessing the validity of plaintiff's amended § 1983 claim, this Court must first define its scope. This requires a determination of the exact constitutional violations that form the legal predicate for plaintiff's § 1983 claim.

In his amended complaint, as in his original complaint, plaintiff claims that Agent Knorr's actions violated his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (See Am. Compl., at ¶¶ 24, 26). For the following reasons, however, this Court treats plaintiff's § 1983 claim as preceding under the lone theory that Agent Knorr's actions rose to the level of malicious prosecution in violation of plaintiff's Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable seizures.

First, the factual allegations in plaintiff's complaint, namely that Agent Knorr's fabrication of evidence led to plaintiff's arrest and the initiation of criminal charges against plaintiff without probable cause, suggest that plaintiff is limiting his § 1983 claim to a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, these facts form the cornerstone of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Lee v. Gregory, 363 F.3d 931, 936 (9^th Cir.2004) (deliberately fabricating false evidence that leads to criminal charges constitutes violation of Fourth Amendment); Graw v. Fantasky, 68 Fed. Appx. 378, 382-383 (3d Cir.2003) (allegations that plaintiffs were forced to defend themselves against baseless criminal charges state § 1983 malicious prosecution claim under Fourth Amendment); Spurlock v. Satterfield, 167 F.3d 995, 1005 (6^th Cir.1999) (fabricating evidence to manufacture probable cause, unlawfully detaining suspect, and causing prosecution for unfounded criminal charges constitutes viable § 1983 malicious prosecution claim under Fourth Amendment). Nor does plaintiff's amended complaint suggest how Agent Knorr's actions implicate the Fifth Amendment, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or a particular guarantee protected by the procedural due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, although the Third Circuit permits § 1983 malicious prosecution claims to proceed under the procedural due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as any other express constitutional guarantee, plaintiff's factual allegations involve the absence of probable cause to push, handcuff, seize, and cause charges to be brought against plaintiff, indeed, the absence of probable cause associated with the pretrial deprivation of plaintiff's liberty. (See Am. Compl., at ¶¶ 9-11). These factual allegations fall under the exclusive province of the Fourth Amendment. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 274-275, 280-281 (plaintiff's allegations in § 1983 claim that police officer arrested, charged, and initiated prosecution against him without probable cause should be resolved under Fourth Amendment analysis); Donahue v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371, 383 n. 18 (3d Cir.2002).

*5 Second, throughout the four-year course of this litigation, plaintiff has failed to identify in any pleading the manner by which Agent Knorr's actions violated plaintiff's Fifth and/or Fourteenth Amendment rights. For instance, when this Court initially granted summary judgment to Officer Jones and Officer Knorr on plaintiff's § 1983 claim, reading plaintiff's § 1983 claim as proceeding solely under the theory of false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, plaintiff never objected nor raised the viability of additional theories of § 1983 liability based upon Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment violations. Nor has plaintiff raised such arguments in response to Agent Knorr's instant motion for summary judgment, in which Agent Knorr expressly argues that Agent Knorr's conduct violated no constitutional provision. (See Def. Br., at 6). Plaintiff's four-year failure to articulate the factual and legal foundation behind defendant's alleged transgressions of the Fifth and/or Fourteenth Amendment implicitly concedes the inapplicability of these theories of § 1983 liability.

For the preceding reasons, this Court construes plaintiff's amended § 1983 claim as proceeding under the theory of malicious prosecution in violation of plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures.

Agent Knorr argues that plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim fails on any of three independent grounds. First, according to Agent Knorr, plaintiff cannot demonstrate a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights necessary to establish a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim. (See Def. Br., at 7-10). Second, Agent Knorr argues that even if plaintiff could establish the violation of a constitutional right, Agent Knorr is entitled to qualified immunity because this right was not clearly established, indeed, that a reasonable officer would not have believed his conduct was unlawful. (Id., at 11-12). Finally, assuming the absence of qualified immunity, Agent Knorr argues that as an arresting officer, he cannot be liable under a malicious prosecution theory. (Id., at 10).

