We then determined that A3371 survived intermediate scrutiny and was “a permissible prohibition of professional speech.”
Id. at 240. This was based on our finding that the State has an “unquestionably substantial” interest in protecting citizens from harmful professional practices, and that this interest is even stronger where the citizens protected are minors, “a population that is especially vulnerable to such practices.”
Id. at 237–38. We found that the State met its burden of demonstrating that SOCE counseling posed harms that were real, not merely speculative.
Id. at 238. Specifically, we pointed to the legislative record, which revealed that various reputable scientific and professional organizations have publicly condemned the practice of SOCE counseling based on its potential to inflict harm and the lack of “credible evidence that SOCE counseling is effective.”
Id. Finally, in evaluating whether A3371 was more extensive than necessary to further the State's interest, we rejected the plaintiff counselors' argument that requiring “that minor clients give their informed consent before undergoing SOCE counseling” would serve the State's objectives just as well.
Id. at 239–40. We noted that minors are “especially vulnerable” and that they might “feel pressured to receive SOCE counseling by their families and their communities.”
Id. at 240.