On appeal, Jackson makes three arguments to the contrary, none of which we find persuasive. First, he contends that the gag and banishment orders implicated more than mere employment matters, so that
Provens is not controlling. Jackson claims that the gag and banishment orders in the instant case allegedly violated his freedom of speech as guaranteed under the Ohio Constitution. The plaintiff in
Provens, however, relied on the very same freedom of speech provisions of the Ohio Constitution that Jackson invokes, and was unsuccessful. Second, Jackson argues that he asserted equal protection claims that can be sustained under theories other than § 4112 of the Ohio Revised Code. But the
Provens doctrine applies even though the statutory and administrative remedies vary from remedies that might be available through a civil action, so long as the statutory and administrative remedies are “sufficiently fair and comprehensive.”
See id. at 965. Finally, Jackson contends that he was not able to seek relief under either Rule XIII(E) of the Civil Service Commission or an action in mandamus. As discussed in Part II.C.3.b. above, however, we conclude to the contrary. The district court therefore was correct in dismissing the majority of Jackson's claims brought under the Ohio Constitution.