Voting for America, Inc. v. Andrade | Cases | Westlaw

I respectfully dissent from the majority's stay of the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas enjoining the Texas Secretary of State from applying five provisions of the state election code against the plaintiff nonprofit voter registration and voting organizations. Because the majority completely disregards and fails to apply the Supreme Court's standards governing a court of appeals' issuance of a stay of a lower court's judgment, it erroneously grants the Secretary's motion to stay the district court's judgment pending her appeal.

The plaintiffs in this action are nonprofit voter registration and voting organizations that seek to assist African–American and Latino citizens in Texas in registering to vote and voting in the upcoming federal elections. The complaint alleged that the Secretary's enforcement of Texas Election Code provisions will prevent them from engaging in their chosen, effective methods and practices for assisting and encouraging citizens to register and to vote. After a full hearing, the district court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of five provisions of the state election code, viz., the requirements that persons providing such assistance must be residents of Texas and appointed in the particular county in which each assisted citizen resides; that assisters personally deliver to registrars all completed voter registration applications obtained within *905 five days; that assisters must refrain from copying or retaining copies of the completed applications; and that assisters may not be compensated in any way tied to the number of completed applications they submit. The district court held that the residency, in-county, and compensation provisions were unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds; and held that the bans on photocopying and mail-in submissions were preempted by the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA). The district court refused to stay its injunction, and the Secretary appealed and sought a stay from this motions panel.

The standards governing the issuance of stays are well established. As the Supreme Court explained in Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 129 S.Ct. 1749, 173 L.Ed.2d 550 (2009), “[a] stay is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise result. It is instead an exercise of judicial discretion, and the propriety of its issue is dependent upon the circumstances of the particular case. The party requesting a stay bears the burden of showing that the circumstances justify an exercise of that discretion. The fact that the issuance of a stay is left to the court's discretion does not mean that no legal standard governs that discretion. A motion to a court's discretion is a motion, not to its inclination, but to its judgment; and its judgment is to be guided by sound legal principles.” Id. at 433–34, 129 S.Ct. 1749 (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted).

“[T]hose legal principles have been distilled into consideration of four factors: (1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Id. at 434, 129 S.Ct. 1749 (citing Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776, 107 S.Ct. 2113, 95 L.Ed.2d 724 (1987)). As to the chance of success on the merits, “more than a mere possibility of relief is required. By the same token, simply showing some possibility of irreparable injury fails to satisfy the second factor.... [T]he ‘possibility’ standard is too lenient.” Id. at 434–35, 129 S.Ct. 1749 (internal alterations, quotation marks, and citations omitted).

“[A] reviewing court may not resolve a conflict between considered review and effective relief by reflexively holding a final order in abeyance pending review. A stay is an ‘intrusion into the ordinary processes of administration and judicial review,’ and accordingly ‘is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury might otherwise result to the appellant [.]’ ” Id. at 426–27, 129 S.Ct. 1749 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). A stay pending appeal is an “extraordinary remedy.” Belcher v. Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank, 395 F.2d 685, 685 (5th Cir.1968). It is well established that it is the stay applicant's burden to demonstrate that the four factors for obtaining a stay pending appeal are satisfied. E.g., Nken, 556 U.S. at 433–34, 129 S.Ct. 1749.

In the procedural posture of this case, we are considering whether the defendants are likely to be able to show that the district court abused its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction. See U.S. Student Ass'n Found. v. Land, 546 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir.2008). “A district court's determination as to each of the *906 elements required for a preliminary injunction are mixed questions of fact and law, the facts of which this Court leaves undisturbed unless clearly erroneous.” Bluefield Water Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Starkville, 577 F.3d 250, 253 (5th Cir.2009). Questions of law are reviewed de novo, but “the ultimate decision for or against issuing a preliminary injunction is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

Moreover, under this Court's precedent, the district court's denial of a stay pending appeal is reviewed for abuse of discretion: “[T]he accepted standard for review of such a stay is whether or not the trial court abused its sound discretion in denying the stay.” Beverly v. United States, 468 F.2d 732, 740 n. 13 (5th Cir.1972); see also, e.g., Wildmon v. Berwick Universal Pictures, 983 F.2d 21, 23 (5th Cir.1992) (same); Allen v. La. State Bd. of Dentistry, 948 F.2d 946, 949 (5th Cir.1991) (applying abuse of discretion standard to district court's stay ruling).

Whether or not the plaintiffs prevail in this court, the fact is that they were granted partial constitutional relief by the district court. The burden is on the Secretary to establish that the judgment of the district court should not be enforced. In my judgment, as in the judgment of the district court, the Secretary has failed to carry her burden to make a strong showing that: (1) the state will be irreparably injured if a stay is not granted pending her appeal; (2) on the other hand, there is not a substantial likelihood that the First Amendment speech and voting rights of the plaintiff voter organizations and of the citizens they seek to assist will be irreparably injured by the stay; (3) there is a strong likelihood that the Secretary will succeed on the merits in her appeal; and (4) the public interest will be served by the stay.

The Secretary has not carried her burden of demonstrating that she will be irreparably injured absent a stay of the district court's judgment during her appeal. See Nken, 556 U.S. at 433–34, 129 S.Ct. 1749; Hilton, 481 U.S. at 777, 107 S.Ct. 2113. “[S]imply showing some ‘possibility of irreparable injury’ fails to satisfy the second factor.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434–35, 129 S.Ct. 1749 (citations omitted). The Secretary introduced no evidence to show that she or the state would be injured by the injunction of the enforcement of the five election code provisions during her appeal. The majority does not find from the record that the applicant will be irreparably injured, either; it merely presumes that a state is irreparably injured whenever any of its laws is enjoined, citing statements to this effect by two members of the Supreme Court in individual chambers opinions. See Maj. Op., ante at 902–03. Those statements have not been embraced by the whole Court, however, and were made as part of a much different standard to be applied only during a Circuit Justice's individual determination of whether to issue a stay pending the Court's consideration of a petition for certiorari.¹ They were not intended as precedents to be followed by *907 the courts of appeals in deciding whether to stay judgments of district courts. Instead, those members of the Court, both chief justices, joined the Court's majorities in prescribing the standards stated above that we must adhere to in deciding whether to stay a district court judgment pending appeal in Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 129 S.Ct. 1749, 173 L.Ed.2d 550 (2009) and Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 107 S.Ct. 2113, 95 L.Ed.2d 724 (1987).

Here, the state has not demonstrated any concrete way in which it would be irreparably injured by the denial of a stay of the district court's judgment during its appeal. The five provisions at issue here are the in-state requirement, the in-county requirement, the personal delivery requirement, and the photocopying prohibition, and the compensation prohibition. The Secretary argues, without presenting evidence or proof, that the district court's injunction of the provisions will irreparably injure the state's efforts to prevent election fraud. Most importantly in the stay context, the state did not provide any evidence at all that it has experienced any specific type of fraudulent activity; it merely asserts that the enjoined laws protect against the threat of fraud.