Plaintiff brings a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution based upon Agent Knorr's alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271-272, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (plaintiff may not bring § 1983 malicious prosecution claim for alleged violation of substantive due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment; instead, claim must be based on an explicit textual source of constitutional protection); Merkle v. Upper Dublic School Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 792 (3d Cir.2000). Although some confusion continues to exist as to what elements plaintiff must meet to succeed on a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment, such as whether the elements for a federal § 1983 malicious prosecution claim coincide with the requirements for the tort of malicious prosecution under Pennsylvania law, the Third Circuit requires, at a minimum, the following elements: (1) deprivation of liberty, consistent with the concept of “seizure,” as a consequence of a legal proceeding; (2) an absence of probable cause for the initiation of the legal proceeding; and (3) termination or reversal of criminal proceedings by reason of the plaintiff's innocence. See, e.g., Backof v. New Jersey State Police, 92 Fed. Appx. 852, 856 (3d Cir.2004) (noting inconsistency in Third Circuit jurisprudence over elements of § 1983 malicious prosecution claim); Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir.2003) (stating without discussion that plaintiff needs to prove common law elements of malicious prosecution to succeed under § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution under Fourth Amendment).

*6 Agent Knorr argues that plaintiff cannot prove a constitutional violation because, according to Third Circuit precedent, the finding of probable cause as to plaintiff's arrest for terroristic threats, a finding that was affirmed by the Third Circuit in Johnson v. Knorr, 130 Fed. Appx. 552 (3d Cir.2005), renders superfluous any inquiry into whether probable cause existed for all additional crimes for which plaintiff was charged, including the simple assault and aggravated assault charges. (See Def. Br., at 7-10). Plaintiff concedes, as he must, that probable cause existed to arrest and charge plaintiff with terroristic threats, but contends that his § 1983 malicious prosecution claim survives because Agent Knorr fabricated evidence as to the assault charges. (See Pl. Br., at 13).

The Third Circuit recently applied its methodology for determining the existence of a constitutional injury in § 1983 false arrest claims-that no constitutional violation occurs when probable cause exists for any of the charged offenses-to § 1983 claims for malicious prosecution. A detailed factual and legal description of this recent decision is necessary to illuminate its applicability to the instant matter.

In Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595 (3d Cir.2005), plaintiff was drugged, abducted, and sexually assaulted by two men, who ultimately forced her, without clothes, from the location of the assault, the home of one of the perpetrator's sisters. 409 F.3d at 596-597. Plaintiff immediately sought help from neighbors in the area, but, after receiving no response, plaintiff broke back into the location of the assault to retrieve her clothes and to take belongings to identify her attackers. Id. at 597. Plaintiff sought medical treatment the following day, at which point she reported the circumstances behind the attack to the police. Id. The police conducted an investigation into plaintiff's allegations, found the sexual assault complaint to be unfounded, and charged plaintiff with a number of crimes associated with the break-in at the location of the assault, including burglary, theft, and criminal trespass. Id. at 598. Ultimately, the charges against plaintiff were dropped when the owner of the building failed to appear at the preliminary hearing. Id.

Shortly after the dismissal of the charges against plaintiff, the police reopened the investigation into plaintiff's sexual assault case, based in part upon complaints made by various advocacy groups. Id. Following the collection of DNA samples, the police brought charges against the two men who plaintiff initially identified as her attackers. Id. These individuals ultimately pled guilty and were incarcerated. Id. After plaintiff's perpetrators were arrested, plaintiff brought a § 1983 claim against the City of Philadelphia and the investigating officers for two Fourth Amendment violations: false arrest and malicious prosecution. Id. at 599.

