[T]he [c]ourt declines (1) to find the Billboard Act's provisions concerning *729 outdoor advertising severable as to the challenged provisions or (2) to sever the non-commercial application of those provisions. The Billboard Act does not explicitly address whether it could function without the on-premises/off-premises provision or without application to non-commercial speech.
A law that is content-based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government's benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of animus toward the ideas contained in the regulated speech. ... That is why we have repeatedly considered whether a law is content-neutral on its face before turning to the law's justification or purpose.
a sign advertising goods or services available on the property where the sign is located is allowed; [but] a sign on a building or other property advertising goods or services produced or offered elsewhere is barred; [and] non-commercial advertising, unless [relating to the premises], is everywhere prohibited. The occupant of property may advertise his own goods or services; he may not advertise the goods or services of others, nor may he display most noncommercial messages.
Insofar as the [State] tolerates billboards at all, it cannot choose to limit their content to commercial messages; the [State] may not conclude that the communication of commercial information concerning goods and services connected with a particular site is of greater value than the communication of non-commercial messages.
The rule against content discrimination forces the government to limit all speech—including speech the government does not want to limit—if it is going to restrict any speech at all. By deterring the government from exempting speech [that] the government prefers, the Supreme Court has helped to ensure that [the] government only limits any speech when it is quite certain that it desires to do so.
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