Tellingly, the majority does not advert to, rely on, or treat as meritorious the Secretary's arguments that the state is likely to be irreparably injured because the injunction will hamper its efforts to deter and detect fraud. Thus, it is undisputed that the argument lacks persuasion. While a state may enact a law based on a hunch that it will curb fraudulent conduct, a showing that the nonenforcement of such a provision will produce irreparable injury must be based on evidentiary proof. The Supreme Court has admonished that “simply showing some ‘possibility of irreparable injury[ ]’ fails to satisfy th [is] factor.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434–35, 129 S.Ct. 1749 (internal citation omitted). The Secretary has not attempted to point to any evidence that the state will suffer irreparable injury because fraud is actually occurring, or that it is likely to occur because of the injunction of the five Election Code provisions. Without any substantiating evidence, the possibility of fraud is just that—a possibility.

The majority's mistake in finding that the Secretary carried her burden on this factor is evidently due to its inexplicable error in placing the burden of proof or persuasion on the plaintiffs rather than on the stay applicant, the Secretary. See Maj. Op., ante at 894 (“[W]e have here the somewhat circular situation of deciding whether there is irreparable harm to Andrade in part by analyzing the likelihood of success on the merits by Appellees of showing irreparable harm to them.”) The majority's “circular” notion that the plaintiffs *908 must show their likelihood of success and irreparable injury or else the Secretary is deemed to be irreparably harmed is dead wrong. The plaintiffs are not required to carry any burden in connection with the question of whether this court should stay the district court's judgment. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly held, the stay applicant, here the Secretary, bears the burden of proving all four of the factors required for a stay—irreparable injury to herself, the stay's lack of substantial injury to the plaintiffs, the Secretary's strong likelihood of success on the merits, and the stay's lack of injury to the public. There is no justification in law or warrant in the record for the majority to cast the burden on the plaintiffs and collapse its analysis into a unitary inquiry of whether the plaintiffs have shown likelihood of success on the merits.

The absence of irreparable injury to the State is made all the more dramatic in contrast to the substantial injury that will result to the plaintiffs. The stay applicant bears the burden of showing both factors: that its own irreparable injury is likely if a stay is not issued, and that the plaintiffs will not be substantially injured if the stay is granted. See, e.g., Nken, 556 U.S. at 433–34, 129 S.Ct. 1749. The majority elides most of its analysis as to whether the stay of the district court's judgment will substantially injure the plaintiffs. The majority also implicitly places the burden of proving the “substantial injury” prong on the plaintiffs rather than the defendants. See, e.g., Maj. Op., ante at 895 n. 9, 899 n. 16. In my view, it is clear that the plaintiffs' constitutional rights of expression and association are likely to be substantially endangered and damaged during the upcoming federal campaign and elections if the district court's judgment is stayed.

The Supreme Court has held that deprivation of First Amendment rights constitutes injury sufficient to establish irreparable injury. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976) (plurality opinion). In Elrod, the Court affirmed a preliminary injunction entered against state officers that barred enforcement of a “patronage” policy under which civil service employees were required to pledge loyalty to a particular political party. Id. at 350–51, 96 S.Ct. 2673. The Court held that the policy infringed on the employees' First Amendment rights. Id. at 373, 96 S.Ct. 2673. It explained, “[i]nasmuch as this case involves First Amendment rights of association which must be carefully guarded against infringement by public office holders, we judge that injunctive relief is clearly appropriate in these cases.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). “The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Id. It added that “[t]he timeliness of political speech is particularly important. The purpose of the First Amendment includes the need to protect parties in the free publication of matters of public concern, to secure their right to a free discussion of public events and public measures, and to enable every citizen at any time to bring the government and any person in authority to the bar of public opinion by any just criticism upon their conduct in the exercise of the authority which the people have conferred upon them[.]” Id. at 374 n. 29, 96 S.Ct. 2673 (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted). Therefore, the Court held that the plaintiffs were likely to suffer irreparable injury and were entitled to a preliminary injunction.

Applying Elrod, I conclude that the plaintiffs have demonstrated that if the *909 district court judgment is stayed they are likely to suffer substantial injury to their significant First Amendment rights of political speech and association. In other words, as the district court found, the plaintiffs' voter-registration efforts and voting campaigns will be hamstrung by a stay of the district court's judgment.

The plaintiffs are organizations “dedicated to helping citizens become registered to vote and to encouraging eligible voters to vote.” Voting for Am. v. Andrade, No. G–12–44, ––– F.Supp.2d ––––, , at *2 (S.D.Tex. Aug. 2, 2012). Among other avenues, they rely on voter registration drives to convey their pro-voting message and to achieve their goals of greater registration. Their mode of operation is to partner with local nonprofit and civil groups to which they provide funding; they hire temporary employees to serve as canvassers. Id. at –––– – ––––, at *2–3. Canvassers are often locally hired, but their trainers and managers, as well as some canvassers, are specially trained to conduct voter-registration drives and may come from out of state in order to engage in voter-registration efforts. The canvassers go to high-traffic locations to encourage people to register to vote and to assist them in doing so.

Crucially, the canvassers collect the applications for delivery and return them to their supervisors, who in turn perform “quality analysis and control checks by reviewing the applications for completeness and signs on fraud.” Id. at ––––, at *2. They then photocopy or scan all documents with confidential information redacted for tracking purposes and then mail them to the appropriate state office. Id. at –––– – ––––, at *2–3. This provision is important because applicants who are added to the rolls are later contacted and encouraged to actually vote. For applicants who were not added to voter rolls, the plaintiffs seek to determine if the voter was rejected for a legitimate reason and if not, the plaintiffs inform them and contact them to re-register if they are eligible. The plaintiffs also use the information to keep track of whether voters are being denied the right to vote for improper reasons, and if so, they may seek legal or political action in response. Id. at ––––, at *3. The plaintiffs also make hiring and termination decisions, based in part on the performance of their employees and volunteers in successfully registering voters. Id. at ––––, ––––, at *3, *28.

The five enjoined provisions all serve to hamstring the plaintiffs' voter-registration efforts. The in-state restriction targets the plaintiffs because many of their organizers are trained nationally and come from out of state to engage in voter registration activity. As the district court found, the organizations' efforts are materially hampered if they cannot bring people from out of state to train their canvassers and oversee the process by which the applications are collected, checked for accuracy and completeness, and returned to the appropriate state agency. Likewise, the county limitation imposes significant administrative burdens on the plaintiffs. Employees must be trained and appointed in multiple counties. In addition, canvassers usually work in high-foot traffic areas, often in metropolitan regions, where many potential voters will be from different counties. Thus, canvassers must contend with potential voters residing in different counties traveling through population centers. Especially in light of the fact that Texas has 254 counties, this burden is quite severe.

