We believe that we lack jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal. In
Johnson, id. at 319–20, 115 S.Ct. 2151, the Supreme Court held that “a defendant, entitled to invoke a qualified immunity defense, may not appeal a district court's summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a ‘genuine’ issue of fact for trial.” By challenging the district court's finding of the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to whether he intentionally discriminated against Mr. Thomas, a question of fact,
see Anderson v. Bessemer City, North Carolina, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985), Captain Talley is asking us to engage in the time-consuming task of reviewing a “factual controvers[y] about ... intent,”
Johnson, 515 U.S. at 316, 115 S.Ct. 2151. This is precisely the type of controversy that the Court concluded should not be subject to interlocutory appeal because such an issue “may seem nebulous” before trial, and because an appellate court's determination of whether there is a “triable issue of fact about such a matter—may require reading a vast pretrial record,”
id. The Court concluded that “considerations of delay, comparative expertise of trial and appellate courts, and wise use of appellate resources argue in favor of limiting interlocutory appeals of ‘qualified immunity’ matters to cases presenting more abstract issues of law,”
id. at 317, 115 S.Ct. 2151.