*7 The Third Circuit dismissed both claims on the basis of qualified immunity, holding that the investigating officers' conduct did not constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment. First, the Third Circuit found that probable cause existed to arrest plaintiff for the crime of criminal trespass, on the basis that the officers were reasonably mistaken in refusing to believe plaintiff's story for entering the premises of her attackers. Id. at 603. This finding in turn compelled, according to the principles announced in Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809 (3d Cir.1994), the dismissal of plaintiff's § 1983 false arrest claim for all offenses charged, despite the district court's finding that genuine issues of material existed as to the reasonableness of the officer's belief that there was probable cause for the burglary charge. Id. at 603-604; see Barna, 42 F.3d at 819 (“Probable cause need only exist as to any offense that could be charged under the circumstances.”).

After dismissing plaintiff's § 1983 false arrest claim, the Wright Court then extended the logic of Barna to § 1983 malicious prosecution claims under the Fourth Amendment, reasoning that the existence of probable cause to arrest and prosecute plaintiff for one crime precluded any § 1983 liability for alleged malicious prosecution with respect to additional crimes. Id. at 604. In other words, the Wright Court determined that even though its “discussion of probable cause was limited to the criminal trespass claim, it disposes of her [plaintiff's] malicious prosecution claims with respect to all of the charges brought against her, including the burglary.” Id. No further caveats or limitations were placed on this logic.

The decision in Wright clearly indicates that, under Third Circuit precedent, the same methodology applies to the resolution of § 1983 false arrest claims and § 1983 malicious prosecution claims: probable cause to arrest and prosecute for a single crime defeats a malicious prosecution claim that alleges the absence of probable cause for various other offenses. Applying this standard, it is clear that plaintiff's § 1983 malicious prosecution claim must fail, as both this Court and the Third Circuit have concluded that probable cause existed to arrest and prosecute plaintiff for the crime of making terroristic threats under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706. See Johnson v. Knorr, 68 Fed. Appx. at 554-555.

Nonetheless, plaintiff asks this Court to carve out a fraud exception to the Third Circuit's methodology in Wright, or, at the very least, to distinguish the situation in Wright from the factual predicate in this case. (See Pl. Br., at 13-16). In particular, plaintiff contends that when an arresting officer engages in fraudulent behavior during the investigation and prosecutorial process, such as by withholding evidence from the prosecutor or by fabricating evidence, a separate § 1983 claim should lie for each individual charge; in other words, probable cause, if found as to one charge, should not be uniformly transferred to all additional, fraud-induced charges in determining the validity of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim. (Id.). According to plaintiff, this qualification stems from a methodological difference between a § 1983 false arrest claim, which focuses on whether probable cause exists at the time of the arrest, and a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, which focuses on whether probable cause exists both at the time of the arrest and at the time of the initiation of proceedings.¹ (Id., at 12-14).

*8 Despite its appeal, this Court rejects plaintiff's argument in favor of the application of Third Circuit precedent. For instance, the Third Circuit did not qualify its holding in Wright by acknowledging the potential applicability of a fraud exception or by imposing the requirement of a factual or legal nexus between the charges upon which a malicious prosecution claim is based. In fact, upon finding the existence of probable cause as to one charged offense, the Wright Court immediately terminated its malicious prosecution analysis. Wright, 409 F.3d at 604. Nor has plaintiff identified Third Circuit precedent holding that an officer's intentional misrepresentations, which ultimately lead to the filing of allegedly unfounded charges, permit a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim to survive when probable cause exists as to a separate offense. Although plaintiff cites the case of Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217 (3d Cir.1998), for this proposition, Gallo did not address whether a plaintiff may bring a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim for each offense that forms part of the criminal prosecution, at least when an arresting officer actively perverts the criminal justice system through the fabrication of evidence.² Instead, the Gallo decision focused on the narrow issue of what constitutes a “seizure” for purposes of a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, and, therefore, Gallo lends no support to plaintiff's argument. Id. at 223-225.