The photocopying restriction is highly detrimental to the plaintiffs' business model *910 and mode of operations because the plaintiffs photocopy or scan all documents (with confidential information redacted) so they can track the applications after mailing. See id. at –––– – ––––, at *2–3. This permits the plaintiffs to follow up with applicants and encourage them to vote, to determine if a voter was rejected for a legitimate reason and, if not, to address the problem, and to determine whether legal or other action would be advisable. It also allows the organizations to screen applications for potential fraud. If the plaintiffs do not have copies of these records, they cannot efficiently perform these functions and this crucial part of their organizational efforts would be very difficult if not impossible.

The in-person provision requires that the plaintiffs return the completed applications in person within five days or else face criminal penalties. This would impose a significant administrative burden in terms of work hours and costs because it would require the canvassers' time and effort to hand the applications in personally rather than simply sending them by mail. Because the individual who collects an application must personally deliver it within a short time period, the provision would also hamper the plaintiffs' ability to monitor the canvassers' work by performing quality analysis and control checks by reviewing the applications for completeness and signs of fraud, which could potentially take more than five days given the volume of applications. See id. at –––– – ––––, at *2–3. The possibility of criminal sanctions would likely make this provision all the more burdensome.

The compensation provisions will either force the plaintiffs to rely on volunteer staff only, which would likely decimate their available staff, or else will prohibit the plaintiffs from disciplining paid canvassers for poor performance or low productivity. The compensation provision criminalizes the plaintiffs' “practice of requiring some bare minimum level of productivity,” which is an additional injury with which the plaintiffs would be threatened. Id. at ––––, at *29. Conversely, the inability to discharge “deadweight” employees might in turn make it more difficult to function effectively and secure donors. Id. at ––––, at *31.

As Michael Slater, Executive Director of Project Vote and Voting for America, stated in his affidavit, the organizations are actually and materially hampered from engaging in their chosen form of advocacy in Texas. While “Project Vote would like to directly fund voter registration activity in Texas,” it is unable to do so “because of restrictions placed on organizations conducting voter registration drives, and the risk of criminal liability for the organizations ... [and] employees[.]” Slater Decl. ¶ 8, at 3.

The district court found that “[s]o long as the provisions remain in force, the likely violations of Organizational Plaintiffs' statutory and constitutional rights continue, and they remain unable to engage in their chosen form of political speech and associational activity.” Id. at at ––––, at *33. The plaintiffs are unable to operate and get out their message. Especially in light of the impending elections, the timeline of the appeal will likely last beyond the deadline to get people registered for the November elections, even with an expedited appeal schedule. Thus, the plaintiffs will not be able to get out their message in time for the elections, which is a significant and irreparable harm. Consequently, the district court clearly did not abuse its discretion in finding that the Secretary failed *911 to carry her burden to show that a stay likely would not substantially injure the plaintiffs.

In addition to the two “injury” factors, the Secretary must make a “strong showing” that she is likely to succeed on the merits. See, e.g., Nken, 556 U.S. at 434, 129 S.Ct. 1749. “[M]ore than a mere possibility of relief is required.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). In my view, the Secretary has not made a strong showing of a likelihood of success against either the First Amendment or the preemption claims.

The majority commits two grave errors in assessing the likelihood of success of the Secretary's argument that none of the enjoined state-law provisions violates the First Amendment. First, the majority takes an unprecedentedly narrow view of what conduct implicates the First Amendment. Second, the majority attempts to make the Secretary's showing of potential success on the merits appear stronger by claiming that the plaintiffs' burden on the merits is heavier because they are making facial challenges to the state-law provisions, an approach the Supreme Court has never required and in fact disavowed in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010).

The plaintiffs are engaged in the First Amendment activities of encouraging and assisting voters in registering to vote and in voting on election day. In their methodology, the plaintiffs complete several steps that are woven into one process. First, they furnish registration applications and persuade individuals to fill them out and consent to their being filed with the proper registrars. Second, they copy the completed applications and see that the originals are properly filed with the correct registrars. Third, they check with the registrars to make sure that the registration applications have been properly recorded. Finally, they recontact the newly registered voters and provide them with assistance and encouragement in traveling to the proper voting places to vote on election day and render assistance if it appears they have been wrongfully denied the right to register to vote. See Voting for Am., 888 F.Supp.2d at –––– – ––––, , at *2–3.

The Secretary has not met her burden of proving a likelihood of success on the merits of her First Amendment argument. As the majority opinion observes, the Secretary concedes that the speech and expressive conduct in which the plaintiff organizations engage are within the protection of the First Amendment. See Maj. Op., ante at 896–97. The majority opinion's First Amendment analysis relies on a compartmentalization of the plaintiffs' activities, reasoning (1) that the voting regulations target only the physical collection and submission of completed voter applications, and (2) that those particular activities are not part of expressive political conduct. However, the collection and submission of completed voter application materials are inextricably intertwined with plaintiffs' political speech and expressive conduct in persuading and assisting voters to register, in making certain their registration applications are delivered and recorded by the proper *912 registrars, and in encouraging and assisting the voters to actually vote on election day. Thus, all of the plaintiffs' speech and activities involved in this entire process constitute core political speech and are protected by the First Amendment.

The majority's interpretation and approach is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. Federal courts have rejected invitations like defendants' to compartmentalize core political activities from the “procedural” or “ministerial” aspects of those activities; the majority cannot point to a single federal decision that has approved the separation of expressive conduct from core political speech as it does today. The Supreme Court rejected this divide-and-conquer strategy in cases in which the Court considered whether a similar core political activity, initiative petition circulation, was protected by the First Amendment. See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 119 S.Ct. 636, 142 L.Ed.2d 599 (1999); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 108 S.Ct. 1886, 100 L.Ed.2d 425 (1988). In fact, in both Buckley and Meyer, the state made the nearly identical argument that Texas does here—it argued that its regulations targeted only the ministerial tasks of collecting and submitting the signatures on a petition. The Court was asked to compartmentalize those activities and conclude that the regulations only applied to the collection and submission of completed initiative applications—but the Court rejected the state's invitation to do so and found that all of the circulators' activities involved in initiative petition circulation were protected.

In Buckley, the Supreme Court held that the circulation of initiative petitions and attendant speech and activity is protected by the First Amendment. 525 U.S. at 192, 119 S.Ct. 636. The Court struck down a Colorado statute regulating the petition process, holding that three provisions violated the First Amendment's free speech guarantee: a provision requiring that initiative-petition circulators be registered voters; a provision requiring that initiative-petition circulators wear identification badges bearing the circulator's name; and a provision requiring that proponents of an initiative must report names and addresses of all paid circulators and amounts paid to each circulator. Id. at 186, 192, 119 S.Ct. 636.

