People v. Harris | Cases | Westlaw

Counsel have ably discussed the development of the social and legal problems involved. Every student of the law will readily admit that changes have occurred since the enactment of section 90, supra, relating to labor disputes. Local Union No. 26, etc., v. City of Kokomo, 211 Ind. 72, 5 N.E.2d 624, 108 A.L.R. 1111; Fenske Bros. v. Upholsterers' Union, 358 Ill. 239, 193 N.E. 112, 97 A.L.R. 1318; Geo. B. Wallace Co. v. International Ass'n, 155 Or. 652, 63 P.2d 1090; National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893, 108 A.L.R. 1352. Much statute law has since been enacted in the interest of labor and in its lawful rights to secure reasonable wage levels. It is quite universally conceded now that labor has the right to organize and to lawfully protect its economic interests. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., supra. It is generally admitted that the right of collective bargaining is here to stay. That this right has created corresponding responsibilities also must be recognized. The need in our economic life of organized labor as an important factor in maintaining wage levels is generally accepted.

By the great weight of authority, peaceful picketing, so long as it does not in fact involve fraud, intimidation, breach of the peace, or coercion, has been sustained in many cases. See *392 Pope Motor Car Co. v. Keegan, C.C., 150 F. 148; Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers Local Union, 165 Ind. 421, 430, 431, 75 N.E. 877, 2 L.R.A.,N.S., 788, 6 Ann.Cas. 829; Steffes v. Motion Picture Machine Operators Union, 136 Minn. 200, 161 N.W. 524; Root v. Anderson, Mo. App., 207 S.W. 255; Bayonne Textile Corp. v. American Federation of Silk Workers, 116 N.J.Eq. 146, 172 A. 551, 92 A.L.R. 1450; Exchange Bakery & Restaurant v. Rifkin, 245 N.Y. 260, 157 N.E. 130; McCormick v. Union, 13 Ohio Cir.Ct.,N.S., 545; Greenfield v. Central Labor Council, 104 Or. 236, 192 P. 783, **992 207 P. 168; Everett Waddey Co. v. Richmond Typographical Union, 105 Va. 188, 53 S.E. 273, 5 L.R.A.,N.S., 792, 8 Ann.Cas. 798, Iron Molders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 7 Cir., 166 F. 45, 20 L.R.A.,N.S., 315; Niles-Bement-Pond Co. v. Iron Molders' Union, D.C., 246 F. 851, 860; Starr v. Laundry & Dry Cleaning Workers' Union, 155 Or. 634, 63 P.2d 1104; Geo. B. Wallace Co. v. International Ass'n, supra; Fenske Bros. v. Upholsterers' Union, supra; Scofes v. Helmar, 205 Ind. 596, 187 N.E. 662; S. A. Clark Lunch Co. v. Cleveland Waiters, etc., Local, 22 Ohio App. 265, 154 N.E. 362; Great Northern Railway Co. v. Brosseau, D.C., 286 F. 414; American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 42 S.Ct. 72, 66 L.Ed. 189, 27 A.L.R. 360; Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 301 U.S. 468, 57 S.Ct. 857, 81 L.Ed. 1229; Lauf v. Shinner & Co., Inc., 303 U.S. 323, 58 S.Ct. 578, 82 L.Ed. 872; Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 2 Cir., 71 F.2d 284, Certiorari denied, 293 U.S. 595, 55 S.Ct. 110, 79 L.Ed. 688.

It is expressly stipulated in the instant case, ‘that said picketing was carried on without intimidation or coercion, and the methods employed did not involve fraud, violence, breach of the peace or threat thereof, nor did such persons commit any act or acts tending thereto.’ It clearly appears, in the light of this stipulation, that Harris was not unlawfully ‘obstructing or interfering with or injuring any lawful business.’ No legal injury of any kind resulted to any person because of his picketing activities. That the employer has the right to refuse to pay union wages and maintain union standards is conceded. Correspondingly, labor has the *393 right to decline to carry on any business relation with such an employer. Any loss which occurs in such economic controversies is damnum absque injuria. Fort v. People, 81 Colo. 420, 256 P. 325; Master Builders' Ass'n v. Domascio, 16 Colo.App. 25, 63 P. 782. There is no contention here that the picketing was not for a lawful purpose, except as charged in the information.

As already stated, regulation is not involved in the instant case. Section 90, supra, does not specifically refer to labor disputes. Its provisions include all persons. There may be situations in which this section is applicable, but for reasons already given, it cannot apply to the facts and circumstances in this case. Section 92, chapter 97, '35 C.S.A., incorporated in the same act in which section 90 is found, provides: ‘It shall be *396 unlawful to use force, threats, or other means of intimidation to prevent any person from engaging in any lawful occupation at any place he or she sees fit.’ That section was directed at what may be termed unlawful picketing. What rights are protected in peaceful picketing under the due-process-of-law provision, it is not necessary to determine. In fact, like the police power, due process of law is impossible of exact definition. In our opinion, however, section 78(e), chapter 97, '35 C.S.A., which reads as follows: ‘Giving publicity to and obtaining or communicating information regarding the existence of, or the facts involved in, any dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling any public street or any place where any person or persons may lawfully be, without intimidation or coercion, or by any other method not involving fraud, violence, breach of the peace, or threat thereof,’ and which is one of the acts under which injunctive relief is prohibited, includes the rights protected under due-process-of-law clause, subject, however, to reasonable legislative regulation. Local Union No. 26, etc. v. City of Kokomo, supra; Geo. B. Wallace Co. v. International Ass'n, supra.

It is contended that section 90, supra, is valid as a reasonable exercise of the police power. If this section, instead of prohibiting peaceful picketing, could be so construed as to be only a reasonable regulation thereof, the contention would be sound; but it prohibits all *397 peaceful picketing. Any legislative exercise under the police power which violates any right guaranteed by the national or state Constitutions is invalid. In re Morgan, 26 Colo. 415, 58 P. 1071, 47 L.R.A. 52, 77 Am.St.Rep. 269; Lovell v. City of Griffin, supra. 12 C.J. 938, 939. ‘Freedom is the general rule, and restraint the exception.’ Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 534, 43 S.Ct. 630, 632, 67 L.Ed. 1103, 27 A.L.R. 1280. It cannot be successfully maintained that guaranties of freedom of speech are less important than guaranties relating to property.

Whatever our individual views may be on economic controversies, such as are involved here, we cannot consent to legislative invasion of constitutional guaranties to the extent for which contention is made in this case. The line of demarcation between police power and constitutional guaranties is not always well defined. Where a law, such as section 90, here under consideration, impairs freedom of speech, as it does, in view of the stipulated facts before us, we have no doubt that it constitutes an invasion of constitutional guaranties, both under the state and federal due-process-of-law clauses and the mandatory provision prohibiting the enactment of laws impairing the freedom of speech.