With respect to prior restraint, the success of such a claim depends on a showing that “potential speech” was “chill[ed] before it happen [ed],”
Brammer–Hoelter I, 492 F.3d at 1209. In order to hold the Academy liable for prior restraint, Dillon must show that the school had a custom or policy supporting the restriction,
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986), or that an employee who is a final policymaker made the decision being challenged,
Brammer–Hoelter II, 602 F.3d at 1189. Thus, Dillon must show either that Marlatt was a final policy-maker, or that she was delegated authority by the Board and her actions were ratified by the Board.
Id. As we held in
Brammer–Hoelter II, Marlatt was not a final policymaker and her actions pursuant to any delegation were not ratified by the board.
Id. at 1190. Dillon alleges that the Academy's Code of Conduct, which prohibits gossiping, justified denial of summary judgment. However, she does not explain or contend that the Code chilled her speech.
See also id. at 1183–84 (rejecting the same argument by the teachers). Dillon identifies no distinctions between the facts in her case and those before us in
Brammer–Hoelter II.