In defending the regulations, the State of Colorado made a nearly identical argument in favor of its regulations on ballot-initiative circulation as the Secretary does in this case. Citing concerns about fraud in initiative circulation, Colorado argued that the conduct did not entail protected speech or expressive conduct: “The circulator collects the votes and presents them to [the] Secretary of State to be validated and counted. The signers depend upon the circulators to collect and submit the signatures.” Petition for Certiorari, Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc. (No. 97–930), , at *11 (emphasis added). The state contended, “the circulator assumes a public role which can be regulated.” Id. at *10. Thus, it argued that the conduct was not speech entitled to the highest protection of the First Amendment. See id.

The Court rejected this argument, concluding the conduct was important to voters to ensure that “the political process is responsive to their needs.” Buckley, 525 U.S. at 196, 119 S.Ct. 636 (quotation marks omitted). The Court held that the underlying conduct was protected speech because it entailed “communication with voters about proposed political change[.]” *913 Id. at 192, 119 S.Ct. 636. The communication at issue was “core political speech” for which First Amendment protection was “at its zenith.” Id. at 186–87, 119 S.Ct. 636 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Meyer, 486 U.S. at 422, 425, 108 S.Ct. 1886). The Court found that the plaintiffs' speech was severely burdened by the law and, applying strict scrutiny, that the significant restriction on speech was not narrowly tailored to serve the asserted state interests of “administrative efficiency, fraud detection, [and] informing voters.” Id. at 192 & n. 12, 119 S.Ct. 636. Thus, all of the speech and connected conduct was protected.

Similarly, in Meyer v. Grant, the Supreme Court struck down Colorado's prohibition of payment for the circulation of ballot-initiative petitions. 486 U.S. at 416, 108 S.Ct. 1886. There, too, the state argued that circulators' conduct is not protected by the First Amendment. Colorado argued in its brief: “[T]he petition circulator [is] the person with the public duty to determine the validity of the signatures of the persons who sign the petitions.... The position is obviously governmental in nature. The verification of signatures does not constitute speech, and the prohibition against payment of petition circulators constitutes nothing more than the prohibition against payment for the act of verifying signatures. The fact that a person voluntarily links his conduct with a speech component does not transform the conduct into speech.” Petitioner's Opening Brief, Meyer v. Grant (No. 87–920), at *12 (emphasis added).

The Court rejected Colorado's argument, holding that the activity of collecting and verifying signatures is connected with the ballot circulators' overall message. See Meyer, 486 U.S. at 421, 108 S.Ct. 1886 (“The circulation of an initiative petition of necessity involves both the expression of a desire for political change and a discussion of the merits of the proposed change.”). The Court explained, “[t]he First Amendment protects appellees' right not only to advocate their cause but also to select what they believe to be the most effective means for so doing.” Id. at 424, 108 S.Ct. 1886. Thus, the Court held that the restriction on paying the circulators “restrict [ed] political expression” by, inter alia, “limit[ing] the number of voices who will convey appellees' message[.]” Id. at 422, 108 S.Ct. 1886. The Court held that petition circulation is “core political speech” because it involves “interactive communication concerning political change.” Id. at 424, 108 S.Ct. 1886 (internal quotation marks omitted). First Amendment protection for such interaction is “at its zenith.” Id. at 425, 108 S.Ct. 1886 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court held that Colorado's “refusal to permit appellees to pay petition circulators restricts political expression” because the “inevitable effect” of the state law was to “reduc[e] the total quantum of speech on a public issue.” Id. at 422–23, 108 S.Ct. 1886.

The Meyer Court concluded that, without question, the subject-matter of the initiative petition (whether the trucking industry should be deregulated in Colorado) was a matter of societal concern that the plaintiffs had a right to discuss publicly without risking criminal sanctions. “The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment. The First Amendment was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of *914 political and social changes desired by the people. Appellees seek by petition to achieve political change in Colorado; their right freely to engage in discussions concerning the need for that change is guarded by the First Amendment.” Id. at 421, 108 S.Ct. 1886 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Further, the Court in Meyer observed that “[t]he circulation of an initiative petition of necessity involves both the expression of a desire for political change and a discussion of the merits of the proposed change. Although a petition circulator may not have to persuade potential signatories that a particular proposal should prevail to capture their signatures, he or she will at least have to persuade them that the matter is one deserving of the public scrutiny and debate that would attend its consideration by the whole electorate. This will in almost every case involve an explanation of the nature of the proposal and why its advocates support it. Thus, the circulation of a petition involves the type of interactive communication concerning political change that is appropriately described as ‘core political speech.’ ” Id. at 421–22, 108 S.Ct. 1886 (footnote omitted).

The Court explained that this “core political speech” was inextricably mixed up in the more procedural aspects of ballot circulation, but that the speech, like the solicitation of charitable contributions, was nevertheless within the protection of the First Amendment. Id. at 422 n. 5, 108 S.Ct. 1886 (citing Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632, 100 S.Ct. 826, 63 L.Ed.2d 73 (1980)). The Court stated: “Soliciting financial support is undoubtedly subject to reasonable regulation but the latter must be undertaken with due regard for the reality that solicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for particular views on economic, political, or social issues, and for the reality that without solicitation the flow of such information and advocacy would likely cease.” Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Similarly, here, whether certain communities, such as Latino and African–American communities, are underrepresented in voting in Texas is a matter of societal concern that plaintiffs have a right to discuss publicly without risking criminal sanctions. More broadly, the decision of whether to vote and participate in the democratic process is a matter of public concern. Plaintiffs seek by voter registration drives and get-out-the-vote campaigns to achieve political change in Texas; their right freely to engage in discussion concerning the need for that change is guarded by the First Amendment. Project Vote organizers “approach members of the community, ensure that applications are completed legibly and completely, and discuss the importance of voting. [They] encourage canvassers to point out that if the community wants politicians to listen to their concerns and do something about them, then the community as a whole needs to get registered to vote.” Slater Decl. ¶ 16, at 5. Canvassers “distribute and collect voter registration applications while simultaneously discussing the importance of participating in the democratic process by voting.” Id. ¶ 18, at 5. The ability to directly contact potential voters and assist them in filling out and submitting completed voter applications in person is a key way in which the organizations fulfill their mission of maximizing voter registration and “it also ensures that [potential voters] hear [their] message about how important it is to vote.” Id. ¶ 24, at 8.

*915 Like the circulation of initiative petitions, the canvassing of citizens to register to vote and to vote in elections “of necessity involves both the expression of a desire for political change” (including, e.g., the more adequate representation of historically disenfranchised voters in elections) and “a discussion of the merits of the proposed change” (e.g., the election of officials more empathetic to the needs of those voters). Meyer, 486 U.S. at 421, 108 S.Ct. 1886. This will involve an explanation of why it is important that a person as a member of a class of voters become registered to vote and actually vote on election day. Thus, providing registration applications to these classes of voters, assisting them in actually recording their registrations, and assisting them and encouraging them to vote on election day is core political speech.

