Following here the analysis established in the earlier cases, we examine the relevant Indiana statutes. This examination convinces us that the recodification of the Indiana statutes and the intermittent substantive changes did not alter the relationship of the county entity and the state department in such a way as to change the status of the county department for purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Indiana Code § 12–19–3–2 (1993) provides for the establishment of a county welfare fund in each county. Each fund is raised by a tax levy on all taxable property in the county. If there are insufficient funds to cover a county's obligations, the county is authorized to obtain money by issuing bonds,
Ind.Code § 12–19–3–12 through
§ 12–19–3–16 (1993), or by borrowing from a financial institution,
Ind.Code § 12–19–5–1 through
§ 12–19–5–12 (1993). In addition, a county has the power to satisfy a judgment against it by means other than resort to the state treasury.
Ind.Code § 12–19–3–28 (1993). Thus, the current statutory framework is similar to that in
Mackey. See Ind.Code § 12–1–11–1 (1976) (establishing county welfare funds to be raised by levying taxes on all taxable property in county);
Ind.Code § 12–1–11–5 through
§ 12–1–11–13 (1976) (authorizing county welfare department to issue bonds for various purposes, including the paying of judgments against the county). The court in
Mackey found these local financial powers to be of prime importance, even though the state exercised some supervision over the county departments.
Mackey, 586 F.2d at 1130–31. Because the relevant aspects of Indiana law have not changed in their essentials, we must adhere to our conclusion in
Mackey: The county welfare department is not entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. We shall therefore defer discussion of the claims against the county until our discussion of the merits of the complaint.