Once a public official proves that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority,
the plaintiff must demonstrate that the official's acts, at the time they were taken, violated clearly established federal statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.
See Harlow, 102 S.Ct. at 2738; Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Univ., 28 F.3d 1146, 1149–50 & n. 3 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc). For the law to be “clearly established,” case law must ordinarily have been earlier developed in such a concrete and factually defined context to make it obvious to all reasonable government actors, in the defendant's place, that what he is doing violates federal law.
See Lassiter, 28 F.3d at 1149 (citing
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). We have said many times that “if case law, in factual terms, has not staked out a bright line, qualified immunity almost always protects the defendant.”
Smith v. Mattox, 127 F.3d 1416, 1419 (11th Cir.1997) (and cases cited therein). In the context of Fourth Amendment excessive force claims, we have noted that generally no bright line exists for identifying when force is excessive; we have therefore concluded that unless a controlling and materially similar case declares the official's conduct unconstitutional, a defendant is usually entitled to qualified immunity.
See id.