Moreover, just as the Court recognized in Meyer that the solicitation of signatures often involves speech protected by the First Amendment, so should we recognize here that the state's attempt to regulate the canvassing of persons to register to vote and to actually vote on election day would infringe on that speech. The plaintiffs encourage and assist voters, especially those in historically disenfranchised groups, in registering to vote and in voting on election day. Their process involves several steps, all of which are “intertwined.” First, they furnish registration applications and persuade individuals to fill them out and consent to their being filed with the proper registrars. Second, they copy the completed applications and see that the originals are properly filed with the correct registrars. Third, they check with the registrars to make sure that the registration applications have been properly recorded. Finally, they recontact the newly registered voters and provide them with assistance and encouragement in traveling to the proper voting places to vote on election day and render assistance if it appears they have been wrongfully denied the right to register to vote. See Voting for Am., 888 F.Supp.2d at –––– – ––––, , at *2–3. The plaintiffs' registration and canvassing activities are “characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech.” Meyer, 486 U.S. at 422 n. 5, 108 S.Ct. 1886 (quotation marks omitted).

In both Buckley and Meyer, the Court refused to conclude that the ministerial act of collecting and submitting signatures for a ballot was the only conduct truly targeted by the regulations. The Court instead concluded that those activities were inherently wrapped up with the speech and expressive conduct that those signature drives entailed. Other courts have likewise rejected the Secretary's argument in favor of compartmentalizing registration procedures from protected speech and conduct. See, e.g., Bernbeck v. Moore, 126 F.3d 1114, 1115 (8th Cir.1997) (“We reject the Secretary of State's attempt to distinguish Meyer with the argument that the registered-voter requirement does not regulate ‘political speech,’ but rather the ‘process' of conducting an initiative election, thereby raising no First Amendment concerns.”).² Here, Texas is making the same argument—that the collection and submission of completed and signed voter registration applications to the county registrars is not protected conduct because it is a public function that should be divorced *916 from the expressive elements of plaintiffs' activities. The same stratagem should be rejected here. Providing, collecting and delivering voter registration applications are all inherently bound up in the core political process of registration drives and get-out-the-vote campaigns.

The majority finds Meyer distinguishable because it addressed the constitutionality of a ballot initiative circulation law, not a voter-registration law. See Maj. Op., ante at 896 & n. 11. Other than citing its “perception” that voter registration is different, Maj. Op., ante at 896, the majority does not justify distinguishing between these types of activities and core political speech although all other courts have rejected defendants' invitation to do so.

In light of the literally unprecedented nature of the majority's approach, I cannot see how the defendants have established a “strong showing” of likelihood of success on the merits, which the Supreme Court has emphasized means “more than a mere possibility of relief[.]” Nken, 556 U.S. at 434, 129 S.Ct. 1749 (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted). Faced with a First Amendment argument with such a losing track record, it defies logic how the majority can find the argument to amount to anything more than “a mere possibility” that the defendants will prevail.

Contrary to the majority's reasoning, the plaintiffs' challenges may be more correctly described as a mixture of facial and as-applied challenges to the Secretary's enforcement of state laws that thwart and burden the plaintiffs' exercise of First Amendment political speech and associational rights in voter registration drives and get-out-the-vote campaigns. The majority's conclusion that the plaintiffs cannot be making both a facial challenge and an as—applied challenge rests on a faulty premise. The concept of a facial challenge is not well settled and there is not one single test for all facial challenges; on the contrary, the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S.Ct. 876, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010) has contradicted this erroneous idea. Rather, courts apply whatever constitutional doctrine is relevant to the claim in a particular case. Id. at 919 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“[T]he debate over whether to consider this claim on an as-applied or facial basis strikes me as largely beside the point.... Citizens United has a constitutional claim ... [and] [t]he Government has a defense.... Whether the claim or the defense prevails is the question before us.”). “[T]he distinction between facial and as-applied challenges is not so well defined that it has some automatic effect or that it must always control the pleadings and disposition in every case involving a constitutional challenge.” Id. at 893 (majority opinion) (citing, inter alia, Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As–Applied Challenges and Third–Party Standing, 113 Harv. L.Rev. 1321, 1339 (2000)) (“[O]nce a case is brought, no general categorical line bars a court from making broader pronouncements *917 of invalidity in properly ‘as-applied’ cases.”). The real significance of the facial/as-applied distinction, the Supreme Court has explained, is that “it goes to the breadth of the remedy employed by the Court [.]” Id. In other words, the facial invalidation of a statute is a broader remedy than an as-applied invalidation. The remedy in a successful facial challenge is an order barring enforcement of the law in all circumstances, whereas in an as-applied challenge, the remedy is an order barring enforcement in some particular set of circumstances. See id.

Likewise, the “no set of circumstances test” that the majority appears to employ to the plaintiffs' facial challenge lacks foundation. See, e.g., Doe v. City of Albuquerque, 667 F.3d 1111, 1126 (10th Cir.2012) (quoting with approval the opinion “that the ‘no set of circumstances' language from [United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) ] constituted ‘nothing more than a controversial dictum’ and ... that ‘diligent research’ had failed to turn up ‘a single Supreme Court case—including Salerno itself—in which the holding actually relied on the ‘no set of circumstances' test’) (quoting Sonnier v. Crain, 613 F.3d 436, 463–64 (Dennis, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Scott A. Keller & Misha Tseytlin, Applying Constitutional Decision Rules Versus Invalidating Statutes in Toto, 98 Va. L.Rev. 301, 312–14 & nn. 45–59 (2012) (collecting cases)).

All this is to say, without exhaustively reiterating the facial versus as-applied debate, that the majority cannot invoke as a talisman the “facial challenge” concept to impose a higher burden that the First Amendment requires for proof of the plaintiffs' constitutional claims. The majority cannot, by this sleight of hand, shift the burden of persuasion off of the state and back onto the Plaintiffs, contrary to the burden and standards governing the issuance of stays prescribed by the Supreme Court's holdings in Nken and others. See, e.g., Nken, 556 U.S. at 433–34, 129 S.Ct. 1749. The majority's approach lacks foundation in law and is contrary to the standards governing stays pending appeal that place the burden on the party requesting the stay to establish a likelihood of success.

Applying the correct First Amendment principles, the district court justifiably concluded that the Secretary failed to carry her burden to make a strong showing that she is likely to succeed on the merits in her appeal. For the reasons stated by the district court, and for additional reasons assigned herein, I agree that the Secretary's motion to stay the district court's judgment should be denied.

The burdens imposed on the plaintiffs' core political conduct and speech make it impossible for them to conduct voter registration drives and get-out-the-vote campaigns using their chosen effective methods of operations they have employed in other states. The state argues that the restrictions imposed by its laws are necessary to prevent fraud in connection with elections in Texas. The only specific kind of fraud it identifies, however, are cases in which a voter registration worker intentionally deprives a person of the opportunity to vote by failing to deliver timely a completed registration application to the *918 appropriate registrar, or in which a person fraudulently uses a false identity to register and to vote in an election. The district court reasonably concluded that the election regulations at issue burdened the plaintiff organizations' core political conduct and speech without narrowly tailoring its restrictions to further its goal of preventing or punishing these specific kinds of criminal conduct.

With regard to the in-state restriction (Tex. Elec.Code §§ 13.031(d)(3) & 11.002(a)(5)), the district court found it was likely to violate the First Amendment because it “imposes a substantial burden on [plaintiffs'] First Amendment rights, and Defendants have not been able to explain how it substantially advances a legitimate state interest.” Voting for Am., 888 F.Supp.2d at ––––, , at *25. It imposes a substantial burden on the plaintiffs' rights because they are prevented from making use of their nationally trained staff and from engaging in their chosen mode of operation they deem the most effective. On the other hand, the state did not explain how the law advances the state's goal because the state did not produce any evidence that non-residents of Texas were any more apt to commit these wrongs than Texas residents. Id. at –––– – ––––, at *24–25. Indeed, the state introduced no evidence that these misdeeds had been committed in Texas by either residents or non-residents. Id. at ––––, ––––, at *25, *34.

As to the county limitation (Tex. Elec.Code § 13.038), the court found it was likely to violate the First Amendment because it imposes a heavy administrative burden on an organization conducting voter registration drives as its employees must be recruited, appointed, and trained in each county (and Texas has 254 counties), which would not be feasible or efficient in urban centers covering multiple counties. Id. at –––– – –––– & n. 21, at *25–26 & n. 21. Conversely, there are little or no “county-specific issues” that arise vis-à-vis voter registration, as it is a state or federal matter, and county-level registration would have a negligible impact on voter fraud. Voting for Am., 888 F.Supp.2d at –––– – ––––, , at *26–27. Thus, the law imposes a heavy administrative burden but is not narrowly tailored to achieving the state's goal of fraud prevention.

Finally, the court held that two of the three sub-provisions of the compensation prohibition (Tex. Elec.Code §§ 13.008(a)(1) & (3)) violated the First Amendment.³ The court reasoned that subsections (1) and (3) severely burden the plaintiffs' First Amendment activities because they prohibit the plaintiffs from disciplining canvassers for poor performance or low productivity and criminalizes the plaintiffs' “practice of requiring some bare minimum level of productivity,” and the statute could not and did not draw the line between bare minima and theoretical “excessively high quotas.” Voting for Am., 888 F.Supp.2d at ––––, at *29. In addition, it would make it nearly impossible to discharge “deadweight” employees, which might accumulate in the organization as time progresses, which in turn would make it more difficult to function effectively, secure donors, etc. Id. at –––– – ––––, at *30–31.⁴ The court postponed the decision of whether strict scrutiny would apply to *919 this provision, and held that it did not even pass muster under the less restrictive Anderson–Burdick balancing test. Id. at ––––, at *32. Though the state advanced a legitimate state interest (preventing voter fraud), the law is not narrowly tailored as it would criminalize common necessary employment practices. Id.

The majority concludes that the state's interests in deterring and preventing fraud are sufficient to sustain the election regulations. However, the Secretary has not introduced evidence of fraud; the majority takes it at face value that an unsubstantiated risk of fraud is enough to justify a significant infringement on the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. As Justice Thomas noted in his concurring opinion in Buckley, however, “the State has failed to satisfy its burden demonstrating that fraud is a real, rather than a conjectural, problem.” 525 U.S. at 210, 119 S.Ct. 636 (Thomas, J., concurring).

The majority's reasoning is doubly unpersuasive because, with regard to the regulations the district court found likely unconstitutional, the court not only noted that the Secretary failed to demonstrate any evidence of actual fraud, but also that the Secretary failed to demonstrate how the provisions would reasonably achieve the goal of fraud prevention. Thus, although a state need not have evidence of fraud to justify enactment of a particular election regulation, without objective evidence or expert opinion, the Secretary failed to make a strong showing that the measure actually prevented or reduced fraudulent acts and was narrowly tailored to do so.

Moreover, other laws preexisting the third-party registration law were in place to prevent fraud, see, e.g., Tex. Elec.Code § 13.007 (stating that a person commits an offense if he or she “knowingly makes a false statement or requests, commands, or attempts to induce another person to make a false statement on a registration application”); as the district court reasoned, enjoining the provisions in question were not demonstrated to materially lessen the deterrent effect of the whole scheme of applicable Texas laws.

For these reasons, the Secretary did not meet her burden of making a strong showing that she is likely to prevail on the merits. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Secretary's motion for a stay pending appeal as to the provisions enjoined pursuant to the First Amendment.

The Secretary also has not met her burden of making a strong showing of her *920 likelihood to succeed on the merits in proving that two of the Texas election provisions, the photocopying ban and the in-person delivery of applications requirement, have not been preempted by the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA).

The right to vote has long been recognized as central to the protection and exercise of the other rights guaranteed in our society. As noted by the Supreme Court in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17, 84 S.Ct. 526, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964), “[o]ther rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.” Nevertheless, many practical barriers remain that inhibit the free exercise of this recognized right. Among such barriers are restrictive or prohibitively inconvenient voter registration requirements that discourage or even prevent qualified voters from registering and participating in elections. “In an attempt to reinforce the right of qualified citizens to vote by reducing the restrictive nature of voter registration requirements, Congress passed the National Voter Registration Act in 1993.” Ass'n of Comm'y Orgs. for Reform Now v. Miller, 129 F.3d 833, 835 (6th Cir.1997) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg(a),(b)).

The NVRA reflects the view of Congress that the right to vote “is a fundamental right,” that government has a duty to “promote the exercise of that right,” and that discriminatory and unfair registration laws can have a “damaging effect on voter participation” and “disproportionately harm voter participation by various groups, including racial minorities.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg(a). Congress enacted the NVRA in order to “increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote” in federal elections, “enhance[ ] the participation of eligible citizens as voters[,]” “protect the integrity of the electoral process[,]” and “ensure that accurate and current voter registration rolls are maintained.” Id. § 1973gg(b); Project Vote/Voting for Am., Inc. v. Long, 682 F.3d 331, 334 (4th Cir.2012).

The NVRA directs states to establish at least three methods of voter registration for federal elections: “(1) by application made simultaneously with an application for a motor vehicle driver's license[,]” “(2) by mail application” using a federally prescribed form, and “(3) by application in person” at designated voter registration agencies. 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg–2(a). It further requires that states conduct a general program to remove ineligible voters from official voter lists without engaging in improper voter removal. Id. § 1973gg–6(a)(3)–(4); Long, 682 F.3d at 334.