Plaintiff fails to provide case law from this Circuit recognizing an exception to the Third Circuit's holding in Wright: that probable cause to arrest and prosecute for any charge, no matter how factually or legally unrelated to the allegedly unfounded, fraud-induced charges, defeats a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim. Although this Court acknowledges the ideological and philosophical absurdities that can-and assuredly will-accompany the application of this rule,³ the Wright holding constitutes the current state of the law in the Third Circuit. Absent further clarification, this Court must apply the Third Circuit's holding in Wright and grant summary judgment to Agent Knorr on plaintiff's § 1983 claim.⁴

Plaintiff's amended complaint asserts state law claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, and assault and battery. (See Am. Compl., at ¶ 16). Agent Knorr contends that, as a Commonwealth official, he is immune from civil liability as to these claims. (See Def. Br., at 12-14).

This Court summarily rejects Agent Knorr's argument. Pennsylvania's sovereign immunity statute only applies to actions taken within the scope of a Commonwealth's official's duties. 1 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 2310 (granting immunity to Commonwealth officials and employees acting within scope of employment).⁵ Agent Knorr presumes that the alleged torts were committed while acting within the scope of his employment as a Commonwealth parole officer, but fails to present any factual or legal analysis to support this conclusion. (See Def. Br., at 13-14). Furthermore, as this Court explained in its October 28, 2003 opinion denying Agent Knorr's first motion for summary judgment on the basis of sovereign immunity as to plaintiff's state law claims, the “scope of a parole agent's employment should never require that the agent lie and fabricate a series of events, leading to the potentially unlawful arrest of a probationer.” (See October 28, 2003 Memorandum Opinion, Doc. No. 24, at 14). This finding remains the law of the case. See, e.g, United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Township of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 397-398 (3d Cir.2003) (“Courts apply the law of the case doctrine when their prior decisions in an ongoing case either expressly resolved an issue or necessarily resolved it by implication.”). Accordingly, drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving party, this Court denies Agent Knorr's motion for summary judgment as to the state law claims, finding that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Agent Knorr was acting outside the scope of his employment during the alleged commission of the intentional torts.

*9 Although this Court finds that the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not defeat plaintiff's state law claims, this Court nonetheless finds that no extraordinary circumstances justify the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over these claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when court has dismissed “all claims over which it had original jurisdiction”); Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir.2000) (noting that “where the claim over which the district court has original jurisdiction is dismissed before trial, the district court must decline to decide the pendent state law claims unless considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for doing so”) (internal citations omitted); Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 106 (3d Cir.1990) (“rule within this Circuit is that once all claims with an independent basis of federal jurisdiction have been dismissed the case no longer belongs in federal court”); Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 540 F.2d 187, 196 (3d Cir.1976) (when federal claim is dismissed, “court should ordinarily refrain from exercising [supplemental] jurisdiction in the absence of extraordinary circumstances”). Accordingly, this Court remands plaintiff's state law claims back to the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, the forum in which plaintiff's complaint was originally filed. See Hudson United Bank v. LiTenda Mortgage Corp., 142 F.3d 151, 157-158 (3d Cir.1998) (acknowledging district court's discretionary power to remand cases back to state court pursuant to § 1367(c)); Henglein v. Informal Plan for Plant Shutdown Benefits for Salaried Employees, 974 F.2d 391, 398 (3d Cir.1992) (“it is well settled that, after disposal of a federal claim, the district court has discretion to hear, dismiss, or remand a supplemental claim for which there is no independent basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction”).

For the preceding reasons, this Court grants summary judgment for Agent Knorr on plaintiff's amended § 1983 claim and denies summary judgment for Agent Knorr as to plaintiff's state law tort claims. However, because no independent basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction exists, this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law tort claims and remands these claims to the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. An appropriate Order follows.

AND NOW, this 31^st day of October 2005, upon consideration of defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 54), and plaintiff's response thereto (Doc. No. 57), it is hereby ORDERED as follows: