In the Matter of Nelson D. ATKIN, II et al., Appellants,
v.
ONONDAGA COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS, Respondent.
In the Matter of Robert J. RABIN, Appellant,
v.
ONONDAGA COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS, Respondent.
June 7, 1972.
Attorneys and Law Firms
***377**687*402 Frederick Alan Provorny, Syracuse, for appellants.
*403 Eli Gingold, County Atty. (Ronald J. Crowley, North Syracuse, of counsel), for respondent.
Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen. (William J. Kogan and Ruth Kessler Toch, Albany, of counsel), in his statutory capacity under section 71 of the Executive Law, Consol.Laws, c. 18.
Opinion
***378 SCILEPPI, Judge.
Petitioners, who first became county residents in September, 1971, sought to register for the November 2, 1971 general election, but were refused registration because they would not have been residents of Onondaga County for three *404 months prior to election day (see N.Y. Const., art. II, s 1; Election Law, Consol.Laws, c. 17, s 150). This proceeding under section 331 of the Election Law, challenging the 90-day New York durational residency requirement followed.
In terms of its purposes and effects, this State's durational residency requirement is indistinguishable from that recently invalidated by the Supreme Court in Dunn v. Blumstein (405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274, Supra). The pre-eminent protection against fraudulent evasion of voter standards today resides in a system of voter registration supplemented by procedures for independent verification of residence (Election Law, s 350; see, also, Election Law, ss 390—399). Though a significant population differential would suggest increased difficulty in protecting the purity of the ballot box and in guarding against wholesale voter fraud, this State's system of permanent personal registration (Election Law, ss 350—352) demonstrates that the task is far less formidable than it first appears. A policy of keeping registration books open until 30 days prior to an election (Election Law, ss 354, 355) further belies any argument that independent investigative efforts are advanced by a more lengthy durational residency requirement (cf. Dunn v. Bumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274, Supra).
On the whole, other, more viable and considerably less drastic alternatives, including systems of voter registration and the relatively simple task of independent investigation during the 29 days immediately preceding an election, are available for preventing voter fraud (Election Law, ss 390—399). Broadly imposed political disabilities, such as those embodied in durational **689 residency requirements belong to another day and under current standards are simply too imprecise to withstand constitutional scrutiny (Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274;Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 95—96, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d 675, Supra). We have little alternative but to strike such devices down.
Accordingly, the order appealed from should be reversed and the matter remitted to Special Term for entry of a judgment *406 granting the petition and ordering that petitioners be registered to vote, and declaring section 1 of article II of the New York Constitution and section 150 of the Election Law violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, insofar as they require that a voter be ***380 residenced in the State or relevant political subdivision for a period exceeding 30 days next preceding an election.
FULD, C.J., and BURKE, BERGAN, BREITEL, JASEN and GIBSON, JJ., concur.
Order reversed, without costs, and the matter remitted to Special Term for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion herein.