Section 8(i)(1) of the NVRA mandates public disclosure of voter registration activities. Id. § 1973gg–6(i)(1). It generally requires states to “make available for public inspection and, where available, photocopying at a reasonable cost, all records concerning the implementation of programs and activities conducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible voters[.]” Id. “This language embodies Congress's conviction that Americans who are eligible under law to vote have every right to exercise their franchise, a right that must not be sacrificed to administrative chicanery, oversights, or inefficiencies.” Long, 682 F.3d at 334–35.

Of the eight regulations at issue in the present case, the district court entered an order preliminarily enjoining the enforcement of Texas' photocopying prohibition (Tex. Elec.Code § 13.038, as interpreted *921 by the Secretary) and personal delivery requirement (id. § 13.042), finding them to be preempted by the NVRA. When preemption challenges are brought against state election laws, the Elections Clause of the Constitution governs. See Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69, 118 S.Ct. 464, 139 L.Ed.2d 369 (1997).

“The Elections Clause establishes a unique relationship between the state and federal governments.” Gonzalez v. Arizona, 677 F.3d 383, 390 (9th Cir.2012) (en banc). The Elections Clause provides: “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of choosing Senators.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (spelling modernized). Thus, while states have the initial responsibility of establishing election laws and regulations, Congress has the authority to “make or alter” the states' regulations. The text of the constitutional provision expressly delegates to Congress ultimate supervisory authority over elections laws.

When states enact election laws that are contrary to federal election laws, the state laws are unquestionably preempted. See Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 384, 25 L.Ed. 717 (1879) (when Congress' power under the Elections Clause is “exercised, the action of Congress, so far as it extends and conflicts with the regulations of the State, necessarily supersedes them”); Foster, 522 U.S. at 69, 118 S.Ct. 464 (stating that the Elections Clause “invests the States with responsibility for the mechanics of congressional elections, but only so far as Congress declines to preempt state legislative choices”) (internal citation omitted). However, unlike preemption for ordinary laws under the Supremacy Clause, there is no presumption against preemption for state election laws that are contrary to federal election mandates. As the court in Gonzalez explained, “[i]n contrast to the Supremacy Clause, which addresses preemption in areas within the states' historic police powers, the Elections Clause affects only an area in which the states have no inherent or reserved power: the regulation of federal elections.” 677 F.3d at 392. “[T]he Supreme Court has never articulated any doctrine giving deference to the states under the Elections Clause.” Id. at 400 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring).

Under our Circuit precedent, if a state election law “directly conflicts” or is “inconsistent with” a federal election law, the state law is preempted under the Elections Clause. Voting Integrity Project, Inc. v. Bomer, 199 F.3d 773, 775, 776 (5th Cir.2000). Applying this rule, the district court held that the two regulations at issue “directly conflicted” with the NVRA and were therefore preempted under the Elections Clause.

The district court did not find it necessary to go any further than its “direct conflict” analysis. However, this court's language in Bomer finding preemption where a state election law “directly conflicts” or is “inconsistent with” a federal election law has deeper roots in Supreme Court precedent indicating that preemption under the Election Clause entails a more searching analysis than preemption under the Supremacy Clause. See id. (citing Foster, 522 U.S. at 68, 118 S.Ct. 464). Bomer reflects that there is no presumption against preemption when it comes to state laws that “conflict” or are “inconsistent with” federal election regulations enacted by Congress, consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion in Foster v. Love. *922 See 522 U.S. at 69, 118 S.Ct. 464 (stating that the Elections Clause “is a default provision; it invests the States with responsibility for the mechanics of congressional elections, but only so far as Congress declines to preempt state legislative choices”) (internal citation omitted).

As the Ninth Circuit persuasively elucidated in Gonzalez v. Arizona, “[w]hile Congress may not always choose to exercise [its Election Clause] power, ‘when exercised, the action of Congress, so far as it extends and conflicts with the regulations of a State, necessarily supersedes them.’ ” 677 F.3d at 391 (alteration omitted) (quoting Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. at 384, and citing Foster, 522 U.S. at 69, 118 S.Ct. 464). The Ninth Circuit in Gonzalez concluded that under Siebold and Foster, courts should approach preemption under the Elections Clause by reading state and federal election laws together as one single system of election law. It explained:

Applying the principles of Foster and Siebold, as explained in Gonzalez and Bomer, I conclude that the Secretary has not met her burden of showing a strong likelihood of success that the Texas photocopying ban and personal delivery requirement are not preempted by the NVRA either under the Fifth Circuit's “direct conflict” or “inconsistent with” test or under the Ninth Circuit's failure to “operate harmoniously” test.

As interpreted by the Secretary, section 13.038 flatly prohibits any person collecting voter registration applications from photocopying them before they are delivered to the registrars. The Secretary does not change her interpretation on appeal. Relying on the Secretary's interpretation of how section 13.038 is to be enforced, the district court held that the photocopying provision (Tex. Elec.Code § 13.038) directly conflicts with the NVRA provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg–6(i)(1). Subsection 6(i)(1) provides:

In Project Vote/Voting for America, Inc. v. Long, 682 F.3d 331 (4th Cir.2012), the court considered the State of Virginia's practice of prohibiting public disclosure of applications that had been accepted but rejected by registrars. Voting rights groups wanted to see the ones that had been rejected to ensure transparency in the voter registration process, and to investigate whether a group of students at a historically African–American university had been unlawfully disenfranchised. Id. at 333–34. The court held that all completed applications must be made available for copying under the NVRA. Id. at 336. The Fourth Circuit held that in this provision, because “the phrase ‘all records concerning the implementation of programs and activities conducted for the purpose of ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible voters' unmistakably encompasses completed voter registration applications, such applications fall within Section [6](i)(1)'s general disclosure mandate.” Id. The court reasoned that reviewing voter registration applications is a “program” and “activity” because it is carried out to maintain voter rolls for the state, and the registration applications are “records” that concern the “implementation of” that “program[ ] and activit [y]” because they are the means by which voters establish their eligibility to vote. Id. at 335–36. The court noted that the state was entitled to redact sensitive information, such as social security numbers, when it complied with the NVRA provision, thus obviating the state's principal concern. Id. at 334, 339. The court concluded that Virginia's provision was preempted by the NVRA. Id. at 337.

In addition to its textual analysis, the court emphasized that the NVRA expresses a policy strongly favoring transparency and public disclosure of completed voter applications. See id. at 334. The NVRA photocopying provision “embodies Congress's conviction that Americans who are eligible under law to vote have every right to exercise their franchise, a right that must not be sacrificed to administrative chicanery, oversights, or inefficiencies.” Id. at 334–35.

