While we have taken great pains to review the reasons articulated by the prosecutor in this case for his use of peremptory strikes to exclude five black potential jurors, and while we find that in this case these reasons are racially neutral, our opinion should not be construed to limit legitimate, racially neutral reasons to the reasons in this case or to hold these reasons to be automatically race-neutral in any other case. We emphasize what the United States Supreme Court pointed out in
Batson, that “ ‘[t]here are any number of bases' on which a prosecutor reasonably may believe that it is desirable to strike a juror who is not excusable for cause ... however, the prosecutor must give a ‘clear and reasonably specific’ explanation of his ‘legitimate reasons' for exercising the challenges.”
Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88, n. 20. We, too, recognize that there are any number of reasons to strike a juror that are legitimate and race-neutral. We point these out today as illustrative examples, reiterating that “the prosecutor's explanation need not rise to the level of justifying exercise of a challenge for cause,”
Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88, but may
not include the prosecutor's “assumption—or intuitive judgment—that they [black jurors] would be partial to the defendant because of their share race.”
Id. See also, Williams v. State, 507 So.2d 50, 52 (Miss.1987). We place our trust in the trial judges to determine whether or not a discriminatory motive underlies the prosecutor's articulated reasons.