Following Long, the district court in the present case found that the NVRA's rule requiring states to “make available” the records for photocopying “unmistakably encompasses completed voter registration applications.” Voting for Am., 888 F.Supp.2d at –––– – ––––, , at *16–17. The sound reasoning in Long is substantially applicable to this case. As Judge Wilkinson noted in Long, the NVRA is intended to guard against franchise sacrifice to state “administrative chicanery, oversights, or inefficiencies” in the conduct of federal elections. See 682 F.3d at 335. The NVRA embodies a strong policy in favor of transparency in election regulations, which extends to the disclosure of completed voter applications. Here, the Texas provision punishing a person for retaining a photocopy of a completed application before filing is just as detrimental, if not more so, to the NVRA's mandate of public disclosure of voter registration activities. Texas' photocopying ban prevents VDRs from providing their own check (by retained photocopies) against franchise sacrifice to “administrative chicanery, oversights, or inefficiencies” that the NVRA was enacted to guard against. Texas' photocopying restriction applies to completed applications whether or not VDRs redact sensitive information; thus, it provides for punishment even if a VDR redacts voters' sensitive information from the copy. Therefore, the photocopying *924 restriction is not narrowly designed to protect voters' privacy, which could be safeguarded by laws specifically punishing use or abuse of such sensitive information. Consequently, in my view the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in deciding that there is a substantial likelihood that the Texas photocopying ban has been preempted because it is inconsistent and disharmonious with the NVRA public disclosure provisions.

Next, the district court in the present case held that the personal delivery requirement directly conflicted with NVRA provisions 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg–4(a)(1)–(2) and 1973gg–6(a)(1). Subsection 4 provides that “[e]ach State shall accept and use the mail voter registration application form prescribed by the Federal Election Commission pursuant to section 1973–7(a)(2)[.]” Id. § 1973gg–4(1). Subsection 2 states that “notwithstanding any other Federal or State law, in addition to any other method of voter registration provided for under State law, each State shall establish procedures to register to vote in Elections for Federal office ... by mail application pursuant to section 1973gg–4[.]” Id. § 1973gg–2(a). Subsection 6 likewise requires each state to “ensure that any eligible applicant is registered to vote in an election ... in the case of registration by mail under section 1973gg–4” if the form is postmarked in time. Id. § 1973gg–6(a)(1).

The district court interpreted these provisions to mean that the federal mail-in application “must be allowed in all circumstances.” Voting for Am., 888 F.Supp.2d at ––––, at *18 (citing Charles H. Wesley Educ. Found. v. Cox, 408 F.3d 1349, 1354 (11th Cir.2005).) In Charles H. Wesley, the Eleventh Circuit held that Georgia's voter-registration law prohibiting the mailing of “bundled” voter applications was preempted by the NVRA. It explained: “By requiring the states to accept mail-in forms, the Act ... regulate[s] the method of delivery, and by so doing overrides state law inconsistent with its mandates. The Act simply requires that valid registration forms delivered by mail and postmarked in time [to] be processed.” 408 F.3d at 1354.

In the present case, the district court found that federal law makes no distinction between VDRs and voters mailing in applications on their own behalf, and that Texas' in-person requirement is inconsistent with the federal law, which requires that states “accept and use” all federal mail-in applications. Voting for Am., 888 F.Supp.2d at –––– – ––––, , at *18–19 (citing Project Vote v. Blackwell, 455 F.Supp.2d 694, 702 n. 6 (N.D.Ohio 2006) (finding a state law “requir[ing] personal delivery of voter registration forms ... would clearly run afoul of the NVRA”).) Therefore, the district court held the personal delivery requirement likely to be preempted.

Texas states that it will accept all mailed in applications, regardless of whether the sender violates state law in mailing them in rather than submitting them in person. However, even if this is the case, it remains that Texas prohibits third parties from submitting applications by mail under pain of criminal punishment, even though mail-in applications must be permitted under federal law. The public is entitled under federal law to take advantage of mail-in voter applications. The Texas law punishes third parties criminally for submitting voter applications by mail when there is a federal directive to the contrary. See Tex. Elec.Code § 13.043. The NVRA *925 makes no distinction or exception for third parties, such as VDRs, mailing in applications. There is a direct conflict and certainly a “disharmony” or “inconsistency,” causing the law to be preempted by the NVRA. The Secretary bears a heavy burden of demonstrating that she is likely to succeed on the merits of her challenge, and she has not met her burden here.

Finally, a stay of the district court's judgment will not serve the public interest. See, e.g., Hilton, 481 U.S. at 777, 107 S.Ct. 2113. A stay pending appeal is contrary to the public interest because, as the Supreme Court has stated, “voting is of the most fundamental significance under our constitutional structure.” Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992) (quotation marks omitted). The laws here “reduc [e] the total quantum of speech on [the] public issue[s]” of voter registration and minority enfranchisement, see Meyer, 486 U.S. at 423, 108 S.Ct. 1886, and are likely to diminish the total number of eligible voters who are registered in Texas, especially among historically underrepresented communities.

Texas' voter registration laws unquestionably made it more difficult to register to vote, thereby decreasing the level of enfranchisement in the state. The plaintiffs' voter-registration drives “are primarily aimed at registering voters from demographic groups ... with a history of underrepresentation in the political process.” Voting for Am., 888 F.Supp.2d at ––––, , at *2. As the district court found, it is in the public interest to protect constitutional rights and effectuate the enforcement of the federal statute, and, most importantly, to ensure that all voters have access to the polls on election day. See id. at ––––, at *35. As discussed above, it is not clear how the enjoined provisions will actually help fight voter fraud; and on the other hand, the provisions are alleged to contribute to disenfranchisement of vulnerable and historically disenfranchised voters, such as the young, the elderly, the disabled, and racial minority communities in Texas.

The state's asserted interest in preventing voter fraud cannot justify the severe impingement on plaintiffs' voter-registration rights and the concomitant intrusion into the ability of many historically disenfranchised voters to register to vote. In this election cycle, two Voting Rights Act panels have refused to preclear portions of Texas' recently overhauled election law regime, finding that the redistricting and the voter ID provision are both likely to have the effect of reducing the number of minority voters eligible to vote in the state. See Texas v. Holder, No. 12–0128, ––– F.Supp.2d ––––, (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2012); Texas v. United States, No. 11–1303, –––F.Supp.2d ––––, (D.D.C. Aug. 28, 2012) (redistricting). As Judge Tatel persuasively demonstrated in his opinion for the three-judge panel, the voter ID law at issue was akin to other historical barriers to enfranchisement such as poll taxes, literacy tests, grandfather clauses, and property qualifications. Those barriers, “though race-neutral on their face,” were calculated to reduce the number of racial minorities to vote. Texas v. Holder, 888 F.Supp.2d at ––––, , slip op. at *8. The majority's opinion today, I fear, lends legitimacy to a modern iteration of these historical ballot access measures—draconian voter-registration regulations.

The Secretary has failed to carry her burden to make a strong showing that *926 there is a likelihood that she will prevail on the merits; that the state will be irreparably injured by the lack of a stay; that the plaintiffs will not be substantially injured by the stay; and that the public interest will not be harmed by the stay. The majority disregards the Supreme Court's declaration of the burden of proof and standards governing the issuance of a stay of a district court's judgment and it clearly errs in granting the stay. Accordingly, I dissent.